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Letter from the editor 
his is the first issue of Workers of the World - International Journal on 
Strikes and Social Conflicts. 
Workers of the World is the journal of the International Association Strikes 
and Social Conflicts, born of the International Conference Strikes and Social 
Conflicts, held in Lisbon, UNL, on 16-20 March 2011. The Association has 
already the participation of more than two dozen academic institutions from 
Europe, Africa, North and South America. 
Workers of the World is an academic journal with peer review published in 
English, for which original manuscripts may be submitted in Spanish, 
French, English, Italian and Portuguese. It publishes original articles, 
interviews and book reviews in the field of labour history and social 
conflicts in an interdisciplinary, global, long term historical and non 
Eurocentric perspective. 
In this first issue we have a dossier on Strikes and Revolution, with articles 
by Alice K. Pate, Kevin Murphy, Michael Seidman and William A. Pelz. 
We also have articles by Richard Roman and Edur Velasco on a century of 
strikes in Mexico, Verity Burgmann and Meredith Burgmann on the 
Australian builders labourers in the 1970s and Anna Koumandaraki on the 
controversy in the Greek trade union movement over a state-centred 
approach to labour movement theory. 
Workers of the World welcomes articles about crisis, working classes, 
internationalism, unions, organization, peasants, women, memory, 
propaganda and media, methodology, theory, protest, strikes, slavery, 
comparative studies, statistics, revolutions, cultures of resistance, race, 
among other subjects. 
Articles should be sent, according to the Editorial and publishing rules that 
you may find in our site (http://workeroftheworldjournal.net/), to the 
executive editor at workersoftheworld2012@yahoo.co.uk. 
We also invite you to visit the site of the International Association Strikes 
and Social Conflicts at http://iassc-mshdijon.in2p3.fr/. 
Welcome to Workers of the World! 
 
António Simões do Paço  
Executive Editor
T 
  
DOSSIER: STRIKES AND REVOLUTION 
The Party as Vanguard: The Role of the Russian Social 
Democratic Party in Strikes in St. Petersburg, 1912–1914 
Alice K. Pate 
ussian revolutionaries reading Marx looked in vain for a comprehensive 
organizational and tactical framework for political parties. The theoretician 
Plekhanov, who adapted Marx to Russian socialism, relied upon the 
definition of the Party found in the Communist Manifesto: 
Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other 
working–class parties [...] (they are) the most advanced and 
resolute section of the working–class parties of every country, 
that section which pushes forward all others [...] they have over 
the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly 
understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate 
general results of the proletarian movement.
1
 
Marx offered both a broad and narrow definition of the term party. 
Marx and Engels also required the party to "support every revolutionary 
movement against the existing social and political order of things." Marx 
                                               
1 Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. Collected Works, vol. 6  Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1975, p. 497. 
R 
  
warned workers they should prepare for revolution by "taking up their 
position as an independent party [...] and by not allowing themselves to be 
misled for a single moment by the hypocritical phrases of the democratic 
petty bourgeoisie."
2
  From Marx, the party member acquires a dual identity 
as a conscious guiding party leader and an observer who follows objective 
reality. In addition to problems of revolutionary identity, if the Communists 
are to be the most politically conscious and most organized part of the mass 
workers' party, parties such as those envisioned by Marx had to exist. But, 
what would be the nature of such parties in Russia?  Furthermore, what, 
according to Marx, is the role of the conscious revolutionary in developing 
political consciousness?   
Russian Social Democrats (SDs) carried out a prolonged theoretical 
debate on these issues in exile outside of Russia that had little to do with 
Russian realities. This changed after the 1905 Revolution. Legal societies 
became possible in 1906 and party activists embraced the new opportunities 
available to organize clubs, unions, libraries and educational societies with 
workers, especially in St. Petersburg. The Russian labor movement refused 
to align itself with either the Menshevik or Bolshevik wing of the Russian 
Social Democratic Party.
3
  In place of a party identity, worker activists 
sought a united campaign against capital and the tsarist state.  
Studies of the revolutionary movement from1906-14, shaped first by 
the memoir literature and debates among émigrés, focus on the decline of 
underground activity during these years. By 1908, a theoretical debate about 
the role of legal work in the movement, the “Liquidationist Controversy” 
                                               
2 Ibid., vol.10, p.287. 
3 Soviet and western historians have examined these years within the context of factional 
debate between Bolshevism and Menshevism. See Leopold Haimson’s two part article: 
The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917. Slavic Review (part 1) 23, 
no. 4, December 1964,  pp. 619-42, and (part 2) 24, no. 1,  March 1965, p.1-22. 
Haimson argued that Bolshevik hegemony was achieved in 1912-14 because of 
increased radicalization of the working class and the similarity between more radical 
worker demands and Bolshevik slogans. Haimson also credits a generational struggle in 
the union for Bolshevik hegemony, an argument refuted in Bonnell, Victoria. Roots of 
Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-
1914. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1983, pp. 395-6; See also 
Swain, Geoffrey. Social Democracy and the Legal Labour Movement, 1906-14. 
London: Macmillan, 1983; Hogan, Heather. Forging Revolution: Metalworkers, 
Managers, and the State in St. Petersburg, 1890-1914. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1993; Arutiunov, G.A.  Rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v period novogo 
revoliutsionnogo pod'ema, 1910–1914 gg. Moscow: Nauka, 1975; Kruze, E.E. 
Polozhenie rabochego klassa Rossii v 1900–1914 gg., Leningrad: Nauka, 1976. 
  
dominated Social Democratic journals. Lenin, in an attempt to marginalize 
legal activity, accused Menshevik party workers of attempting to “liquidate” 
the underground. While debates continued in the party press, party and non-
party activists inside Russia combined legal and illegal work in clubs, 
libraries, enlightenment societies, cooperatives and unions that strengthened 
the movement as a whole. Submerging party within the movement, these 
activists collaborated to organize excursions, libraries, print newspapers and 
journals and to organize strikes and demonstrations. From 1912-14, many of 
these collaborators won seats on governing bodies of workers’ associations. 
Elected on “Marxist” platforms supported by Pravda and the Bolsheviks, 
their victory often was presented in the historiography as a Bolshevik 
victory over the revisionist “Menshevik Liquidators.” Bolshevik activists 
were ascribed revolutionary characteristics that best reflected the demands 
of the radicalized working class movement. According to this interpretation, 
the expanding strike movement abandoned simple trade unionism and 
increasingly voiced political demands.  
Recent research has indicated that the Bolshevik faction was no 
more revolutionary than the Menshevik in this period.
4
 Both party factions, 
especially those in exile, rejected spontaneous strikes and sought a guiding 
role in the development of working-class consciousness in this period. 
Fearful of police repression, the Mensheviks hoped to limit strike activity to 
preserve the movement. Bolsheviks remained distrustful of the masses and 
often refused to join strikes planned by activists inside Russia.   
Labor radicalism challenged party institutions thinned by repression 
and political infighting. The Leninists had few ties to local groups. In St. 
Petersburg, Bolshevik conciliators in Kolpino, Neva, Gorodskii and 
Vasileostrov districts merged with the Vperedists from Petersburg Side and 
Vasileostrov to form the Central Group of Social Democratic Workers of St. 
Petersburg. They were not reliable Leninists. Some individual Party 
                                               
4 See for example, Melancon, Michael and Pate, Alice K. eds., New Labor History: Worker 
Identity and Experience in Russia, 1840-1918.  Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2002; Pate, Alice. St. Petersburg Workers and the Implementation of the Social 
Insurance Law. In: McCaffrey, Susan and Melancon, Michael eds, Russia in the 
European Context, 1789-1914: A Member of the Family. London: Palgrave Macmillan,  
2005,  pp. 189-202; Melancon, Michael.Lena Goldfields Massacre and the Crisis of  the 
Late Tsarist State. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2006; Pate, 
Alice. May Day and Late Imperial Russia: Workers’ Voices, 1891-1914. In: Steinberg, 
John and Wade, Rex eds., Making of Russian History: Society, Culture, and the Politics 
of Modern Russia, Essays in Honor of Allan K. Wildman.  Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 
2009, pp.75-90. 
  
Mensheviks, who upheld the authority of the illegal party, joined the Central 
Group. Other nonfactional SD circles included the "Group of Social 
Democratic Workers of St. Petersburg" in Vyborg district and the "Group of 
Social Democratic Workers" in Narva district which by 1912 was tied to the 
Menshevik Initiative Group.5 Finally the Mezhrainoka or the Interdistrict 
Group became one of the most active SD groups in the capital. Close to 
Trotsky, its members included Bolshevik conciliators in the Petersburg 
Metalworkers' Union, A.M. Novoselov, P.I. Nikolaev and A.S. Kiselev, and 
SD deputies A.F. Burianov and N.M. Egorov. The Mezhrainoka denied the 
legitimacy of decisions taken at Prague and urged unity of all "revolutionary 
Social Democrats."
6
 In May 1914, the Mezhrainoka collaborated to 
distribute Plekhanov's newspaper, Edinstvo.
7
   
The strongest Menshevik organization was the Central Initiative 
Group formed after a secret conference in January 1911. The Initiative 
Group hoped to unite both legal and illegal groups throughout Russia and 
included workers as well as Menshevik praktiki such as I.A. Isuv, V. Ezhov, 
I.S. Astrov, P.A. Garvi, K.A. Gvozdev, K.M. Ermolaev, Eva Broido, 
secretary of the Organizational Committee and the trade union leaders, A.N. 
Smirnov and V.M. Abrosimov.
8
 In all, seven district initiative groups were 
established at Moscow, Narva, Neva, Gorodskii, Vyborg, Petersburg Side 
and Vasileostrov encompassing a membership of around 100.
9
 By 1913, the 
predominance of intellectuals over workers in the Initiative Group was 
drastically altered. Although the Group's existence was sporadic, a total of 
sixteen workers, four of these members of the Metallists' Union, participated 
throughout the year. The active intellectuals were the veteran Mensheviks, 
Feodor Dan, Isuv and S.M. Shvarts, a former Bolshevik. By the end of the 
year and into 1914, Dan and Iulii Martov began to encourage an expansion 
                                               
5 I. Iurenev, "Mezhrainoka, 1911–1917," Proletarskaia revolutsiia, 24, 1924,  p.114; 
Iakovlev, I, Aprel'sko–maiskie dni 1912 goda v Peterburge. Krasnaia letopis.  3, 1925, 
p.228; Rabochaia gazeta 4/5, 28/15 April 1911, p.4. 
6 Iurenev, I. "Mezhrainoka," 24, 1924, pp:115–16; Bulkin "Departament politsii i soiuz 
metallistov," Krasnaia letopis', 9, 1923, p.137. 
7 Iurenev,  I, "Mezhrainoka," pp.116–125; Liubimov, A.I."Neobkhodimaia raziasneniia" 
Edinstvo, 1, 18 May 1914. 
8 Listok golosa sotsialdemokrata ,1,  25 June 1911, p.3 ; See Larin, Iu. Puti sozdaniia. Delo 
zhizni, 7, 1911, pp.:13–20. Many of these had signed the Open Letter in Golos Sotsial–
demokrata in 1910. See Chapter V above. 
9 Izveshchenie o konferentsii organizatsii RSDRP  New York: Krauss International 
Publications, 1982, p. 10; Dan to Akselrod, 11 May 1912. In: Saper, Boris, ed. 
Theodore Dan Letters,(1899–1946).  Amsterdam:  IISG, 1985, p.261. 
  
of illegal activity through the district initiative groups. The Central Initiative 
Group failed to recover from arrests in 1914.
10
  
The Menshevik central apparatus elected at the Vienna conference in 
August 1912 had a varied existence. The Menshevik Organization 
Committee (OK) included the trade unionist A.N. Smirnov, Petr Garvi, an 
active party worker, Eva Broido, secretary until her arrest in January 1913 
and the lawyer, Baturskii.
11
 In late 1912, the OK set up district committees 
which were decimated by arrests in February 1913. Throughout 1913, the 
only successful meetings of the OK occurred in April.
12
 By early 1914, the 
OK renewed legislative work, calling for freedom of coalition, 
democratization of city governments and abolition of the Pale, but 
simultaneously promoted the formation of illegal cells. Menshevik cells 
existed in educational societies and trade unions throughout the capital 
before the war and Duma deputies met with Garvi, Dan, Martov and 
Baturskii to discuss political activity in clubs and the organization of 
insurance centers. The OK, Vperedists and Party Mensheviks formed the 3 
July Bloc at the Unity Congress sponsored by the International and held in 
Brussels from 3–5 July 1914.13 The Menshevik network, though broad, was 
disconnected due to continual arrests.  
The only formal Bolshevik organization, the Petersburg Committee 
(PK), was not consistently loyal to Prague. Reincarnated repeatedly from 
1912–14, the PK leadership fluctuated between conciliators, Vperedists and 
Leninists. In February 1912, all its members were workers, six from Putilov. 
Party activist I. Iurenev complained that the PK was not united and had no 
central leadership and E.P. Onufriev reported to Krupskaia the PK was 
affiliated with the Central Group, which had denounced the Prague 
resolutions. While the PK actually sanctioned the Prague resolutions, they 
contended "true unity is only possible by means of joint work in the 
                                               
10 Dan to Akselrod, 24 January 1912, 14 September 1912, Ibid., pp.245–6, 254; Dan to 
Garvi, April 1912, 13 August 1912, Pis'ma P.B. Akselroda i Iu. O. Martova, pp. 223, 
252–3; McKean, Robert B.  St Petersburg Between The Revolutions: Workers and 
Revolutionaries, June 1907-February 1917. New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press,  1990,  p.108 citing GARF, f.102, DPOO 1913g. d.5 ch.57, 11.190, 201,311–12; 
pp. 107–8, citing GARF f.102, DPOO 1913g. d.5 ch.57, 11.2, 166,190,274–5,310–31. 
11 Listok organizatsionnogo komiteta po sozyvu obshchepartiinoi konferentsii.  3, 1912, p.1 
12 McKean.Op.Cit., p. 108–9 citing f.102, DPOO 1913g, d.307, prod.III, 1.116. 
13 Nasha zaria. 4, 1914, pp: 60–63; Elwood, R. Carter. Lenin and the Brussels `Unity' 
Conference of July 1914. Russian Review, 39, January 1980, pp.32–49. 
  
localities."
14
 Arrests suppressed the PK in 1913 and 1914, which obliged the 
board of the Metallists' Union to take over its activities. In 1913, ten skilled 
metalworkers sat on the PK including the conciliator Kiselev, Mitrevich, 
assistant secretary of the union, and board members P.A. Mel'nikov and 
Ignatev. In February 1914, five of the eight members were metallists and 
either officers or activists from the two Vperedists strongholds, Vasileostrov 
or Vyborg districts.
15
 Party workers in the metallists' union noted in 1913, 
the "lack in St. Petersburg of strong party organizations capable of leading a 
general strike."
16
 
Local activists cooperated in a number of demonstrations during the 
prewar years. For May Day 1912, the nonfactionalist group "Unity," the 
Central Group and local Socialist Revolutionaries formed the "Group of 
Worker Social Democrats."  This organization summoned a "meeting of all 
Petersburg workers' organizations" to compose a May Day proclamation 
calling for the establishment of a democratic republic. When the Third 
Duma used its powers of interpellation to investigate the framing of the SD 
Second Duma fraction, all activists cooperated in demonstrations at Narva 
and Vasileostrov.
17
  
In 1913, the PK, Central Initiative Group, local SRs and unions 
attempted to reestablish the Central Bureau of Trade Unions. Metallist was 
published until 1914, and accepted contributions from activists regardless of 
factional identity. The Okhrana credited the press with raising the 
consciousness of workers and, in effect, acting as the illegal underground 
party organization by spreading party ideas.
18
 Even the police noted, “ There 
is marked increase in the new conciliatory movement among workers in the 
rank and file of Social Democracy who are extremely dissatisfied with the 
                                               
14 Iz epokhi `Zvezdy' i `Pravdy,' 1911–14, vol.3,  Moscow 1921, pp.184, 230, 234–5; 
Iurenev, "Mezhrainoka," p.111; "V.I. Lenin v 1912–14 gg." Krasnyi arkhiv, vol.2, 
no.62, 1934, p.229. 
15 Sotsial demokrat, 31, 28 June 1913;Listovki Peterburgskikh bol'shevikov. 1902–1917. 
Tom vtoroi, 1904–1917. Leningrad: Ogiz, 1939.  p. 77–78; McKean. Op.Cit., p.112, 
citing GARF f.102 DPOO 1914g. d.5,ch.57,84–5;d.5 ch.57, t.2,1.24. 
16 McKean. Op.Citi. pp. 104–5 citing GARF f.102, DPOO, 1913g.d.5 ch.57, 11.308–9; 
d.341 prod.II,11.218–20; prod.III,1.266. 
17 Iakovlev, "Aprel'sko–maiskie dni," pp.230–4. 
18 Bonnell.Op.Cit. p.412 citing GARF DPOO f.102, d.341, 1913, pp.8–10. 
  
political fervor and factional infighting between the pravdisit and the 
liquidators.”19   
The reaction of Party activists to the upsurge in strikes after the 
massacre of protesters in Lena was similar. While the Menshevik press 
criticized "strike fever" as a "dangerous illness," Bolshevik activists in the 
capital also feared the spontaneity of the masses would cause repression of 
the St. Petersburg Metalworkers’ Union and suppression of legal activities.20 
After winning a majority of seats on the metallists' board, Bolsheviks 
actively began to implement the directives of Prague, moving into the legal 
arena and overtaking former Menshevik territory. However, their policies 
differed little from the former Menshevik administration of the union. Since 
63% of the strikes in St. Petersburg from 1912 to 1914 involved metallists, 
both SD factions had to respond to the escalating strike movement.
21
 An 
examination of this response, the nature of Bolshevik victory, the 
individuals who governed the union and the governing board's actions after 
the Bolsheviks won a majority reveals little significance in Bolshevik 
hegemony.
22
 
From 1912 to 1914, protests initiated by the metallists and Social 
Democratic activists were either political in their initial conceptualization, 
or locally initiated in response to a particular economic or political policy of 
the factory administration or government.
23
 These protests and work 
stoppages were not coordinated or controlled.
24
 The police repeatedly 
hindered attempts at citywide collaboration and workers' actions were 
equivocal. The workers' demands and motivations suggest they collectively 
                                               
19 Bonnell. Op.Cit. p. 425. 
20 Luch no. 53,  17 November 1912, p.:1. 
21 Arutiunov, G.A. Rabochee dvizhenie, p. 258. 
22 The scholarly discussions of strikes and the Bolshevik victory exaggerate and distort the 
reality in the movement. See for example Haimson, L.H. and Tilly, Charles Tilly, eds. 
Strikes, Wars, and Revolutions in an International Perspective: Strike Waves in the Late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989). Haimson interprets the election of Bolsheviks as an indication of a younger 
cohort of Bolshevik workers who rejected Menshevism and pushed Russia to the brink 
of revolution before the war. Bonnell cites the election of Bolsheviks as a rejection of 
the reformist trade union. See Bonnell, Roots, pp.434–8 . 
23
 On the characterization of strikes see Haimson and Tilly. Op.Cit. 
24 Elwood blames the lack of coordination and spontaneous nature of the strikes on the lack 
of a viable underground organization. See Elwood, R.C. Russian Social Democracy in 
the Underground: A Study of the RSDRP in the Ukraine, 1907-1914.Amsterdam: 
International Institute for Social History, 1974,  pp. 236–38. 
  
opposed authority in all its forms and sought a united movement against 
those who attempted to wield political, economic or ideological power. 
Among the Social Democrats, both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks attempted 
to assert Party control of the movement.  
The first types of protests, political demonstrations, were regularly 
summoned on May Day and the anniversaries of 9 January and 4 April. 
After the news of the massacre of miners at the Lena Goldfields on 4 April 
1912 reached the capital, the Menshevik deputy, G. S. Kuznetsov, local SDs 
and students called for a demonstration on Nevskii Prospect on Sunday, 15 
April. However, activists in Narva and Moscow districts, more inclined 
toward political strikes than demonstrations, did little to inform workers of 
the planned protest. Meetings at Baltic Shipyards and the engineering plant 
at United Cables approved a five day stoppage beginning two weeks later, 
on May Day. Therefore students, rather than workers, dominated the 
protests on 15 April, while workers participated in a wave of spontaneous 
strikes from 14–22 April involving around 140,000 workers.25 
As May Day approached, students active in a study circle at Putilov 
piloted the establishment of 1 May Committees at Moscow, Narva, 
Petersburg and Vasileostrov districts. These committees with joint 
participation of all SD and SR groups except the Initiative Group formed the 
Central Bureau of 1 May Committees, which distributed leaflets calling for 
a strike, a democratic republic, Constituent Assembly, eight–hour day and 
land confiscation.
26
 In response to such widespread agitation, 150,000 
laborers joined May Day strikes. The police, prepared for the protest, 
prevented convergence of strikers in the center and dispersed the 
demonstration.
27
 Although activists made efforts to coordinate strike action 
after May Day, inviting formation of strike committees at district meetings, 
arrests curbed their success until August.
28
 
Local activists also resisted Party leadership in political protests 
occurring in 1913. The PK, a long celebrated bastion of Bolshevism, did not 
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agitate for strikes on 9 January 1913: they advocated only factory meetings. 
Despite the lack of Bolshevik agitation, 71,000 walked off the job on the 
anniversary of Bloody Sunday.
29
 For May Day 1913, the OK, PK and TsK 
printed leaflets and the PK formed a strike committee with local SRs.
30
 
Collaboration between party activists continued throughout 1914, when the 
Central Initiative Group, Bolsheviks, Mezhrainoka and SRs coordinated 
strike plans for 9 January. Petersburg socialist groups also supported work 
stoppages when the Menshevik deputy, N.S. Chkheidze was arraigned for a 
speech given in the Duma and the left was expelled for fifteen sessions. On 
23 March, metalworkers and party activists reorganized the PK and called 
for demonstrations on Good Friday. Both Mensheviks and SRs agreed with 
the plans and the educational societies "Sampsonievskii" and "Science and 
Life" promoted the strike.
31
 Coordination continued on 4 April, May Day 
and in other protests even though party institutions were weak and 
decentralized. 
In contrast to political demonstrations, party activists and the union 
administration of both factions often denounced strikes emerging from the 
shop floor or joined them only after they had begun. An economic upswing 
produced a labor shortage in 1912, which prevented concerted action by 
employers. The Petersburg Society of Manufacturers and Factory Owners 
(PSMFO) could not agree on a response to the massive strikes that began 
after Lena. Even though their 1912 Convention voted against union 
mediation in disputes, standardized black listing, rejected a minimum wage 
and pay for strikers, most PSMFO members did not confirm to this 
agreement until March 1913.
32
 This time lag allowed for the expansion of 
worker unrest.  
The Mensheviks held a majority on the Union's governing board 
when a strike at Siemens–Halske against a May Day fine became a 91-day 
protest against factory reforms. Workers opposed recently decreased rates, 
time clocks and demanded a polite form of address, a council of elders, hot 
water, and extra pay for Saturday and preholiday work. In 1913, metallists 
walked off the job for 102 days at Lessner in Vyborg district after the 
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suicide of Iakov Strongin who had been accused by the foreman of stealing 
brass screws. The strike committee consulted the union only after 82 days. 
The owners refused to bargain with the union, brought in strike breakers, 
blacklisted strikers and eventually defeated the strike.
33
 
A change in the Metalworkers' Union Board did not produce a 
corresponding change in strike policy. In the summer 1913, a specialist in 
time work, Balik, was carted out of the factory in a wheelbarrow at New 
Aivaz industrial plant.
34
 Even though the majority of the newly elected 
interim board was Bolshevik, the union's response was cautious. On 28 July, 
the union passed a resolution condemning the use of wheelbarrows and 
refused to grant strike assistance until 17 August. The factory administration 
responded more promptly, closing the factory for six weeks while reforms 
were completed and then hiring many replacements especially from the new 
pool of women and unskilled workers.
35
 The strike failed.  
Local activists participated in strikes and protests despite 
pronouncements of condemnation by emigres, party institutions, and 
theoretical leaders of both factions. The Menshevik August Conference at 
Vienna had delegated full responsibility for strike action to the union 
administration and urged members to appraise possibilities for victory 
before walking out.
36
 The Central Initiative Group opposed walkouts in June 
1913 to protest charges against 52 sailors of conspiracy to commit armed 
uprising. The PK had been arrested and did not initiate the strike. When 
36,000 participated, Luch denounced the protest as "chaotic, prematurely 
weakening the forces of the working class."
37
 
Menshevik literatory responded to the strikes with some degree of 
alarm, as they were convinced government repression of unions was sure to 
follow continued work stoppages. Garvi condemned the "elemental nature" 
of strikes "preceding for the most part apart from the existing trade unions" 
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a sentiment echoed confidentially by Dan and Martov.
38
 Dan and Martov 
also published articles predicting poor results from the strike movement. In 
the thick journal, Nasha zaria, Dan warned "in the political struggle the 
strike is not always the sole expedient means."
39
 On the March walkouts that 
led to the closing of the union in 1914, Martov theorized "the elemental 
development of the recent wave of political stoppages has led the workers 
into a dead end."
40
  Émigré Mensheviks were alarmed by the "spontaneity" 
of striking workers, "hotheads intoxicated by their own mood and the 
excitement reigning in St. Petersburg."  The praktiki defended union 
organization against their critics who labeled unions a "harmful 
undertaking" which corrupted working-class struggles.   
Leninists at Prague approved the formation of cells in legal 
organizations, but the Bolshevik hierarchy moved slowly in this regard. 
Only after an increase in strike activity was noted did Lenin observe:  
the proletariat is drawing the masses into a revolutionary strike, 
which indissolubly links politics with economics, a strike which 
wins the support of the most backward sections by the success 
for an immediate improvement in the life of the workers, and at 
the same time rouses the people against the tsarist monarchy. 
While requiring a revolutionary stance of the strike movement, the 
Bolsheviks moved more fully into the legal organizations. The TsK resolved 
in 1913: 
Social Democrats must attract into all workers' societies the 
broadest possible circles of workers, inviting into membership 
all workers without distinction according to party views. But the 
Social Democrats within these societies must organize party 
groups [cells] and through long, systematic work within all these 
societies establish the very closest relations between them and 
the Social Democratic Party.
41
 
Even the Leninist TsK tactics moved toward a combination of legal 
and illegal work.  
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After the Bolsheviks gained control of the Metallists’ Union, the 
board continued to register complaints about the spontaneous nature of 
strikes. From 25 August 1913 to 18 January 1914, 29 of 41 strikes began 
before the union was consulted. On 3 November 1913, Kiselev admitted "a 
majority of stoppages and conflicts proceed without any organizational 
influence on the part of the union." At the general meeting on 19 January 
1914, strike assistance was restricted to those who had been members for at 
least one year.
42
 Both the PK and the union denounced the spontaneous 
strike activity which followed the closing of the labor press from 6–12 
March 1914.
43
 In response to the walkouts, 16 engineering and electrical 
firms joined a lockout from 20 – 24 March. The Bolsheviks and the union 
met on 21 March to determine an appropriate response to the employers' 
attack. Before any compromise could be reached the union was closed 1 
April 1914 under articles 33–35, for the disturbance of public order.44 
Party activists and workers inside Russia rejected party factionalism 
and infighting. They collaborated in trade union activities, strikes and 
worker associations voting for “Marxist” slates. In elections to insurance 
institutions following passage of the “Law on Social Insurance,” the labor 
movement reaffirmed the desire for unity. Activists from both party factions 
utilized the slogan, but defined it differently. Leninists called for unity of all 
anti-liquidationist elements in hopes of claiming center stage as the true 
Social Democrats. Mensheviks and pro-Menshevik trade unionists still 
retained the hope that party workers in legal and illegal arenas could work 
together. Menshevik insurance activists asserted, “divisiveness and 
fratricidal struggle among leading workers in the campaign is far worse, 
more senseless, than in political organizations embracing only the 
vanguard.”45 
From 1912–1914, Petersburg workers acted independently of both 
the union and party leaders. They staged strikes and walkouts without 
approval. Both Social Democratic factions, acting through union and other 
governing boards, condemned spontaneous strikes asserting the authority of 
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the Party over the movement. Fearing repression by tsarist authorities, they 
sought to limit workers’ demands for economic and social justice. This 
attempt to establish the Party as the vanguard of the movement led to the 
complete rejection of party identity by Russian worker activists. Radicalized 
workers made politically conscious by prolonged socialist agitation and 
their daily experiences demanded a united workers’ movement rather than 
Party leadership. By 1914, the discourse of unity placed the workers, not the 
Social Democratic Party, at the political center.  
 
 
 
  
The Prerevolutionary Strike Movement in Russia, 1912-1916 
Kevin Murphy 
he strike movement during the Russian revolutionary era has long been of 
interest to both socialists and scholars. Rosa Luxemburg famously sought to 
revise the ambivalent Social Democratic attitude toward the "Mass Strike" 
based on the experience of the 1905 revolt, "the first historical experience 
on a very large scale with the means of struggle."
1
 The mass strike of 
February 1917 quickly escalated into a general revolt that overthrew the 
Tsar Nicholas II and throughout 1917, as in 1905, over two million workers 
went on strike.
2
 
While historians understandably have focused attention on the 
revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the strike wave during the pre-revolutionary 
period from 1912 to 1916 was no less spectacular. Two and half million 
workers participated in more than thirty political strikes from April 1912 to 
the end of 1916, while another 1.8 million workers engaged in economic 
strikes.
3
 The epicenter of this movement was St. Petersburg (later named 
Petrograd), where 23 large strikes involving 50,000 workers or more 
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occurred for various political causes.
4
 The disproportionate number of strike 
participants in the capital can be explained by its politically-charged 
atmosphere and the unusual size and strength of the revolutionary left that 
focused much of their efforts at building workplace cells in the factories of 
the capital, particularly in the metal industry. Workers in St. Petersburg 
responded almost immediately to political events, whereas their numerically 
weaker Moscow counterparts invariably responded slower, often days later, 
and in much lower numbers. 
Much of the rich historiography of the pre-revolutionary strike 
movement has focused on quantitative analysis of the strike movement, 
particularly in St. Petersburg. These works have demonstrated convincingly 
that political and economic strikes cannot be treated as separate phenomena, 
that the escalating workers’ movement often meant that economic strikes 
directly impacting workers’ confidence to strike over political causes and 
vice versa. The demographic studies of strike activity have also shown that 
more literate and urbanized metal workers with weaker ties to the 
countryside, particularly in St. Petersburg, were proportionally much more 
likely to engage in strike activity. Such evidence has led to more general, 
but also more speculative arguments, about the role of literacy and 
urbanization in the radicalization of the Russian working class. 
Several authors of these quantitative studies have frankly admitted 
the limitations of such an approach, particularly the difficulty of 
incorporating and assessing the role that ideological influences had on the 
strike movement.
 5
 Leopold Haimson's seminal study of Russian urban 
unrest noted that the Bolsheviks provided a "significant catalytic role" to the 
movement.
6
 In the conclusion of his quantitative analysis, Haimson offers a 
more nuanced appraisal of this Bolshevik influence, suggesting that is was 
“the participation of Bolshevik militants in ad hoc, amorphous, cellular 
“committees” at the factory or shop level that provided whatever elements 
of leadership the Bolshevik underground actively maintained at the 
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grassroots level.”7 Similarly, in his superlative study of Petrograd, S.A. 
Smith argues that “factories were more likely to go on strike, firstly, if there 
was an organized Bolshevik cell in the enterprise and secondly, if there was 
a core of proletarian men or women with some experience of strikes, 
sufficiently numerous and cohesive to organize new workers.”8 
Several historians have taken issue with the emphasis on Bolshevism 
as the dominant socialist influence in the movement by examining the role 
of Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), Mensheviks and other smaller socialist 
groups.
9
 Robert McKean’s study of St. Petersburg argues that there was 
often cooperation between socialist groups. What was surely the most 
sustained strike movement in world history, however, is inexplicably 
described by McKean as a failure because “the Bolsheviks failed to spark a 
national general political strike movement” or create “a Soviet of Workers’ 
Deputies.” According to McKean, the only sphere in which the Bolsheviks 
enjoyed some measure of success was in the legal labor movement of 1912-
1914.
10
  
This assessment is at odds with the archival record and says much 
more about the mindset of anti-Bolshevik historians than about the strike 
movement. The Director of the Police Department noted in late 1913 that 
"The faction of Leninists is always better organized than the others, stronger 
in singleness of purpose...When during the last two years the labor 
movement began to grow stronger, Lenin and his followers came closer to 
the workers than the others."
11
 Moreover, while the optimist Lenin argued in 
January 1913 that "the revolutionary upswing is incomparably higher today 
than it was before the first revolution",
12
 the Mensheviks were often less 
than enthusiastic participants in the movement, raising fears of "strike 
fever."
13
 Additionally, during the war, the Bolsheviks continued to agitate 
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for political strikes while the defencist (pro-War) Mensheviks and SRs 
abstained from such actions.
14
  
This essay focuses on the strike movement in the largest metal 
factory in Moscow. As both the Bolsheviks and SRs competed for influence 
in the factory, it provides a useful benchmark to assess the strike movement 
at the factory and even shop level.  Using political police (Okhrana) and 
management reports, and workers’ petitions and retrospective memoirs, the 
source base for the study is diverse.  The methodology is explicitly Marxist, 
examining the process of class development, of workers growing sense of 
class solidarity at the factory level and weighing the factors that shaped this 
process of overcoming divisions within the workforce. 
Metal production was at the center of Russia’s industrial revolution 
and the class polarization evident throughout Russia society reverberated 
powerfully in the massive Moscow Metalworks in the city’s eastern 
Rogozhskii district. By 1900, the factory employed over 2,000 workers in 
‘hot’ shops such as the steel foundry, form casting, and rolled metal shops 
and also ‘cold’ shops that produced such products bolts, nails and screws. 
The owner, Iulii Guzhon, personified both the paternalism and intransigence 
of Russian corporate liberalism by offering free schooling to his workforce, 
but also hard-line opposition to the workers’ movement. From the Lena 
massacre in 1912 to the end of 1916, workers in this factory struck nineteen 
times, with nearly fifteen thousand employees participating. Eight of the 
strikes were overtly political and included over seven thousand workers.
15
  
This development of class solidarity is all them more impressive 
when considering the myriad of divisions within the factory. The partition 
of the factory grounds into separate production departments fostered shop-
loyalty (tsekhovshchina) among employees. Tsekhovshchina transcended 
craft divisions because former peasants maintained strong ties between 
specific shops and particular villages. Ideological, skill, and age differences 
also divided the workforce. Many workers were sympathetic to the 
autocracy, embracing an aggressive Russian nationalism, while others were 
either active revolutionaries or sympathetic to the demands of the left 
organizations. Twenty-five skill categories ranged from the most skilled 
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metalworkers, lathe operators, smelters, and rolling mill operators to 
apprentices and unskilled laborers. The workforce was young, with about 
half under the age of thirty, a third between thirty and forty years old, and a 
smaller group over forty. Unskilled women workers earned low wages in 
the lowest of ten categories and suffered abuse in the traditionally male-
dominated metal industry.
 16
 One worker later wrote that conditions in the 
shops were “particularly difficult for teenage girls” as heavy conditions 
“messed up hair, tore dresses, and forced many to leave the factory.”17 
During the 1905 revolution, the workers’ movement in the factory 
closely mirrored that in Moscow itself with economic and workplace issues 
dominating grievances until the autumn of 1905 when the movement 
became more politicized. On 12 January 1905, workers from the nail shop 
struck and the stoppage quickly spread to other departments, with workers 
demanding an eight-hour day, wage increases, better work conditions and 
the removal of abusive managers. Management partially conceded to some 
of the demands, including reducing work hours to ten hours, ending the 
strike. In November, workers again demanded the removal of abusive 
managers and by this time the movement was much more political. Workers 
struck on 12 November and stayed out through December, elected 
representatives to the Moscow Soviet and participated in the December 
Moscow uprising. A handful of workers died in the revolt; many others 
were jailed or exiled after the rebellion was crushed.
18
 
The nadir of Russian labor activism came in years of repression after 
the 1905 Revolution. In 1910, just over 200 strikes took place involving less 
than fifty thousand workers.
19
 Despite repression, workers’ memoirs 
indicate that a handful of Bolsheviks and SRs continued underground 
agitation in the Metalworks throughout this period. Management blacklisted 
militant workers: “Revolutionary workers in Guzhon were fired,” wrote one 
worker, “and this was communicated to other factories.” 20 Other memoirs 
stress the sense of political isolation and fear that dominated factory life: 
“For the first three or four years of my work in Guzhon, from 1908 to 1911, 
all workers were suppressed,” recalled one worker, “and it seemed that at 
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that time no kind of revolutionary work was conducted.”21 A Bolshevik later 
wrote that he was arrested in 1910 for participating in a strike, but the 
Leninists were so weak that an SR member recalled being unaware of any 
Bolshevik presence: “At this time the Socialist Revolutionaries were the 
only party in the factory,” he asserted. “I did not hear or see anything about 
the Bolsheviks.”22 
The reawakening of political activism was led by students. Students 
demonstrated in the autumn of 1910 in commemoration of the death of the 
former liberal Duma president Muromtsev; then in memory of Leo Tolstoy; 
and later against the treatment of political prisoners. These actions helped 
inspire the workers’ movement as radical students started to make contact 
with workers, including workers at the Moscow Metalworks. Wider political 
events often intervened in factory life. The death of Tolstoy also spurred 
demonstration strikes in the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party 
(RSDWP) strongholds of Bromlei, Gustav List, Bari, and other factories. In 
1911, a student general strike against state repression spread throughout 
Russia, and the general ferment created an atmosphere in which newly 
radicalized students initiated contacts with workers.
23
 
The Lena Goldfields massacre signaled the rebirth of working-class 
militancy on a mass scale. Working conditions at the goldfields were 
particularly harsh, with miners working fifteen hour days for extremely low 
wages. Workers struck on 29 February when rotten meat was distributed 
and on 4 March, put forward demands for an eight-hour workday, 30 
percent raise in wages, improvement in provisions and the elimination of 
fines. The tsarist government sent in troops and arrested the entire strike 
committee. On 4 April, 2,500 workers marched in protest, government 
troops opened fire upon striking Lena miners, leaving five hundred 
casualties. Minister of Internal Affairs Makarov’s remarks offered a 
menacing warning to the workers’ movement: “So it has been, and so it will 
be in the future,” he declared.24 Across the empire, workers responded with 
a show of force. During the post-Lena and May Day strikes several weeks 
later, police estimated that nearly three hundred thousand workers struck in 
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St. Petersburg alone, a figure that exceeded the total number of all strike 
participants in the entire nation between 1909 and 1911.
25
 
In the Moscow Metalworks, according to the Okhrana, the 
Bolsheviks participated in “a group that made it their goal to organize a 
strike at the factory … against the best interest and wishes of the well-
intentioned workers.”26 Participants describe how two hundred mostly 
young workers struck and met in Vadlinsky Woods, listened to speeches 
about the massacre, sang the Marseillaise, and raised the red flag.
27
  
The small Moscow Bolshevik organization made the factory a 
political priority, with almost ten percent of their Moscow membership 
working in the plant, but Okhrana arrests and firings thwarted these efforts. 
Okhrana reports and worker's memoirs indicate that almost the entire cell 
was arrested in repeated raids between April and August. The Moscow 
Okhrana apprehended socialists throughout 1912; with nineteen RSDWP 
members arrested on 15 April 1912, another eight in May, fifteen in August, 
seven in September, and six more in November.
28
 In October 1912, the 
Okhrana arrested seventeen SR members for organizing in support of court-
martialed sailors.
29
 A Bolshevik organizer who worked in many cities 
claimed that Moscow “broke the record for provocateurs,” and that efforts 
to restore the Moscow Committee “inevitably got entangled with one of 
these provocateurs.”30 Plans to establish a Bolshevik press in the district 
collapsed in 1912 because the most active worker turned out to be an 
Okhrana agent. An attempt to revive the Bolshevik cell in 1913 failed when 
the secret police arrested five Bolsheviks in the days leading up to May 
Day.
31
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The Okhrana had also infiltrated the St. Petersburg Bolsheviks but 
the organization managed to sustain its operations and continued to act as an 
effective catalyst for the labor movement. Despite three Okhrana agents on 
the St. Petersburg Central Committee and repeated roundups, the group was 
able to bounce back, rebuild a center, and agitate for strikes, and by 1916 
had expanded to three thousand members.
32
 In Moscow the Bolsheviks had 
only two hundred members in the spring of 1913 and about six hundred 
three years later.
33
 
Despite the political arrests, a seismic shift in workers’ confidence 
had reinvigorated the movement and the divide between economic and 
political strikes dissipated as workers’ confidence quickly grew. Soon after 
the Lena strike, employees petitioned Guzhon for an eight-hour workday 
and organized economic strikes in different shops.
34
 The strike became 
increasingly bitter when management brought in strikebreakers from 
southern Russia.
35
 New workers started at the factory in July, one of whom 
told the Okhrana that strikers had followed him from the factory and had 
threatened that “they would deal with him,” while another claimed that 
strikers threatened to “throw him off the bridge.”36 The mayor’s office sent 
an order to the Okhrana chief of the district, asking him to “Find the ones at 
the factory who are the worst scoundrels and who set the tone for others.”37 
In response, the Okhrana reported that eight workers had played important 
roles in the strike and that at least three were Bolshevik members or 
sympathizers, one of whom, according to an undercover Okhrana agent, had 
worked in the factory for eighteen years and “enjoyed a degree of popularity 
among the workers in the factory.”38 
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A distinguishing feature of the post-Lena movement was the lack of 
involvement by working women and younger workers. Though they earned 
low wages, one worker wrote that “they remained outside the movement 
and did not participate in strikes.”39 Okhrana reports on strikes and 
subsequent arrests suggest organizers themselves apparently made little 
effort to involve women, focusing their efforts on traditional socialist 
strongholds in the metal and printing industries. A wave of strikes in early 
November in support of court marshaled Sevastopol sailors was 
overwhelming male, yet women workers, including four hundred from the 
Bonaker Metalworks, did participate.
40
 
The relative weakness of revolutionary influence, however, meant 
that even older more skilled male workers in the factory refrained from 
strike activity. Sixty thousand St. Petersburg workers struck in support of 
the Sevastopol sailors involved in a mutiny, an action supported by fourteen 
thousand workers in eighty-two factories in Moscow, including nine 
factories in the district.
41
 By the spring of 1913, the Okhrana was confident 
that it had again managed to obliterate the revolutionary underground in 
Moscow, anticipating a demonstration-free anniversary of the Lena 
massacre because, “To have any organized event, appropriate agitation is 
necessary, which assumes the presence of some kind of underground party 
organization.” However, “thanks to the most recent arrests, everything has 
been extracted that was considered more or less capable of even creating a 
semblance of such activity … the most conscious carriers of Social 
Democratic ideals, are terrified...”42  
The Okhrana belief that the strike movement could be surgically 
snuffed out by removing key activists underestimated both the resonance of 
revolutionary demands among wider groups of workers and the socialists’ 
resolve to continue the battle while replenishing their ranks. On May Day 
1913, four weeks after the secret police claimed that the revolutionary 
underground had been crushed, thirty-three thousand Moscow workers 
struck.
43
 The revival of Moscow’s political strikes continued in June with 
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forty-eight of fifty-seven stoppages overtly political, but only a small 
minority of Moscow Metalworks employees participated because of the 
previous rounds of arrests. The largest strikes were in the Social Democratic 
strongholds of Sytin Printing, Dinamo and Bari. In contrast, workers in 
Guzhon’s factory did not participate. On 24 June renewed strikes included 
six factories in the district, but only 198 of 2,759 Moscow Metalworks 
employees participated three days later.
44
 
By July 1913 Guzhon expressed concern to other factory owners that 
“the strike movement taking place at present in Moscow industrial 
organizations does not show a clear economic form and the essence of the 
demands and other characteristics are reminiscent of 1905-1906 with all the 
qualities of a political demonstration.” Again the industrialists’ response 
was to call for harsh measures. Metal factories had called for “listing the 
names of the most zealous strikers,” and requested that members circulate 
information about the movement’s leaders.45Although Guzhon was 
justifiably concerned about the reemergence of political strikes, the only 
other political action during 1913 in his Metalworks occurred during 
September, when a mere seventy-five employees stopped work to protest 
against the harassment of the labor press in Moscow.
46
 
A comparison with the Bromlei factory, a metalworking plant with a 
strong Bolshevik cell,
47
 illustrates the degree to which workers responded to 
shop floor agitation. At Bromlei 900 (of 1,100) workers struck on the 
anniversary of Lena, while Moscow Metalworks employees continued to 
work. On May Day 1913, 800 Bromlei workers stopped work, but again the 
Okhrana found reported no stoppage in Guzhon’s factory. At the beginning 
of the strike in defense of Baltic sailors in June, 600 Bromlei employees 
went out, but less than 200 Moscow Metalworks employees participated and 
only on the last day of the action. Bromlei’s 1,100 workers led the strike 
wave in November 1913 in support of arrested St. Petersburg workers while 
employees in Guzhon’s enterprise did not participate.48 Thus, in a factory 
with a strong Bolshevik presence on the shop floor, workers repeatedly 
struck in large numbers. 
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The arrest and subsequent collapse of the Bolshevik cell in the 
Moscow Metalworks meant that the SRs set the tone for political strike 
action in the factory for the duration of the prerevolutionary period. An SR 
member wrote that they had attracted fifty young workers, had organized a 
study circle and a drama group, and apparently led a successful economic 
strike in the steel foundry shop in April 1913.
49
 One of the few Bolsheviks 
also acknowledged admitted that the SRs had had more influence in 
organizing political strike action.
50
 
By the eve of the war the sectarian bad blood appears to have 
subsided as socialists cooperated in an attempt to establish the 
metalworkers’ union in the plant as they did in other Moscow factories.51 
One SR member noted a strengthening of ties among different factories, 
including a general strike fund established through cooperation between the 
SRs and Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and the metalworkers’ union.52 Renewed 
collaboration probably encouraged several economic strikes, the first of 
their kind since the spring of 1913. Pravda reported a work stoppage in the 
steel foundry shop in March 1914.
53
 Workers’ memoirs also mention two 
short one-day strikes: one in the cable shop, which was defeated, and a 
second in the bolt shop, which resulted in a wage increase.
54
 
On 15 March 1914, Guzhon reported to the owners “the latest 
workers’ demonstration in St. Petersburg shows an extremely weak 
reverberation” in Moscow with only seven hundred workers participating. A 
few days later four thousand employees were on strike in Moscow but by 
then the movement in St. Petersburg that had earlier included fifty thousand 
workers had collapsed.
55
 Yet on May Day 1914, Guzhon informed the 
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Moscow Manufacturer's association that more than twenty thousand 
workers in seventy-three enterprises had struck in 
Moscow.
56
 Over one million workers struck in the first seven months 
of 1914, a level of strike activity comparable to that of the 1905 revolt. In 
July of 1914, after government troops fired on Putilov workers, a general 
strike developed and workers erected barricades on the streets of St. 
Petersburg.
57
 
Two SR-led political strikes in 1914 illustrate the importance of 
socialist agitation at the shop level. On 26 April management informed the 
factory inspector that 1,120 Guzhon workers had struck “because of the 
expulsion of some members from the State Duma from several meetings.” 
The strike included all employees in three smaller shops, but the only large 
shop with a strong showing was the SR stronghold in the steel foundry.
58
 
The stoppage in response to the July 1914 general strike of 120,000 in St. 
Petersburg was larger and better organized. Management informed the 
factory inspector that 1,500 (of 3,000) Moscow Metalworks employees had 
struck on 7 July.
59
 Management letters to the factory inspector indicate that 
this was a well-organized action: workers left in unison at 8 a.m. on 7 July 
and the next day all workers returned “at the usual time and started work.” 
Two days later the same workers “after lunch again stopped work in the 
form of a protest against the imposition of fines for the above-mentioned 
unauthorized work stoppage.” The SR-dominated steel foundry shop was 
again the only large shop to participate.
60
 Thus, participation depended on 
agitators in particular shops--not just factories--to carry the argument for 
strike action. 
World War I brought working-class militancy to a virtual halt. The 
Factory Inspectorate reported 3,493 stoppages in which 1,327,897 workers 
participated in the first seven months of the 1914 but only 9,562 workers 
participated in 41 strikes in the last five months of the year.
61
 No strikes 
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were recorded in the Moscow Metalworks for the first seven months of the 
war.
62
 “At the start of the war,” wrote an SR leader, “there was a complete 
stoppage of strikes and later, although they happened, they were small and 
short-lived.”63 The decline in strike activity did not correlate with the 
deterioration in workers’ living standards as management utilized the 
patriotic mood to cut the average monthly wage from 48.3 to 34.1 rubles by 
March 1915.
64
 Another memoir recalled that during the first year of the war 
“it was tense and you could not say a word against the war … after the 
capture of Przemysl, workers were taken to Red Square for a prayer service” 
and if one did not participate “you were considered an opponent of the 
war.”65 
Economic actions started to revive in the first seven months of 1915, 
with 231,794 workers involved in 523 strikes. Political strikes remained 
weak as only 18,008 workers throughout the empire participated in 42 much 
smaller stoppages in the first year of the war, the largest in Moscow (3,098 
workers total) in March 1915 in support of Bolshevik Duma deputies on 
trial.
 66
 The first wartime strike on 15 April 1915 shows how far solidarity 
had slipped. The Okhrana reported that eighty workers in the rolled metal 
shop nightshift had turned down management’s offer of a 10 to 30 percent 
raise and then struck, demanding a piece-rate increase of 50 to 100 
percent.
67
 Guzhon’s strategy for defeating this strike involved a combination 
of compromise and intimidation. On the same day, management informed 
the factory director, “because of the rise in prices of goods, all workers in 
the factory would receive an increase of ten kopecks an hour.”68 The 
average monthly wage jumped from 34.1 to 52.5 rubles—the largest 
wartime wage increase in the factory.
69
 Management also fired thirty-four 
strikers.
70
 Additionally, management apparently victimized the remaining 
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rolling mill operators as their real wages fell to half their 1913 level.
71
 An 
activist admitted that “things went badly” during the strike because “other 
shops would not support it.” Significantly, the sectional divisions between 
older skilled workers and younger workers were strengthened at the start of 
the war: “We had many young workers and at that time it was impossible to 
raise the issue of equality in the shop.”72 
Nationalist sentiment at the start of the war helped set the stage for 
anti-German riots after Russian troops withdrew from Przemysl in May 
1915. Tens of thousands of Moscow workers, including employees from the 
Moscow Metalworks, looted and pillages German owned businesses and 
factories. Yet continued war losses, workers’ deteriorating economic 
position, and their perception that gendarmes had led the riots and then 
arrested other participants all undermined the patriotic mood.
73
 
Workers’ memoirs indicate that after the riots the political mood 
began to change. “Soon after the pogroms in May 1915 were over,” one 
activist recalled, “workers began to express their dissatisfaction with the 
war.”74 A Bolshevik activist wrote that “comrades again renewed work that 
had been interrupted” after the upheavals.75 Another Guzhon worker 
described the deteriorating living standards and growing political anger 
against the regime: “Our skilled workers began discussions about political 
events … that the Tsar was a fool incapable of governing and that Rasputin 
ruled Russia.” The revolutionary underground became bolder, putting up 
political leaflets in the general lavatory near the sheet metal shop calling for 
“the overthrow of the Tsar, for arming workers. Frequently these included 
quotes from the speeches from the meetings of the State Duma by the 
Bolshevik deputies…”76  
By the summer’s end, the patriotic fervor had dissipated, giving way 
to a new round of militancy. Six hundred and fifty workers in the rolled 
metal shop struck for seven days in August 1915 and prevailed in the first 
substantial wartime economic stoppage, securing a small wage increase.
77
 In 
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a meeting of the Russian Council of Ministers on 2 September 1915, 
Minister of Internal Affairs N.B. Shcherbatov warned that, “The testimony 
of all agents is unanimous ... the labor movement will develop to an extent 
which will threaten the safety of the state.”78 In Moscow the sentiment was 
“violently anti-government” and “workers and the population as a whole are 
gripped by some sort of madness and are like gunpowder.” He complained 
that “authorities in Moscow have virtually no forces,” and that those at their 
disposal were “far from reliable.” Moreover, Moscow had a “wild band” of 
thirty thousand convalescent soldiers who clashed with police and freed 
prisoners. In the event of disorders, Shcherbatov feared, “this whole horde 
will be on the side of the crowd.”79 
On the following day, Tsar Nicholas prorogued the Duma and 
triggered the largest wartime political strike wave in Moscow. Alexander 
Shliapnikov wrote that in Moscow during the late summer of 1915, rising 
prices and the dismissing of the State Duma led to “meetings and rallies 
everywhere.”80 Guzhon reported to the Moscow factory owners that on 4 
September 31,166 workers in sixty-one enterprises struck.
81
 SR agitation 
again placed the Moscow Metalworks at the head of the movement as the 
entire factory struck in unison. On 5 September 1915, “workers in all 
departments appeared at work at the prescribed time, but then did not start 
work and without permission left the factory without issuing any kind of 
demands.”82 The Okhrana reported that three thousand Guzhon workers had 
“stopped work for two days in the form of a protest about the incident of 
interrupting the activity of the State Duma.”83 
This brief SR militancy during the war was exceptional, as their 
members in Moscow tended to be more conservative than in Petrograd. On 
19 August 1914, the SRs resolved that, because of “the liberationist 
character of the war,” no attempt should be made to hinder it. Nevertheless, 
responding to the growth of antigovernment sentiment following the 
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dismissal of the Duma, Moscow SRs briefly shifted to the left, playing an 
important role in the September 1915 strike wave, but retreated again after 
another round of arrests. Moscow SRs convened to pass resolutions that de-
emphasized strikes and demonstrations in favor of building their party 
organization.
84
  
The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, were so weak in the district that 
in September 1916 their Moscow Committee decided to combine the 
Lefortovo and Rogozhskii districts that had a combined membership of only 
thirty-three: ten in Dinamo and smaller cells in Bari, Guzhon, Tsindel’, and 
Postavshchik. Dinamo was the only cell that survived an Okhrana sweep in 
October, and went on to spark three political strikes in 1916.
85
 The 
Bolsheviks had a difficult time going it alone in Moscow with only 23,566 
participants in political strikes in 1916 while the stronger Bolshevik 
organization in Petrograd sparked more than ten times that many (256,067), 
including 138,076 in support of court-martialed Baltic sailors in October.
86
 
During the war, the overwhelming number of political strike participants, 
348,118 or 74.2%, were found in the politically-charged atmosphere of the 
capital, with Moscow a distant second with only 39,279 or  8.4 %.
87
 Aside 
from the brief SR cooperation in September 1915, the Okhrana records 
during the war shows round after round of sweeps in the factories and 
arrests of Bolsheviks. These were not fictional activists, exaggerated by the 
Okhrana, but real men and women who paid dearly for keeping the 
revolutionary movement alive under dire conditions.
88
 
 Despite the absence of overtly political stoppages in the Moscow 
Metalworks after the SR participation in the summer of 1915, seven 
economic strikes demonstrated renewed labour confidence and improved 
organization in the face of Okhrana and management threats of reprisals. 
Two strikes in August 1915 involved 400 and 650 workers, extended 
beyond a single shop, and lasted nine and seven days respectively. A two-
day strike in December 1915 involved nearly 500 workers. Strikes in 1916 
were even stronger: 3,000 workers participated in a May stoppage, 760 
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struck in June, and more than 1,000 participated in an eight-day strike in 
September, with another 489 going out for six days in December.
89
  
The May 1916 stoppage was the best organized of the wartime 
strikes. Plant managers, possibly sensing trouble, issued a factory 
announcement on 30 April that increased insurance benefits for workers and 
their dependents.
90
 On 2 May three thousand employees stopped work and 
demanded a raise in the minimum rate from 2.5 to 4 rubles.
91
 On the 
following day, according to management, some departments began work, 
but under threats from strikers in other shops, the strike soon engulfed the 
entire factory. At 9:30 a.m., workers from all departments gathered at the 
main office and handed the factory administration a list of demands. These 
included: doubling sick pay; minimum wages of fifteen kopecks for 
apprentices and women, twenty-five kopecks for male workers, and thirty 
kopecks for skilled workers; ending work at 2:30 on Saturdays and the day 
before holidays; and issuing wages and bonus pay on Saturday.
92
  
Significantly, the new grievances reflected a demographic shift to a 
younger and more female workforce that had occurred during the war. 
Whereas on the eve of the war, teenage workers made up 15.7 percent of the 
workforce, two years later they constituted 26.6 percent. Similarly, the 
number of women had steadily increased from 193 in July 1914 to 363 in 
December 1916, an increase from 5.8 to 13.1 percent of the workforce, with 
women working in six shops instead of just two as they had earlier.
93
 Thus, 
the project of forging unity against management necessitated the drawing up 
of more inclusive demands that addressed the concerns of an increasingly 
significant minority. This strengthening of workplace solidarity by taking up 
the demands and concerns of women and younger workers has previously 
been largely ignored in the literature of the pre-revolutionary strike 
movement. 
The Okhrana reported on 3 May that after lunch, all workers with the 
exception of seven hundred workers in the rolled metal and repair shops, 
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returned to work.
94
 Some workers expressed dissatisfaction with the results, 
and a subsequent 22-day strike by 760 workers in June was the longest of 
the prerevolutionary period. One memoir describes the difficulties of 
maintaining such a long action because in “the third week of the strike, the 
morale of many workers suffered. Many were forced to sell their things to 
somehow survive.” By the fifth week, many workers secretly returned to 
work, and by the sixth week “almost all” workers returned. Management 
managed to break the strike with “some comrades” not returning to work as 
they were “subject to repression.”95 
In the context of the rising working-class movement, such 
management tactics only encouraged more effective labor organization. The 
eight-day strike of more than a thousand workers in September and October 
1916 shows the increased level of workers’ solidarity, organization, and 
confidence. The Okhrana reported that this was the only strike in the district 
for the month.
96
 To avoid victimization, shops elected delegates to meet 
with Guzhon and workers did not leave the plant.
97
 The strike started in the 
form casting and steel foundry shops on 26 September and spread to the bolt 
and cable shops the next day. Employment figures show that the strike 
included all employees in the four shops, including 123 women in three 
shops and 33 teenage laborers. This was also a well-timed strike, as 
management complained it caused delays in “orders for various items 
needed for state defense.” Management was compelled to ask the inspector 
to certify that the strike had caused the holdup, reporting that on 5 October 
the strike had been “liquidated,” but provided no details of the result.98 
 A six-day strike by almost five hundred workers in December was 
the last action of the prerevolutionary period, and again showed a high level 
of organization with the solid participation of the entire form-casting shop 
and elected delegates to avoid victimization.
99
 Workers demanded pay for 
days when it was impossible to work because the machines were frozen, and 
despite the threat of sending military reservists to the front, almost all 
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workers in several shops struck.
100
 The strike ended in a partial victory for 
the workers, as management conceded to some of the workers’ demands.101 
The strike movement in the Moscow Metalworks illustrates several 
features of the prerevolutionary strike movement. First, the radicalization of 
workers at the factory level cannot be viewed in separation from wider 
political events. The student movement of 1910-11, the Lena massacre, the 
war, the proroguing of the Duma, etc., all impacted workers’ consciousness 
and their willingness (or unwillingness at the start of the war) to strike. 
Second, there was clearly cooperation between socialist groups in the pre-
War years. All contemporary sources indicate that revolutionaries—both 
Bolshevik and SRs—played a significant role in organizing strikes, 
particularly political stoppages.  Strikes did not organize workers, workers 
organized strikes and these efforts often depended on the presence or 
absence of worker agitation at the shop level. When the larger SR cell 
participated and cooperated with the Bolsheviks, the strike actions were the 
largest in Moscow, though this SR influence in the factory was exceptional 
rather the norm in the city. Rather than mandated by directives from a party 
center, political strikes were the result of local initiatives by shop militants 
supporting the larger movement in the capital. Evidence at the shop level 
suggests that Haimson and Smith were correct, that a wider milieu of 
experienced activists collaborated in organizing economic strikes. Third, 
Okhrana repression in Moscow was particularly harsh and, unlike Petrograd, 
the Bolsheviks had a more difficult time organizing political strikes by 
themselves when other socialists retreated from strike action. While political 
strikes continued in a few Bolshevik strong-holds during the war, the 
movement was much less effective than it was in Petrograd. The Bolsheviks 
paid a heavy price for their principled tenacity while pro-War socialists 
temporarily benefited numerically—a factor usually overlooked in 
explaining the contours of 1917. The Mensheviks and SR strength in early 
1917 was based in part on their pro-War anti-strike pledge of the previous 
years which allowed them to avoid the repeated Okhrana sweeps of the 
factories. It was hardly coincidental that the cowards of October 1917 were 
also the cowards of the Great War. Fourth, workers learned through class 
conflict. Their collective experience refutes the notion that workers were 
mere victims incapable of challenging a “strong state”, while also 
confirming the Marxist notion of the working class as a powerful “universal 
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class” capable of reshaping society. The long-term tendency was for 
workers to become better organized and more inclusive in their demands in 
attempting to combat both the employers and the Okhrana. Significantly, by 
the eve of 1917, the grievances of women and younger workers were 
included in strike demands, strengthening intra- and inter-shop solidarity. 
This protracted radicalization and development of class consciousness 
would directly impact events in 1917— the culmination of years of bitter 
class conflict in the factories. 
 
  
Workers’ Strikes in the Paris Region in 1968: Continuities 
and Discontinuities 
Michael Seidman 
he specter of revolution dominates much of the historiography on 1968 in 
France.  Henri Lefebvre, Alain Touraine, Edgar Morin, Claude Lefort, and 
Cornelius Castoriadis viewed the May “events” as a welcome “rupture” 
(une brèche) with a hierarchical consumer society.
1
 These French 
sociologists/philosophers found that the 1968 rebellion anticipated a new 
social order. Likewise, Pierre Bourdieu stated that May 68 was a “critical 
moment” “when all became possible.”2 Michel de Certeau, a pioneer of 
current cultural interpretations, argued that May represented an innovative 
“prise de parole” by oppressed social groups.3  Most recently, a handful of 
French political scientists have mirrored Bourdieu’s perspective by labeling 
68 as a crisis of “symbolic order” “without precedent.”4   
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These analyses emphasizing discontinuity are based largely on 
interpretations of the student component of the 1968 events, and they either 
ignore or distort the history of the workers’ movement. The latter began 
after student protests at Nanterre and La Sorbonne in late April and early 
May had challenged and weakened the centralized Gaullist government. On 
Monday, May 13, a large worker-student demonstration initiated a one-day 
solidarity strike against government “repression” of the student movement. 
The following Monday, May 20, workers’ strikes expanded massively, even 
as the government assured many essential services, such as gasoline 
distribution, to priority consumers. Thus, workers in 1968 continued various 
nineteenth-century traditions when wage earners took advantage of an 
upward economic cycle and full employment to launch major strike waves, 
which often began in the spring and on Mondays (Saint Lundi).
5
 On May 25 
formal national negotiations among government, employers, and unions 
opened in Paris. On Monday, May 27, the major partners issued what 
became known as the Grenelle Accord, but workers in large Parisian 
metallurgical firms rejected it. The estimates of the total number of strikers 
at the height of the movement vary.  Bernard Pudal declares seven to ten 
million; Kristin Ross nine million; Antoine Prost seven million, and Xavier 
Vigna 3.5 million.
6
 Whatever the figure, it far outclassed the 1 million 
strikers of the previous great strike wave in the spring of 1936 during the 
Popular Front.   
On 29 May a large Confédération générale du travail (CGT, General 
Confederation of Labor) demonstration in Paris and President Charles de 
Gaulle’s departure from the capital seemed to indicate a deep crisis of the 
                                                                                                                       
In : Damamme, Dominique; Gobille, Boris; Matoni, Frédérique; Pudal, Bernard, eds. 
Mai-Juin 68.  Paris: éd. de l'Atelier, 2008, pp.11, 13, 19. 
5 Perrot, Michelle. Les ouvriers en grève: France 1871-1890. Paris: Mouton, 1974, pp.101, 
109, 137, 722.  
6 Pudal, Bernard. Les événements de mai et juin 1968: bref récit chronologique. In : Mai 
68. Op.Cit., p. 192; Pudal, Bernard Pudal and Retière Jean-Noël., Les grèves ouvrières 
de 68, un mouvement social sans lendemain mémorial. In Mai 68. Op.Cit., p.208; Prost, 
Antoine. Les grèves de mai-juin 1968. L’Histoire, no. 110, April, p.36, 2008 ; Ross, 
Kristin. May ’68 and its Afterlives. Chicago and London : University of Chicago Press, 
2002, pp. 8, 184; Vigna, Xavier. L’Insubordination ouvrière dans les années 68. 
Rennes Ed. Presses universitaires de Rennes: 2007, p.37; Zancarini-Fournel, Michelle. 
L’épicentre. In : Artières, Phillipe and Zancarini-Fournel, Michelle. eds. 68: Une 
histoire collective. Paris: La Découverte, 2008, p.226; Zancarini-Fournel, Michelle. Le 
moment 68: Une histoire contestée. Paris Le Seuil, 2008, p.46; Kergoat, Jacques. Sous 
la plage, la grève. In : Artous, Antoine; Epsztajn, Didier;  Silberstein, Patrick eds., La 
France des années 68. Paris : Syllepse, 2008, p. 66. 
  
regime. The following day, De Gaulle returned to Paris and addressed the 
nation. His speech was followed by a massive rightist demonstration which 
contested the leftist dominance of the streets of the capital. The government 
took the offensive, guaranteed “the right to work,” and threatened 
recalcitrant strikers with repressive state power. Unlike in 1848 or 1871, 
authorities were able to fuel and feed the city and thus to prevent their 
adversaries from gaining the solid support of discontented housewives.
7
 In 
the first week of June, strikers in smaller firms returned to work, and 
gradually in the first half of that month, holdouts from the major enterprises 
negotiated firm-by-firm agreements which ended the work stoppages.   
Workers’ actions could only with difficulty be seen as a “rupture” or, 
in the hyperbolic words of André Malraux and Georges Pompidou, “a crisis 
of civilization.” Similarly, the influential sociologists mentioned above 
viewed wage earners as participating in a broader movement that challenged 
the social order. They posited that salaried personnel desired autogestion 
(workers’ control) which demanded the end of separation between those 
who commanded and those who obeyed. According to these analysts and 
some recent historical accounts, workers wanted to democratize their 
workplaces.
8
 Other progressives sympathetic to the movement yearned so 
deeply to believe that workers wished to take over their factories that they 
invented the story that the personnel of the CSF factory at Brest had 
initiated “democratic control” and were producing walkie-talkies.9 The 
myth-makers—who included historians Alain Delale and Gilles Ragache, 
theorists Ernest Mandel and Serge Mallet, and the major newspapers Le 
Monde and Témoignage chrétien—proved as willing to take their desires for 
reality as any youthful gauchiste.  
As in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, strikers’ demands 
remained traditionally materialist, and workplace democracy was seldom 
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invoked by the workers themselves or their representatives.
10
 Rather than 
reflecting worker sentiment, the call for autogestion may have served as a 
facile solution to the genuine and thorny problem of worker dissatisfaction 
with industrial discipline in particular and wage labor in general. The 
doctrines of self-management had little appeal to a mass of wage laborers 
for whom work remained travail (from the Latin, tripalium, instrument of 
torture) and who were more enthusiastic about escaping the factory or 
enjoying the opportunities of consumption provided by the expanding 1960s 
economy. Despite the rhetoric of various unions and parties, including the 
leftist groupuscules, workers never fully identified themselves as producers 
who wanted to take control of the means of production. 
The notion of workers’ control in the 1960s recalled fin-de-siècle 
French revolutionary syndicalism. Autogestionnaire militants and 
intellectuals demanded that the individual adapt to the productivist 
collectivity. However, workers inevitably questioned whether it was really 
advantageous for them to run the factories.
11
 Many concluded that it was 
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not, since successful workers’ control demanded a degree of professional 
and social commitment that they could not or would not provide. Instead of 
autogestion, during the strikes of May-June, the major CGT and even local 
Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT, French Democratic 
Confederation of Labor) affiliates recalled their agreement of January 1966, 
which pledged to struggle for a dramatic 35 percent increase in the 
minimum wage, higher salaries for skilled workers, job security, and a 
reduction of the working week.
12
 In metallurgy and other branches, the CGT 
and the CFDT demanded less work time and more pay, particularly for the 
lowest-paid workers, who were often foreigners, women, or young people.
13
 
This signaled the resolve of union activists (generally male and French) to 
reach out to social groups who composed the majority of industrial workers.  
Well before May, the CGT had made efforts to attract different 
categories of wage earners, including women.
14
 The demand for female 
equality meshed harmoniously with new attitudes toward female freedom 
and emancipation in the “long sixties.”15 As early as 1965, the CGT had 
called for a reduction of working hours for women. Aware of “the double 
and profoundly social role of female workers as both wage earners and 
mothers,” it campaigned in 1967 for equal wages and opportunities for 
working females. CGT militants insisted upon “the end of any type of 
discrimination against women.”16 In a special edition of its women’s 
magazine, the confederation argued that females should labor less. Its 
activists claimed that a work-free Saturday and reduced work time were 
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even more necessary for women because “time-measurement and piecework 
has pushed them to the brink.”17 The CFDT too had appealed for equal pay 
for equal work, regardless of sex.   
Women were not the only objects of the unions’ attentions. The 
confederations also wanted young workers and immigrants to participate as 
equals in the worlds of labor and leisure.  The unions accepted growing 
1960s multiculturalism and recognized that “one out of four workers is 
foreign,” a percentage which was three or four times greater than during the 
last great strike wave of 1936. The CGT congratulated itself on its “long 
tradition of internationalism” and supported the demands of immigrés.18 
French Communists backed the Italian Communists’ Main d’Oeuvre 
Immigré (MOI, Immigrant Labor Force), which fought for equal pay and 
equal rights.
19
 The unions urged the end to discrimination against foreigners 
and youth and demanded the suppression of the practice of paying lower 
wages to youthful wage earners. Prior to May, the CGT made special efforts 
to recruit young rebels who resisted factory discipline and the authority of 
supervisory personnel. It wanted to enlist insurgent youth who might have 
otherwise gravitated towards gauchisme.
20
 Youthful CGT activists insisted 
that employers pay for educational courses, sporting activities, housing for 
young married couples, and a fifth week of paid vacation. Displaying their 
desire for a key commodity of consumer society, young automobile workers 
at Citroën pleaded for the right to discount car rentals during their 
vacations.
21
 As in automobile firms, the formal demands of striking youth in 
vocational high schools—more money for scholarships and the creation of a 
technology teaching center—were highly materialist.22  
Although militants occupied many factories—e.g., 31 out of 39 
striking firms in the Parisian suburbs of Issy-les-Moulineaux and 20 out of 
40 in Boulogne-Billancourt—the occupations revealed that the rank and file 
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had little desire to become actively involved. Contrary to the assertions of 
the Union national des étudiants de France (UNEF, National Student Union 
of France) activists and other leftists, who adhered to the productivist legacy 
of Marxism and council communism, many forms of worker struggle did 
not imply “a total change of society.”23 In general, the number of workers 
actually engaged in the occupations remained a tiny percentage of the work 
force. At Sud-Aviation, the pioneer plant of the occupation wave, the 
overwhelming majority of workers did not wish to participate in the sit-in, 
but rather to spend time alone or with their families and friends. Only 3,195 
of 8,000 workers voted, and just 1,699 of them wanted to occupy the 
factory.
24
 Merely several hundred out of a work force of 5,000 occupied the 
Renault factory at Cléon.
25
 At Flins, approximately 250 of 10,000 were 
occupiers. A few hundred of the 30,000 workers at Boulogne-Billancourt 
remained inside the flagship plant. At Citroën, both strike meetings and the 
occupation revealed the passivity of the rank and file, who remained content 
to permit those union militants who had initiated the strike to spend time at 
the workplace.
26
 In the Citroën branch in the fifteenth arrondissement, 
usually no more than 100 occupiers out of a work force of over 20,000 were 
present. Leftists charged that the Citroën strike committee was more 
concerned with organizing ping-pong matches and card games than with 
educating workers politically. During the long weekend of Pentecost (June 
1-3)  when gasoline became readily available, only twelve remained in the 
factory. The occupations were the greatest wave since 1936, but the small 
number of occupiers suggested that the number of engaged militants was 
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proportionally tiny. In contrast to 1936, when masses of workers remained 
in the factories to prevent unemployed scabs from entering them, in 1968—
when full employment prevailed—the fear of scabbing was relatively weak, 
and workers felt less compelled to join sit-downs.  
Usually it was the same group who initiated the strikes—mature 
male French workers close to the CGT—that conducted the occupation.  
Employers continued to attribute “responsibility” for most strikes to union 
militants, particularly the CGT.
27
 Of the 77 metallurgical strikes listed, CGT 
militants were responsible for 68, CFDT for 6, and Force Ouvrière (FO, 
Workers’ Force) for 3. As a rule, militants were male. Although women in 
the textile and service industries were unusually active, sectors with a 
female work force generally struck less than male-dominated branches.
28
 
Wives found themselves saddled with increased social and familial 
responsibilities during the strike wave.
29
 When observers discussed the 
change in June of “public opinion” towards strikes, they often meant the 
opinion of women.  School closings added to their child-care duties.
30
 
Unexpected shutdowns, lack of fuel, unavailability of cash, and runs on 
supplies complicated shopping. Many workers did not stop working because 
their “women at home did not look favorably upon the strike.”31 Numerous 
wives opposed the work stoppage because it unbalanced the family budget 
or, in higher income households, destroyed vacation plans. It is not 
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surprising that militants reported divorces. A Flins worker with radical 
tendencies explained to a strike sympathizer that his wife did not want to see 
him involved in the movement. As the stoppages endured, perhaps even 
more than males, women feared politicization, i.e., the subordination of 
material demands of the movement to the political goals of left parties and 
unions. Yet during the strikes they pragmatically welcomed the meals 
offered by left municipalities. They also appreciated the aid of priests in the 
working-class suburbs who “every day visited some families [of strikers] in 
their homes.”32   
Metallurgical industrialists reported that older and more experienced 
workers provoked the stoppages.
33
 Fifty-one out of 88 strikes (58 percent) 
were started by wage earners between 30 and 40 years old. Twenty-four (27 
percent) were begun by 20- to 30-year olds.  Only 7 (8 percent) were 
initiated by those under twenty. Young people under 30 may have become 
strike leaders in firms where unions were weak, but usually activists had 
some seniority.
34
 Workers who had been employed in their firms for more 
than one year were leaders of 67 percent of the strikes. Wage earners at 
Renault-Billancourt and at a major electronics firm, Jeumont-Schneider, in 
La Plaine-Saint Denis, did not remember young wage earners as particularly 
active in the strike.
35
  
The above information is significant because it modifies the common 
interpretation of May 1968 as a youth revolt.
36
 Even in cases such as 
Renault-Cléon (Seine-Maritime), where young workers were said to be most 
committed to the movement, the major unions and their more mature trade 
unionists quickly gained control over the work stoppage.
37
 Relatively 
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mature, stable, and unionized French workers were largely responsible for 
initiating metallurgical strikes in the Paris region. The stoppages in Parisian 
metallurgy confirm the statistical analysis that has established that age was 
not a determining factor in the strike wave.
38
   
Maturity, though, did not exclude boldness. Metallurgical 
industrialists noted that in 35 out of 41 reported strikes, workers used threats 
to convince their colleagues to stop work. In 16 of 60 strikes, militants 
resorted to force; yet they did not usually insult their bosses or lock in 
management. In only two cases was property damaged, but the threat of 
sabotage certainly existed. For example, several persons entered a factory at 
night and set a truck on fire.  A police investigation was unable to conclude 
if the incident was provoked by strike tensions or by a desire for 
“vengeance” on behalf of a worker fired before May. In certain white-collar 
firms, union militants forcibly excluded non-union workers.
39
 CGT militants 
dominated the occupation at Jeumont-Schneider, an important electronics 
firm in the Parisian suburbs, and locked out anti-CGT and indifferent 
workers. At Flins, veteran wage earners normally manned picket lines.
40
  
Sometimes—especially in one large white-collar company that was 
occupied—older militants were joined by young gauchistes. The presence 
of leftists did not alter the corporatist concerns of strike committees, which 
were reluctant to forge links with students or even with other occupied 
firms. Police explained that the Parti communiste français (PCF, French 
Communist Party) was sure that the situation was not revolutionary and 
insisted that strikers fly the tricolor as well as the red flag at the gates of 
their factory.
41
 Foreigners usually played a minimal role, perhaps because 
French wage laborers in many cases regarded them as strikebreakers or as 
disinterested trade unionists.
42
 Yet some nationalities were more willing to 
participate than others.  For example, at Citroën-Levallois, Spanish workers 
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were active during the work stoppage; whereas, North African workers were 
largely passive.
43
   
As the stoppages endured, mature breadwinners seemed more 
anxious to end the strikes than younger wage earners.
44
 It was at the end of 
the strikes—not the beginning, as many have assumed—that a generation 
gap became relevant in the workplace. Young workers resisted returning to 
the workplace more than their elder colleagues. Indeed, perhaps the most 
famous striker, known only by her first name Jocelyne, was captured on 
film as she defiantly refused to return to work as the strike at her 
metallurgical factory was being settled.
45
 The continuing popularity of anti-
work ideologies quickly transformed Jocelyne into the rebellious heroine of 
the May revolt. Her refusal to labor (ne pas perdre sa vie à la gagner as the 
slogan went) pithily expressed the specific sixties’ synthesis of personal, 
social, and political concerns. Being both female and a worker further 
heightened her status as a symbol of an ideology that male intellectuals had 
articulated. Her complete disappearance from the media spectacle enhanced 
her mystique. Yet ultimately neither she nor any other individual or group 
resolved the problem of wage labor. Thus, ideologists of the sixties 
proposed contradictory solutions that ranged from the abolition of work to 
its internalization in a democratic workplace.   
Initially, women were excluded from certain sit-downs for “moral 
reasons,” but in others they played important roles.46 Occupations disclosed 
gender divisions. The 400 female workers at the Kréma chewing gum 
factory outnumbered the 200 males, but male domination of the strike 
provoked the resentment of women.
47
 At a branch of the Compagnie des 
compteurs of Montrouge, women did participate in the occupation, yet only 
in their traditional roles as cleaners and cooks. Men proved reluctant to 
allow them to spend the night at the factory in order “to avoid that the 
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bosses make an issue of morality.”48 Women rejected this argument and by 
the third night of the occupation were almost as numerous as men. Usually, 
the overwhelming majority of workers—female or male, foreign or 
French—preferred to stay away from the plant.49   
Large numbers—whether male or female—displayed little 
commitment to the electoral process at the workplace, and participation in 
strike votes varied widely from 40 to 75 percent.
50
  The low level of 
attendance contrasts sharply with late nineteenth century when meetings 
attracted 80 to 100 percent of strikers.
51
 Union and non-union strikers of 
some of the most important Parisian firms—Otis Elevators, Sud Aviation, 
Nord Aviation, Thomson-Houston, Rhône-Poulenc—reflected on striker 
passivity in a pamphlet written at the beginning of June.  They contended 
that in order to win, a greater number of workers [must] get involved. While 
the strike forces everyone to make material sacrifices, many comrades rely 
on a minority and do not participate actively. This allows the government to 
divide workers by playing on the weariness of some and on the poor 
information of others… There is only one response to these tactics of 
division: massive participation of all workers who have stayed away from 
the occupied factories.
52
  
To encourage non-committed or apathetic workers to join the 
movement, the pamphleteers recommended adopting the model of strike 
organization at Rhône-Poulenc (Vitry), where rank-and-file strikers elected 
strike committees that were easily revocable. Militants regarded the 
occupation of this firm as particularly impressive because 1,500 of a work 
force of 3,500, or 43 percent, were actively involved.
53
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Even in this example of relatively high participation approximately 
57 percent of personnel avoided activism. Many wished to evade the 
workplace and stayed at home either to garden or to bricoler. Suggestions 
from an inter-union committee, action committees, and Nanterre students 
that proposed a more innovative and participatory form of striking failed to 
interest wage earners. Committees recommended that workers engage in 
“freebie strikes” to rally opinion to their side and to direct public anger 
against the government. For example, garbage men should collect 
accumulated trash, transportation workers should permit free rides, and 
Postes, Télégraphes, Téléphones (PTT, Communications) employees should 
allow free postage and telephone calls.
54
 However, sanitation, transport, and 
postal workers disappointed activists by making only traditional 
bread-and-butter demands. The belief of the Movement of March 22 that the 
occupations expressed the “unconscious yearning of the working class to 
take over the means of production” was wishful thinking.55 March 22’s 
demand for the sabotage of the means of production in case of a police 
assault usually went unheeded.
56
 Striking workers seldom damaged 
property, and when they did, their targets—telephone lines, vehicles, etc.—
were precise and limited.  
 Indeed, workers’ strikes displayed a considerable continuity with 
previous strike waves.  As in the nineteenth century, most strikers did not 
use the stoppage as a political weapon, even though the political climate had 
a decisive influence on the strikes’ beginning and ending.57 The fact that 
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student radicals looked to workers to make the revolution was less important 
in sparking strikes than the divisions among political elites. What has been 
called the “political opportunity structure” encouraged the extension of the 
unrest to wage earners.
58
  As in 1789, 1848, 1871, and 1936, cleavages 
within ruling groups promoted popular revolt. Students triggered the 
enormous wave of work stoppages during the second half of May by 
challenging the state and, at the same time, provoking its brutality.
59
 Both 
student and worker actions were parts of “a general cycle of protest,” which 
traversed the social system from its center to the periphery.
60
   
A strong state proved as necessary to limit workers’ insubordination 
in the late 1960s as it had during the Popular Front strike waves of the late 
1930s. In contrast to 1936, when Prime Minister Léon Blum defied 
management and endorsed the shortening of the work week from 48 to 40 
hours, Prime Minister Pompidou rejected workers’ demands for a 40-hour 
week and negotiated a moderately progressive reduction of the work 
week—2 hours for wage earners laboring more than 48 hours and 1 hour for 
those laboring between 45 and 48 hours.
61
 The follow-up to the Grenelle 
Accord, the national agreement between employers and unions of December 
13, 1968, decided in principle to return gradually to the forty-hour week 
without a reduction of buying power.
62
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Many workers shared an ambivalent attitude towards salaried labor 
which they considered both wage slavery, but also a part of their social 
identity. An important recent work, Xavier Vigna, L’Insubordination 
ouvrière dans les années 68, focuses on resistance to labor discipline in the 
decade following 1968. Vigna explores absenteeism, slowdowns, lateness, 
faking illness, turnover, sabotage, and theft during what he and other French 
historians have called “les années 68.”63 These revolts against work 
integrated various components of the class.  Militants and rank and file, 
women and men, French and foreign could all participate in the “guerrilla” 
against wage labor. Vigna renews the rich tradition of French social/labor 
history by showing the paradox of workers’ identities as both producers and 
refusers. While avoiding workspace and work-time, wage earners used the 
same vocabulary that they had employed in the nineteenth century and 
labeled their enemies—whether scabs or cops—“lazy” (fainéants). Vigna 
also demonstrates the dual role of the state as état-flic and état-providence. 
However, his periodization of “insubordination” is not fully convincing.64 
Since he fails to explore resistance to work before the 1968 strike wave, he 
cannot argue that the decade following 1968 was especially “insubordinate.” 
Strike statistics do not indicate any major increase in days lost to work 
stoppages in the decade before and after 1968, even if the number of strikes 
and strikers did rise.
65
 We do not know how the micro-conflicts Vigna 
examines were different either in kind or degree from other mini-struggles 
prior to 1968. Acts of insubordination were hardly new phenomena and 
were prevalent from 1936 to 1938.
66
 The Gaullist government was much 
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more effective in limiting resistance to work than its Popular Front 
counterpart in the 1930s or its contemporary Italian foil during the maggio 
strisciante.
67
   
Socially, the strike wave of 1968 expressed continuity by repeating 
the nineteenth and early twentieth pattern of elite division which caused 
state weakness and consequently promoted worker opportunity. Workers 
made very few demands for revolutionary workers’ control and instead 
asked for more wages and less work time. Even though women, immigrants 
and youth participated to varying degrees, French male militants led the 
work stoppages. The 1968 stoppages did not support a Marcusian 
interpretation that workers were integrated into capitalist society since 
resistance to work, whether in form of strikes, absenteeism, sabotage, theft, 
lateness, etc. had to be curbed by a strong state (état flic) which served, in 
workers’ words, as prison wardens (gardes-chiourme).68 The absence in the 
1968 work stoppages of a significant rupture with the past can help to 
explain the “memory deficit” of the strikes in present-day French 
consciousness.
69
  In sharp contrast to the continuity in the domain of labor, 
discontinuity dominated the cultural arena. In the sixties, public questioning 
of work expanded from avant-garde groups such as the Surrealists to a 
larger mass of students and workers. Similarly, the sixties also marked a 
new interest in labor history which for the first time began to chronicle 
workers’ everyday refusals of work.70 A focus on resistance to work helps 
link the French movement to others around the world.
71
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The Significance of the Mass Strike during the German 
Revolution of 1918-1919 
William A. Pelz 
y strikes, this article means, in agreement with Marcel van der Linden, 
“forms of struggle, coercion and power in which a group of workers 
collectively stops working to enforce economic, social and/or political 
demands that matter to those directly concerned and/or others.”1 This may 
seem obvious to most scholars, but in the popular media strikes are often 
confused or conflated with demonstrations, riots or other forms of public 
activity. Of course, all discussions of the working class can be subject to 
greatly nuanced discussion along with various ideological interpretations.
2
 
Strikes, and most of all the general strike, have long been considered 
as having potential as an insurrectionary weapon. Georges Sorel, French 
syndicalist philosopher, went so far as to hold that the myth of the general 
strike was a major factor in the rise of the workers’ movement.3 Sorel notes 
that even a general political strike “might be peaceful and of short duration, 
its aim being to show the Government that it is on the wrong track.”4 On the 
other hand, there is the Syndicalist general strike where the “proletariat 
organizes itself for battle . . . it longs for the final contest in which it will 
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give proof of the whole measure of its valour.”5 As the Industrial Workers 
of the World,
6
 based mainly in the United States, were fond of saying “One 
Big Union, One Big Strike”.7 With less stress on union organization, 
anarchists have often seen strikes as weapons against the state.
8
 In addition, 
various members of the Socialist International also would on occasion talk 
about the need to consider the general strike as a weapon in the arsenal of 
Social Democracy.
9
 Karl Kautsky considered that mass strikes “may be used 
as an effective weapon” in the battle for suffrage.10 
Rosa Luxemburg had a different conception of the nature of the mass 
strike than those cited above. In her famous work on the Russian Revolution 
of 1905, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions, she 
criticized both anarchists on the left and Social Democrats on the right as 
having an essentially mechanical view of strikes. That is, they saw the strike 
as a weapon that can either be used or not used according to the taste of 
leaders. Both tendencies based themselves on the “assumption that the mass 
strike is a mere technical weapon that can be ‘decided’ or ‘banned’ at will . . 
. A kind of jack knife that is closed and ready, carried in the pocket ‘just in 
case’ and can be opened and used.”11 As the German Revolution of 1918-
1919 was later to prove, neither commanding a strike wave, nor prohibiting 
it, would prove successful.  
The mass strike, according to Luxemburg, was a more complex, 
historically based and even contradictory phenomena. She argued that if the 
Russian Revolution of 1905 “teaches us anything at all, then it is especially 
that the mass strike is not artificially ‘made’, not ‘decided’ haphazardly, not 
‘propagated,’ but it is a historical phenomenon that results from social 
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relations at a certain moment of time with historical necessity.”12 This 
means that the strike ceases ultimately to be a tactic and becomes a 
historically determined phenomenon. This clearly demonstrates 
Luxemburg’s political differences with V.I. Lenin13 especially as concerns 
both the mass strike and democracy.
14
 Less than a decade after Luxemburg 
had published her critique,
15
 Europe was plunged into the largest bloodbath 
hitherto known on the continent.  
The events of the First World War are well known and need not be 
repeated here. The point does need to be emphasized that the battle field 
losses Germany suffered were mirrored in death and pain on the home front. 
As many as three quarters of a million German civilians may have died as a 
result of the food shortages caused by the British naval blockade. The lack 
of food combined with falling real wages as the government attempted “to 
develop substitutes for fat – an abiding deficiency – from rats, mice, 
hamsters, crows, cockroaches, snails and earthworms, even hair clippings 
and old leather boots, but none was very successful.”16 These experiments 
neither solved the food shortage crisis nor endeared the common people to 
the Imperial system. In fact, the “class peace” proclaimed by the leadership 
of the Majority Social Democratic Party (SPD) felt increasingly like a vain 
boast as workers struck against hunger, sometimes the war itself, and 
ultimately the entire system. 
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Table I 
Strikes in Germany during World War One17 
 
Time Period   Number of Strikes Workers on Strike 
  
January – July 1914    1199   94,014 
August, 1914           0            0 
September-December 1914       24     1,126 
1915        141   12,866 
1916        240            124,865 
1917        562              651,461 
1918        773         1,304,248 
 
While local radical groups had influenced some, or even many, of 
these job actions, it seems that the overwhelming bulk were spontaneous 
reactions. Still, as the war ground on and particularly after the Bolshevik 
Revolution in autumn 1917, the strikes and the workers became more 
politicized. A vague, if intense, longing for peace among the workers “was 
transformed into an ardent sympathy with the Bolsheviks in the course of 
their negotiations with the German militarists.”18 In late January 1918, 
between 250,000 and 400,000 workers, particularly in Berlin, went on 
strike. Besides economic demands, the strikers asked for an end to the war 
without annexations or indemnities. By February, the strike was broken with 
great brutality with long sentences handed out freely by military courts that 
judged civilians accused of political crimes.
19
 The left-wing Revolutionary 
Shop Stewards
20
 were unable to turn this into a general strike against the 
war nor were the SPD officials able to prevent it from happening. Yet, by 
October 1918, General Ludendorff feared “There is no relying on the troops 
anymore . . . our western army will lose its last self-control and, in complete 
chaos, flee back across the Rhine and bring revolution to Germany.”21 
                                               
17 Kuczynski, Jürgen. Die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter in Deutschland von 1800 bis in 
die Gegenwart. Berlin: Verlag die Freie Gewerkschaft, 1947, p. 249. 
18 Rosenberg, Arthur. Imperial Germany: The Birth of the German Republic. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 210. 
19 Ibid., pp. 211-216. 
20 For more on this interesting, if short lived organization, consult the work of Müller, 
Richard. Vom Kaiserreich zur Republik, 2 vols. Vienna: Malik Verlag, 1925. And 
Barth, Emil. Aus der Werkstatt der deutschen Revolution. Berlin: A. Hoffman Verlag, 
1918. 
21 Von Thaer, Albert. Generalstabsdienst an der Front und in der OHL. Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1958, p. 236. 
  
As fate would have it, when the red flags signaling the outbreak of 
what has gone down in history as the November Revolution first appeared, 
they emanated from neither factory nor front, but rather from the fleet. By 
October 1918, the common sailors looked increasingly forward to the end to 
a war that was less dangerous but as tedious, boring and degrading as army 
service. The Admirals thought differently. The Lords of the German High 
Seas Fleet wanted to redeem their honor even at the risk of great losses. 
They planned a full scale assault against the superior British naval forces 
that had kept them bottled up near Germany’s coast line throughout the war. 
Whether or not the naval leaders contemplated mass suicide, this was the 
way most sailors perceived matters.
22
 When ordered to sea, sailors on two 
ships mutinied. The mutiny soon spread to other ships and even in face of 
mass arrests, the movement was too strong to be suppressed.
23
 By the first 
days of November, the Imperial German high seas fleet was effectively out 
of the war and the sailors were heading for home and in many cases 
spreading word of the revolution.
24
 
This led to frantic efforts on the part of some leftists to call for a 
mass strike and insurrection to be held on November 11.
25
At the other end 
of the labor movement, the moderate SPD leaders attempted to hold back 
the wave of radicalism. On November 4, the SPD issued a manifesto that 
warned of anonymous flyers and mouth-to-mouth agitation which were 
urging workers to strike and go out onto the streets. The SPD statement 
warned “rash acts may bring horrible disaster to the individual and to our 
party. Action that promises success must have the support of the entire 
working class. Yet for this action the moment is not ripe.”26 The plan for an 
uprising was upstaged by the masses taking action on November 9 without 
                                               
22 Horn, Daniel (ed. & trans.). War, Mutiny and Revolution in the German Navy: The World 
War I Diaries of Seaman Richard Stumpf.  New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1967, pp. 417-420. 
23 Horn, Daniel. The German Naval Mutinies of World War I. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1969, pp. 225-226. 
24 Most soldiers, like the sailors, wanted to get home as quickly as possible. See 
Stephenson, Scott. The Final Battle: Soldiers of the Western Front and the German 
Revolution of 1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
25 Broué, Pierre. The German Revolution, 1917-1923. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005, p. 
136. 
26 “Aufruf des Vorstands der SPD vom 4. November 1918,” Institut fur Marxismus-
Leninismus (ed.), Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen 
Arbeiterbewegung, Reihe II (1914-1945), Vol. 2: November 1917-Dezember 1918, 
Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1957, pp. 289-290. 
  
awaiting orders from the would-be revolutionaries while, at the same time, 
the pleas of the SPD moderates fell on largely deaf ears.
27
 
Commenting on the revolutionary process, Rosa Luxemburg noted 
that: “there was nothing of the sort of a preconceived plan or an organized 
campaign since the parties’ proclamations were hardly able to keep abreast 
with the spontaneous upheaval of the masses. The leaders had barely time to 
formulate the slogans of the forward rushing mass of proletarians.”28 
Interestingly, those words were written over a decade earlier about the 1905 
Russian Revolution, but they could just as well describe Germany in 1918.   
In fact, the way strikes did, or did not, break out would seem to have 
proved Luxemburg’s point. As one radical historian comments: “The 
revolution which exploded in Germany during the first days of November 
1918 seems at first sight to confirm the expectations and the opinions of 
Rosa Luxemburg. The working masses were finding their way to 
revolutionary action despite their leaders, and often against them, almost 
completely independently of the revolutionary organizations, which were 
overtaken by the event . . .”29 Rosa Luxemburg knew that the strike wave 
that could be transformed into socialist revolution would be a product of 
history and not the creation of a mere decree.
 30
 Her fellow revolutionary 
Karl Liebknecht was not so sure.  
Karl Liebknecht, who with Luxemburg founded the German 
Communist Party (KPD) at the end of 1918, was one of the most recognized 
voices of revolt. More moved by the power of the Bolshevik example than 
many German revolutionaries were, he combined this position with a type 
of inherent revolutionary optimism that annoyed Luxemburg.
31
 All of these 
                                               
27 For a different view that stresses the conscious activity of a select number of 
revolutionaries see Hoffrogge, Ralf. Richard Müller: Der Mann hinter der 
Novemberrevolution. Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag, 2008.  For a more detailed appreciation 
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16(1), Spring/Summer,  pp. 138-139, 2012. 
28 Luxemburg, Op.Cit, p.110. 
29 Broue, Op.Cit., p. 129. 
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 This is the argument made for a consciousness that is neither separate nor distinct from 
the working class in Guérin, Daniel. Rosa Luxemburg et la spontanéité révolutionnaire. 
Paris: Flammarion, 1971. 
31 Fischer, Ruth. Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the Origin of the State Party. 
Cambridge, MA,: Harvard University Press, 1948, pp. 73-74. 
  
things came together and caused him to be reckless, particularly during the 
fatal days of January 1919 in Berlin.
32
 
Provoked by the dismissal of the radical Berlin police chief, anger 
got the better of prudence for many. It was also alleged that there were 
police agents urging crowds on to occupy buildings, such as Alfred Roland, 
leader of the group that occupied the SPD’s newspaper.33  
Failing to understand the virtue of patience, Liebknecht rushed into 
premature action, dragging the KPD into an ill-considered pact with the 
Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the left-wing of the Independent Social 
Democrats. When Luxemburg first heard of what Liebknecht had got them 
involved in, she exclaimed: “Karl, is that our program?”34 This terrible 
overreach would give the counter-revolutionaries the opportunity to murder 
him and Luxemburg on January 15, 1919.
35
 From there they went on to 
murder much of the far left leadership in Germany. 
Part of the objective situation was that a massive increase in 
unemployment had made many workers desperate to the point of 
recklessness while at the same time undercutting the ease of organizing 
strikes since those remaining employed were more likely older and more 
moderate and fearful of losing their jobs. The irony is that those who were 
most willing to engage in strikes were often without jobs that they could 
withdraw their labor from.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
32 For more on Liebknecht and Luxemburg during the revolution, see Laschitza, Annelies. 
Rosa Luxemburg und Karl Liebknecht in den Wochen der Revolution. In: Ito, Narihiko 
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Table II 
Unemployed Relief Recipients, 1918-191936 
 
     Date      Number 
    1 December 1918      501,610 
    1 January 1919       905,137 
    1 February 1919              1,076,368 
    1 March 1919              1,053,854 
    1 April 1919      829,580 
    1 May 1919       700,000 
 
Thus, it can be argued that the events of the German Revolution of 
1918-19 reaffirmed Luxemburg’s theory of the role of strikes in the 
revolutionary process. Yet, she wrote that “for the coming mass conflicts in 
Germany, the absolutely necessary unity of the unionized and social 
democratic worker movement actually exists. Unity is embodied in the 
broad masses that is the basis of both social democracy and of the unions 
and in the consciousness of both sides that they are merged into one spiritual 
entity.”37 This turned out to be wishful thinking, as the majority of the 
leaders of German labor dared little and feared the left more than the right.  
When, during the heady days of early November 1918, Liebknecht 
went to give a speech proclaiming the Socialist Republic, SPD leader 
Scheidemann was warned and in haste gave a speech wherein he proclaimed 
the formation of a German republic with all socialist parties invited to 
participate.
38
  This impromptu declaration undercut the left but Ebert, SPD 
leader and first President of the Weimar Republic, turned livid with rage as 
he lectured Scheidemann that he had no right to proclaim a republic.
39
 
Quickly reversing himself, Ebert supported the Kaiser’s abdication, and 
finally even the Republic, but only out of fear of the alternative. Ebert said 
that if the Kaiser did not go “then social revolution is inevitable. But I will 
have nothing to do with it, I hate it like sin.”40 Of more importance, was the 
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fact that Army Headquarters asked their officers if the troops would fight 
for Kaiser Wilhelm II.  The answer was overwhelmingly: Nein!
41
 
What tentative conclusions might one draw from this historical 
episode and what questions might be asked? (1) To be successful, a general 
or mass strike must have overwhelming support that can only be expected to 
occur in exceptional circumstances. (2) Mass unemployment undermines 
class unity by potentially pitting employed versus unemployed.  As early as 
February 1906, Luxemburg recognized that the “Achilles heel” of the 
workers’ movement “is the colossal unemployment, which is spreading like 
a terrible plague.”42 (3) Urban revolutionaries often take too little notice of 
the rural proletariat, let alone small landowning peasants. Unless these are 
drawn into the revolution, even successful strike action in cities is likely to 
be broken by forces from the countryside. 
43
 (4) The mass strike cannot, 
contrary to syndicalist, anarchist and Social Democratic theories, be willed 
into being. Neither can it be prevented. In 1910, Luxemburg belittled the 
SPD leadership’s attempt “to forbid even a discussion about the mass strike! 
. . . The masses themselves ought to decide.”44 (5) Revolutionary 
organizations must be able to relate to strikes in the context of an 
unpredictable, complex and contradictory situation. This is, of course, 
extremely difficult to do in practice. (6) The mass strike always poses the 
question of power. How can the masses be moved from angry radicalism to 
conscious desire to re-organize society? (7) The strike weapon is often 
initiated as a defensive measure against some attack by either the employers 
or the state. One notable example is the general strike that helped defeat the 
Kapp Putsch against the Weimar Republic.
45
 When and under what 
conditions can a defensive strike action transform itself into an offensive 
weapon? (8) Strikes should be understood less as weapons that can be used 
by leaders and more of as part of the historically determined class struggle. 
Since one of the points of this article is that Rosa Luxemburg had a 
generally correct understanding of the strike as an insurrectionary 
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development, it is fitting that she be given the last word. For further human 
progress, she urged “it is high time that the working masses learn how to 
express their wisdom and ability to act and demonstrate their ripeness for 
the time of great struggles and great tasks in which they, the masses, will be 
the actual chorus and the directing bodies will merely act the ‘speaking 
parts,’ that is be the interpreter of the will of the masses.”46 
 
                                               
46 Luxemburg, Op.Cit., p. 170. 
  
When the Cactus Blooms: A Century of Strikes in Mexico. 
Richard Roman and Edur Velasco 
Mexico: more industrialized, more global, more unstable  
t seems paradoxical that the decline in strikes in contemporary Mexico 
coincides with the country’s increasing importance in global manufacturing 
and the logistical aspects of international capitalism. Mexico is now (2012) 
the second largest economy within the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), with a GDP of U.S. $ 1,743 billion, greater than that 
of Canada and the eleventh largest economy in the world, just behind France 
and Italy.
1
  
A few statistics will further illustrate the crucial role played by 
Mexico in the new international economy. Beginning in 1995, automotive 
production in the factories located in Mexico increased at a dizzying speed, 
reaching an average volume of 210,000 vehicles per month. This is three 
times greater than the rate fifteen years earlier. In 2011, one out of every 
five autos built in North America was produced in Mexico. Companies 
manufacturing transportation equipment and autoparts directly employ 
470,000 people in Mexico (INEGI 2010ª: 2.1.17). With regard to the 
logistical aspects of the world market, the movement of containers through 
Mexican ports has multiplied 15 times during the last quarter of a century. 
Every year Mexico’s new maritime terminals move four million containers, 
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which are transported along highway corridors crossing the country between 
the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, or stretching up to the country’s northern 
border, in some cases having passed through one of the thousands of 
Mexico’s maquiladoras2 Consequently, a strike capable of paralyzing this 
powerful machinery of international capitalism would have consequences—
uneven but appreciable—in world industry, as well as in all the world’s 
ports: from Shanghai to Long Beach, from New York to Rotterdam. 
The dramatic expansion and deepening of the transnational character 
of the Mexican working class has a potential significance as great if not 
greater than the specific gravity of Mexico in the global economy. There are 
four million industrial workers in Mexican territory, and a similar amount in 
the industries of the United States. It is a transnationalized proletariat, some 
of which settles permanently in the US and many others who enter and leave 
according to economic cycles, with flows of half a million people per year.
3
 
This long history of the Mexican working class as a transborder working 
class, with a presence in both the Mexican and US labor markets and labor 
movements, has been profoundly expanded and deepened with capitalist 
globalization. The voracious appetite of US capital for cheap and vulnerable 
labor has combined with the neoliberal destruction of sources of livelihood 
within Mexico to greatly expand Mexican migration to all parts of the US 
and many sectors of the economy. This transnational character of the 
Mexican working class combined with Mexico’s multiple crises creates 
potential for a labor insurgency that could have significant impact on both 
Mexico and the U.S.
4
  
In this essay, we will reconstruct some key aspects of the bleak 
course of Mexico’s labor movement within the history of the subsumption 
of the ancient Mexican nation into the world economy. The deepening of 
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capitalist globalization has further tightened the heavy chains of control 
placed over Mexico’s working class during the decades following the 
Mexican Revolution of 1910.
5
 And the liberalization of the electoral system 
has not led to a growth of labor rights. In fact, the government of 
“democratic transition” has maintained the old system of labor control and 
added new elements of repression. 
The arrival of globalization gave Mexico’s major private 
corporations the hope of creating a strike-proof economic and social 
configuration. They, in collaboration with the government, have carried out 
the worst assault on the living and working conditions of the working class 
in memory. This assault has led to a decrease of strikes every year, as shown 
in Appendix 1 and 2.  
The number of strikes decreased considerably from 1982 to 2010. 
There were only 84 legal strikes in the entire country in 2010, with only 
8,000 workers participating—in a country with a labor force of 50 million 
people. Only one out of every 6,250 persons in the labor force went on 
strike that year.
6
  
This data is perhaps surprising if we consider that over the course of 
the past three decades, the share of wage-earners in the Gross Domestic 
Product decreased from 40 to 25%, and the effective unemployment rate 
increased from 6 to 18%. In addition, accidents in the workplace are turning 
Mexican factories and mines into nothing short of “death chambers” that 
                                               
5 The exploitation of Mexico’s working class can be concentrated into a single statistic. The 
minimum hourly wage in 2011 was 42 cents of a euro. Nearly 25 million workers, or 
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Pasta de Conchos Mine that resulted in the deaths of 65 workers. The official version 
regarding the “compliancy of Mexico’s working class” also disregards the strong 
presence of workers in the post-election conflict in 2006, with their combativeness 
evident in the massive protests in Mexico City between July and October of that year, 
with over a million people participating.    
  
cause the deaths of 7,000 workers each year.
7
 And tens of thousands of 
other accidents leave more workers with serious life-long disabilities. The 
economic and political engineering constructed by the Mexican bourgeoisie 
with the aim of subduing workers in the workplace has been developed step 
by step, and we will examine it in the last part of this article.  
The decline of formal strikes would seem to indicate quiescence on 
the part of the working class. But this decline has been accompanied by a 
silent rebellion, a rebellion difficult to measure statistically but nevertheless 
real. In recent years, workers in a number of factories in northern Mexico 
have begun to demonstrate their discontent in an increasingly defiant 
manner—without revealing their underground network—although these 
actions are not officially recorded as “legal strikes.” They have included the 
burning of facilities, wildcat strikes, occupation of highways next to 
maquiladora assembly plants, and open confrontations with federal security 
forces, as witnessed in Puerto de Lázaro Cárdenas, in the state of Michoacán 
in 2006
8
 and less intensely but still repeatedly in 2009 and 2010. The 
“peaceful labor relations” imposed by Mexico’s neoliberal governments 
since the signing of NAFTA with Canada and the United States in 
November 1993 are fragile. The alleged solidity of these relations is 
disappearing. 
This article will critically examine some important studies of strike 
incidence in twentieth century Mexico and will present an alternative way of 
measuring and interpreting strike data. We will then examine two key 
periods of strike activity (1930s and 1976-1983) in order to present the 
Mexican experience more vividly as well as to illustrate the methodological 
and interpretive problems we see in the studies critiqued. We will then 
discuss the new period of the capitalist offensive and globalization, a period 
in which formal strike activity has continuously declined, but in which 
informal resistance appears to be growing. Finally, in the conclusion, we 
will discuss the implications for the study of strikes and the future of 
Mexico. 
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Determining Factors in the Long Wave of Strikes in Mexico 
There have been various attempts at constructing time series of 
strikes in Mexico from the classic 1965 work of Pablo González Casanova, 
La democracia en México
9
, to the recent work coordinated by B.R. Mitchell 
in the extraordinary 2007 volume, International Historical Statistics
10
, 
which covers the period 1930-2004. We find that these works, along with 
those of Zapata
11
 and Middlebrook
12
, have significant methodological and 
interpretive problems. This paper will suggest a more complete way of 
measuring strikes in Mexico as well as an alternative interpretation of them. 
Our data and analysis will be presented more fully in our forthcoming book 
on Mexican working-class struggles.  
Those strikes that are recorded in Mexico are not recorded in an 
aggregate manner. And many strikes are not recorded at all. Government 
employees, whether federal, state or municipal have a severely restricted 
right to strike. Their strikes, however large and of whatever duration, do not 
appear in official figures. These government employees, including teachers 
and health workers, make up a significant part of the union movement and 
are covered under section “B” of Article 123 (the labor code) of the 
Mexican Constitution.They do not have the right to strike over wages and 
working conditions; they have the hypothetical right to strike only if the 
employer, the government itself, agrees that it has violated their 
constitutional rights in a broad and systematic manner. Therefore almost all 
of their actions of collective resistance are not recognized in government 
statistics as “strikes.” There is no record of them, except in the inaccessible 
archives of the political police and other state security agencies. This 
omission is tremendously important since the public sector has expanded 
massively in the second half of the twentieth century. The collective 
resistance of hundreds of thousands of public sector workers, which has had 
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great importance in Mexican labor history, is omitted from official strike 
data.  
Workers employed by the private sector or by state-owned 
decentralized organisms (paraestatales) involved in production and/or 
services, are included in Part A of the labor code of the Constitution and 
have the right to strike over wages or working conditions. Their strikes, 
however, are recorded in two different sets of records, depending on 
whether the union is registered under federal or local jurisdiction. The 
designation of federal or local is made legislatively by the federal Congress 
according to the importance of the company and the strategic importance of 
that sector of production. Those enterprises designated as strategic, 
important, or of national scope, fall under federal jurisdiction. All other 
enterprises fall under local jurisdiction. Both individual and collective labor-
related issues have to be brought to either the federal or local boards of 
conciliation and arbitration. The importance of this distinction is that strikes 
are recorded in two different registries, those in enterprises that are 
“important, strategic, or national” in the registry of the Federal Conciliation 
and Arbitration Board while the others are recorded by local boards. 
Many strikes of workers covered under section A are also not 
counted in strike data. The local and federal Conciliation and Arbitration 
Boards (juntas) have the legal authority to declare a strike inexistente or 
ilegal and these strikes will not be included in the data. Inexistente refers to 
procedural violations and ilegal refers to violence or threat to public order, 
according to the judgement of the Boards. A good example would be the 
1972 strike at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (National 
Autonomous University of Mexico -- UNAM). This strike, which was 
declared illegal, lasted 85 days and involved 20,000 workers. It is not 
included in strike statistics. Some ilegal or inexistente strikes may end 
immediately, some may go on for considerable periods, depending on many 
factors, including political elements (such as the relation of the union to 
municipal, state, or local government), the strength of union (strategic 
location or skills, solidarity, militancy), and the political conjuncture. The 
omission of these strikes not only underestimates the total number of strikes, 
but likely also underestimates the variation over time as it is likely that a 
greater number of strikes declared ilegal or inexistente would nevertheless 
continue in periods of rising working militancy as compared to periods of 
relative quiescence. 
  
One of the problems in the statistical series elaborated by B.R. 
Mitchell in the section on “North America: Industrial Disputes” in which the 
Mexican data is presented, is that the data from the federal and local 
jurisdictions are not added together, but rather different sources are used for 
different years. Federal jurisdictions are used for some years and local 
jurisdictions for other years. For example, local jurisdiction data is used for 
the 1975-1985 period, but, from 1986 on, federal data is used. Thus the data 
from 1975-1985 only reflects strikes at the local level whereas for 1986-
2004, the data reflects federal jurisdiction strikes. This creates a non-
comparability of data for the different periods and undermines analysis of 
long-term trends. We have combined the data of both the federal and local 
jurisdictions to develop an alternative strike index in an attempt to correct 
this serious problem in Mitchell’s data (see Appendix 1 and 2). 
Perhaps the most specific and detailed works on Mexican strikes are 
those by Francisco Zapata, who developed a methodology based on the six-
year presidential terms in Mexico, using data from the Juntas de 
Conciliación y Arbitraje (Conciliation and Arbitration Boards). Zapata, as 
Mitchell, is inconsistent in his use of sources, at times using local, at other 
times federal.
13
 He reported the number of strikes and strikers through 
averages that coincide with each of the six-year presidential terms in 
Mexico from 1934 to the present.
14
 The most important actors in his 
analysis of strikes are neither workers nor capitalists, but the state-union 
officialdom complex.
 
The most important dynamic is not class struggle but 
formal politics. From his perspective, labor conflict in Mexico is restricted 
by and subordinated to rigorous vertical control of unions by their leaders in 
collaboration with the Federal Executive Branch. The Mexican Revolution 
of 1910-1920 produced a legal and institutional framework in which, 
according to Zapata, strikes were part of the political mechanisms needed by 
the party in power to establish an equilibrium with other forces, such as 
national businessmen and foreign capital. Strikes in Mexico, in his view, did 
not express worker discontent over economic conditions or the imposed 
leadership of their unions.
15
 Zapata also argues that the cycle of strikes in 
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Mexico since 1934 is not related to the long cycle of the Mexican economy, 
nor is it associated with the international configuration of the correlation of 
forces between wage workers and capital.
16
 Rather they were part of a 
dynamic limited to the political plane.
17
  
Our data, based on aggregating both local and federal figures, is 
presented in Appendix Two in comparison to Zapata’s non-aggregated 
figures. We also present our data in the form of an index. In addition to 
showing the differences between our figures and those of Zapata, it supports 
our argument that there are important interconnections between the pattern 
of strikes in Mexico, on the one hand, and the economic cycle, the strategies 
of capital, and international models and events, on the other. Of course, 
Mexican institutional dynamics play a crucial role, but they do not replace 
these other fundamental elements that shape class struggle. The Mexican 
workers’ movement has been inspired into action through the influence of 
international models and events, particularly those in Latin America. As 
well, there has been an increasing synchrony with the patterns of the rest of 
North America (Canada and the United States). 
Zapata’s analysis has led to mistaken perceptions by other authors, 
who have based their understanding of the Mexican experience on Zapata’s 
six-year-term averages.
18
 In contrast to Zapata, we maintain that there was 
                                                                                                                       
peace, and this is achieved by mutual consent with the country’s political authorities. 
Therefore, strikes take place within a dynamic limited to the political sphere, and 
economic fluctuations do not influence their determination. Zapata, F. El Conflicto 
Sindical en América Latina. Mexico: El Colegio de México, 1986, p. 127. [Our 
translation] 
16 Zapata, Op.Cit. 2007, p.122. 
17 Zapata.Op.Cit. 1986, p.127. Also, in a recent text, Francisco Zapata states that since the 
end of the official party system of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, the 
Party of the Institutional Revolution) in 2000, when a different political party came to 
power, the situation has not changed in any substantial way. Zapata maintains that the 
State’s vertical control over labor unions continued during the early part of the first 
decade of the 21st century. “… (The official unions) support the government in any 
critical situation and it ensures that the rank and file do not engage in strikes or 
mobilization through the implementation of clientelistic measures. Until now the CTM 
has been successful …to provide a relatively quiescent labor force…we don’t have 
evidence to suggest that the Mexican Government will really face up to the challenge of 
corporatist unions…An important indicator of the way state-labor relationship 
functioned in Mexico is the overall tendency for decrease in the average number of 
strikes from 1940s to the present”. Zapata. Op.Cit. 2007, pp. 118-122. 
18 Dribbusch, H. and Vandaele, K. Comprehending divergence in strike activity: Employers 
offensive, government interventions and union responses. In: Van der Velden, Op.Cit. 
2007, p. 369, 372.  
  
indeed an increase in workers’ militancy in Mexico in the 1970s and the 
first part of the following decade
19
 as also observed in Argentina, Brazil and 
South Africa.
20
 The retreat by Mexico’s working class during the most 
recent period from 1994 to 2010, with its particular characteristics, was the 
result of a capitalist offensive carried out by the major corporations in all 
three North American countries against their respective working classes
21
, 
and not only a consequence of “national peculiarities” in the relationship 
between Mexico’s working class and the state. Mexico’s quasi-corporatist 
system of labor control
22
 has been an important element in deterring worker 
protest.
23
  But this system of control has itself become subjected to the 
powerful processes of capitalist continental integration that have been part 
of the international capitalist offensive waged against the working class in 
the three nations increasingly integrated under the cloak of  NAFTA.
24
 
Zapata describes an important element – the vertical control over the 
working class and over the incidence of strikes – but that element alone is 
inadequate for understanding the incidence of strikes in Mexico’s state-
heavy dynamic of class struggle. Workers’ culture, consciousness and 
                                               
19 Van der Velden, Sjaak. Introduction. In: Van der Velden, Sjaak. (ed.) Strikes around the 
World 1968-2005: Case Studies of 15 Countries. Amsterdam: Aksant Academic 
Publishers, 2007, pp.20-22. Zapata’s six-year presidential terms conceal a much clearer 
cycle that is, however, apparent in the data published in the Introduction by Van der 
Velden cited above. The powerful labor insurgency in the 1970s is reflected in the 
number of strikes during that period. 
20 Van der Velden, S. and Visser, W. Strikes in the Netherlands and South Africa, 1900-
1998: A Comparison. South African Journal of Labor Relations, vol. 30, no. 1, 2006. 
21 Of course, U.S. capital plays major roles in both Canada and Mexico while Mexican and 
Canadian capital, though having an important presence in some niches, plays a lesser 
role in the U.S. 
22 Roman, R. and Velasco, E. The Peculiarities of Mexico´s Unions. Relay. March-April 
2006. 
23 The old system of labour control was based on five key, inter-related pillars: 1) labour 
law that gave the state control over union recognition and the right to strike; 2) 
integration of the officially recognized unions into the ruling party and state apparatus; 
3) authoritarian control over the unions by the union officialdom on the basis of state 
laws and links as well as the usual control mechanisms of an organizational oligarchy; 
4)`repression by the state and by thugs commanded by the union officials; 5) and, for 
some periods, a social pact that allowed gains for limited sectors of the working class, 
especially in the realm of the social wage (most notably in the period of import 
substitution expansion, the so-called “Mexican miracle” from the 1940s to the 1970s). 
We agree with Zapata that the change from one-party rule to electoral competition has 
not changed the core dynamics of union officialdom-state control over workers. 
24 Part I of our forthcoming book, Continental Crucible: Big Business, Workers and Unions 
in the Transformation of North America (2013), deals with the continental capitalist 
offensive. 
  
horizontal linkages are always important, albeit not easily accessible to the 
researcher. They enter into individual and collective responses of 
acquiescence or resistance. The behavior of workers, whether it is militant 
protest or relative passivity, is not something that is simply imposed. 
Workers’ action and inaction involves individual and collective processes of 
interpreting the just and the possible.  
The Mexican Revolution and the Working Class 
The Constitution, which was written in late 1916 and early 1917 by 
representatives of the Revolution’s triumphant factions, recognized for the 
first time in the country’s history ‒ more as a matter of tactics than 
conviction ‒ the right to association for wage-earning workers, as well as an 
eight-hour workday, with a dignified minimum wage, and of course, the 
right to strike.
25
 The right to strike ‒ as well as employers’ right to lock-out 
workers ‒ was conditioned by the vague notion of its contribution to an 
equilibrium between capital and labor. The determination of whether a 
strike or lock-out contributed to “equilibrium” would be decided by tri-
partite boards of conciliation and arbitration which would basically have the 
right to declare strikes or lockouts legal or illegal.
26
 These boards would 
become powerful institutions of control by the state as well as areas of class 
contestation. Consequently, the first official statistics on strike movements 
in Mexico date back to the creation of the Departamento de Trabajo 
(Department of Labor) and Juntas Locales de Conciliación y Arbitraje 
(Local Conciliation and Arbitration Boards) in in each Mexican state during 
the years immediately following the end of the armed period of the 
Revolution.
27
 The creation of the Juntas Locales de Conciliación y Arbitraje 
led to the legal existence of unions and their right to collective bargaining 
with companies in the various Mexican states. The Juntas Locales de 
Conciliación y Arbitraje immediately became vital spaces of power, 
                                               
25 Roman, R. and Velasco, E. 1810, 1910 and 2010 and Mexican Labor. Against the 
Current. no. 149, November-December, 2010. 
26
 Roman, R. 1976, Ideologia y Clase en la Revolución Mexicana, Mexico: Instituto 
Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, Chapter 5. 
27 Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 instituted the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Boards as public institutions to resolve differences and conflicts between 
labor and capital. 
  
administered by the governor of each territory, in accordance with his 
particular political strategy.
28
 
The wave of strikes in Mexico during the 20th century 
The incidence of strikes in Mexico followed a tendency similar to 
that experienced in the other North American countries during the 
international crisis that exploded in the 1930s – a drop in union membership 
and in strike incidence during the months immediately following the 
beginning of the great crisis, and then an intense process of reorganization 
and worker militancy during the rest of the decade up until the start of the 
Second World War in 1939. The highest point of worker mobilization in the 
case of the United States was reached in 1937, with 4,740 strikes and 1.8 
million workers involved in these strikes.
29
 Worker insurgency in Mexico 
reached its peak during the decade of the 1930s in 1935, with 642 strikes 
and 145,000 strikers. A significant development within this major wave of 
strikes was the recuperation achieved by classist currents in labor unions. 
Many unions elected communist and socialist militants to lead their 
struggles in the 1930s. 
The short duration of the first strike wave in the history of 
contemporary Mexico stands in sharp contrast to the experience in the 
United States where unions continued to vigorously make demands until 
well into 1941, with a spectacular increase in strikes and labor organization. 
Membership in the major industrial unions in the United States increased 
from 3.7 to 10.7 million between 1935 and 1941. In Mexico, however, the 
labor offensive came to a halt unexpectedly in 1937, in response to a change 
in the national political scene. 
The independence, militancy and classist orientation of the new 
labour movement of the 1930s, grouped at that time around its large 
industrial unions and the recently-created Confederación de Trabajadores 
Mexicanos (CTM, Mexican Workers’ Confederation), was destroyed by its 
incorporation into the ruling party, an incorporation based on selective 
coercion and the politics of important sectors of the labor movement. The 
                                               
28 Bortz, J. Revolution within the Revolution: Cotton Textile Workers and the Mexican 
Labor Regime, 1910-1923. California: Stanford University Press, 2008. 
29 US Census Bureau 1976, Historical Statistics of the United Status, Colonial times to 
1970, US Department of Commerce, pp.178-179. 
 
  
ruling party transformed itself in 1938 from a loose coalition of political 
elites to a mass party of four sectors,
30
 one of which was the unions. The 
radical and independent labor movement of the early and mid-thirties had, 
by the end of the thirties, been largely incorporated into the official 
apparatus. 
The incorporation of the labor movement into the regime’s project of 
“revolutionary nationalism” and anti-imperialism was not simply imposed 
from above. First, the working class itself had strong traditions of anti-
imperialist “revolutionary nationalism”. Second, the use of union positions 
and state links by personally ambitious union leaders for personal mobility, 
power, and enrichment also had roots in the union movement. Finally, the 
important role of the Communist Party in building mass independent 
unionism, gave it the leverage to push the independent unions back to 
subordination to the anti-democratic leadership that had emerged in the 
CTM (with government blessing). The Communists had been a key 
component in splitting the main industrial unions from the opportunist and 
anti-democratic leadership of the CTM. But the Comintern (Communist 
International) ordered them to go back in on any terms and back in they 
went, weaker and with a big loss of credibility. The strategy of popular 
frontism of the Soviet Union and the Comintern was very congruent with 
the strategy of “revolutionary nationalism” of the Mexican regime. To 
summarize, the main currents within the leadership of the labour movement 
chose to give up class independence to ally themselves to a party 
organization led by national political elites whose project was national 
capitalist development. The nationalization of the oil industry in 1938, 
previously in the hands of major foreign energy corporations, helped 
consolidate this voluntary subordination to the project of national 
development. The Mexican union movement, including the communist 
current, identified its priority as the tasks of national liberation and the 
recuperation of revenue from natural resources, in this case oil revenue, to 
thus lay the groundwork for the country’s own domestic market. Mexico 
hoped to achieve a higher level of industrialization and higher employment 
levels on the basis of this domestic market. But when the government of 
President Lazaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) turned against key sections of the 
working class, as it increasingly did in the last period of his presidency, the 
working class lacked the independence in perspective and organization as 
                                               
30 This was shortly dropped to three sectors – worker, peasant, and popular – with the 
fourth, the military, dropped. 
  
well as sufficient unity to resist.
31
 The ruling party and labour federation had 
ideologically and politically disarmed the working class and it was thus in a 
weak position to resist paying the price for national capitalist development. 
The working class would pay a huge price for this subordination to 
the national project over the next three decades of industrialization. The 
ruling party and the trade unions then became almost fully – though with 
more autonomy and exceptions than in Communist countries – an 
instrument of government policy for controlling the working class. 
Corruption and gangsterist methods of control of unions and workers 
became characteristic and were fostered and sustained by the government.
32
 
The “labor truce” agreed upon in the Cárdenas era (1934-1940) was 
extended for more than 30 years in a harsh and, at times, brutal manner, 
under the iron hand of the country’s presidents. The state used severe 
repression when faced with any attempt at labor autonomy. Workers were 
only able to achieve major strike movements during brief, intense periods of 
organized labor protest in 1944 and 1958. 
The peak of labor insurgency in the 20th century 
Employment grew significantly from 1970 to 1983, but it was 
especially rapid in mining, auto, and construction. This high demand for 
more workers favored the development of independent organization and 
contributed to the labor insurgency of the period. The second major wave of 
labor insurgency in recent history erupted in 1980. On June 9 the first national 
day of action, or Primera Jornada Nacional, was held by teachers organized 
independently from the corporatist teachers’ union.33 Though concentrated in 
Mexico City, the action was led by teachers in Chiapas, with 80,000 teachers 
participating in a week-long work stoppage.
34
 Workers in all manufacturing 
                                               
31 Roman, R. Nationalization and the Formation of the Administración Obrera of Mexico's 
Railroads, 1937-1938.  Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 35, #3, Winter, 1981, 
pp.3-22. 
32 Campa, Valentín. Mi testimonio. Mexico: Editorial Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1978, 
pp. 167-173. 
33 The CNTE (Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de Educación- National 
Coordinator of Educational Workers), is an organized national alliance of dissident 
teachers’ groups in the SNTE (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de Educación – 
National Union  of Educational Workers), an authoritarian union previously connected 
to the state party, now a key cog in the conservative- neoliberal power bloc. It has close 
to 1.5 million members. 
34 Martínez Verdugo: 478-479.. 
  
areas, from automotive to food production, entered into a period of open labor 
discontent.
35 
 
The paralysis of the official union leaders in the face of the 
combination of inflation and full employment led to growing pressure for 
action from the rank and file in 1981. As well, the rise of Solidarnosc as an 
independent workers movement in Poland and the triumph of the Sandinista 
Revolution in Nicaragua inspired many of these rank and file movements. A 
series of strikes and stoppages were unleashed in automotive plants. Miners 
and metallurgical workers suspended work in copper deposits and steelworks. 
Teachers carried out the largest mobilizations in the country. Between 1981 
and 1982, labor struggles were led by teachers from Oaxaca, Guerrero, Puebla, 
the state of Mexico, Zacatecas, Michoacán, Queretaro, Morelos, Hidalgo and 
eleven other states. Throughout the year, tens of thousands of workers 
participated in struggles for union democracy in the streets of Mexico City 
and throughout the rest of the nation. The teachers’ strikes were not counted 
in the statistics developed by B.R. Mitchell
36
, since they correspond to Section 
B. And here lies our major difference with the analysis presented by Francisco 
Zapata. In the period from 1978 to 1982, precisely when tens of thousands of 
teachers initiated an unprecedented cycle of strikes and work stoppages, 
Francisco Zapata perceives a “decline” in the number of striking workers.37  
The problems with the data on the number of strikers in Zapata’s 
presentation are the same as that for the number of strikes: 1) that is, the 
switching between local and federal data; and 2) the fact that large numbers 
of strikes do not appear in the data. (As well, reliable data on the number of 
strikers, does not yet exist.) There is a substantial difference in the number 
of strikes in Zapata and the number in Roman & Velasco, especially for 
1983, since he switches from local data to federal data. This decrease in the 
number of strikes did not occur. 1983 was a year of considerable labor 
                                               
35 In the final decades of the 20th century, the labor union movement would receive an 
impulse from other major torrents of social mobilization in a country with its own pre-
capitalist cultural matrix, as powerful as Mexico itself. Due to limited space, it is not 
possible to review the magnitude of the contribution from the 1968 student movement 
to the labor insurgency, or the powerful links between the working class and the 1994 
insurrection by the EZLN (Zapatista National Liberation Army) in Chiapas. See 
Velasco Arregui, E. Cuestión Indígena y Nación; Una Perspectiva Andina del 
Zapatismo, Chiapas, no. 9, vol. 3, Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, 
UNAM, 2000. 
36 Mitchell. Op.Cit. 
37 Zapata, 2007. Op.Cit. p.122. 
  
militancy. And 1982 appears in his data as a year with a paltry number of 
strikers: only 25,173, compared to 92,774 in 1980 which is highly 
improbable since 1982 witnessed the highest number of strikes in Mexican 
history. Widespread strikes by teachers broke out in1978, but are not 
included in our data or Zapata’s data. Their statistical disappearance in 
Mexican official data makes them no less real and important for 
understanding strike patterns. But beyond statistical discrepancies and 
similarities, there is a fundamental difference of interpretation. Zapata sees 
solid corporatist control throughout the 1940 -1982 period whereas we give 
great importance to the labor insurgency of the 1970s and early 1980s, an 
insurgency that happened almost simultaneously, though with some delay, 
to that of the USA and Canada. 
The second wave of labor insurgency was the result of a combination 
of factors that particularly helped to facilitate the development of worker 
autonomy: (1) a notable increase in the industrial labor force, which doubled 
in a brief period of time, as a result of the oil boom that occurred between 
1975 and 1981; (2) a chronic inflationary process threatening the total wage 
mass for workers. In 1981 the prices of consumer goods purchased by 
workers increased nearly 30% for the second consecutive year. Inflation and 
an increase in industrial employment led to the most intense period of 
autonomous worker mobilization in 1980 to 1983. These mobilizations took 
a variety of organizational forms ranging from the struggles of individual 
unions, union sections, rank and file caucuses, and the special case of the 
nationally organized teachers’ dissident movement. The period of 1976 to 
1982 can be characterized as an ongoing tug of war around the workers’ 
share of the GDP.
38
 The regime, of which Mexico’s peculiar labor 
bureaucracy was an integrated part, responded with repression. Starting in 
early 1981, the use of paramilitary groups hired by official union 
bureaucrats became more frequent and began to deal serious blows to the 
labor insurgency.
39
 The second wave of labor insurgency crested in 1982, as 
illustrated in Figure 1 in Appendix 1, despite all the attempts by the regime 
to avoid the synchrony between the failure of its economic project and the 
rise in protest by workers autonomously organized.  
                                               
38 Bortz, J. La estructura de salarios en México. Mexico: Universidad Autónoma 
Metropolitana, 1985, p.17. 
39 Cockcroft, J. Mexico: Class Formation, Capital Accumulation and the State. New York, 
Monthly Review Press, 1983, p.viii. 
  
The Capitalist Offensive, Globalization, and Worker Militancy 
This section will explore three of the most important elements in the 
decline in the number of strikes in Mexico in the last three decades: 1) the 
globalization of production and industrial relocation; 2) high levels of real 
unemployment; 3) increased repression (a State of Exception and social 
violence). 
Global manufacturing and industrial relocation 
Mexican industry was structured around the domestic market and 
concentrated in industrial cities in the country’s central region until 1982 
when an extensive process of industrial re-structuring was initiated. 
Production was relocated to different areas of Mexico, areas without unions 
and without established working-class communities. It also involved the 
massive introduction of foreign investment. The new factories carry out 
only fractions of globalized manufacturing processes, and consequently 
isolated strikes in individual factories have lost a significant amount of their 
previous capacity to exert pressure on companies ‒ as compared to previous 
periods when the nation’s industry was integrated into an autarchical 
domestic market.
40
 In addition, industrial relocation involved the de-
industrialization of the traditional industrial regions in the center of the 
country – regions characterized by a great tradition of labor combativeness – 
and the relocation to new industrial corridors in the country’s northern 
states, in which capital’s despotism has been a constant factor during a 
major part of the 20th century and the first part of this century. The rate of 
unionization in the country’s central region is 25%, while in the northern 
states it is less than a third of that percentage, with an average of 7%, and 
most of these unionized workers are employed by the federal government. 
                                               
40 Roman, R. and Velasco, E. Neoliberalism, Labor Market Transformation and Working 
Class Responses. Latin American Perspectives Review, issue 119, vol. 28, no. 4, pp.54-
56, 2001. The exception would be if the plant was the sole supplier of a crucial 
component for the continental production chain. This is rarely the case. In general, 
companies can relatively easily shift production from one maquiladora to another. 
 
 
  
New technologies, reorganization of work and outsourcing  
The incorporation of new technologies dislodged many workers 
from their old knowledge of work processes – knowledge which was 
transferred and assimilated into the objectified production process, as the 
force of accumulated labor-capital that devours the new, precarious living 
labor.
41
 It is much more difficult to conduct an effective work stoppage in 
the new automated factories on the periphery of the central technological 
nucleus of the new production processes. And the new strategic segment of 
the working class has been de-unionized through various methods including 
subcontracting out the work to “other companies” in order to block 
working-class unity.
42
  
Real unemployment rate at high levels  
The Mexican government’s claim that the unemployment rate in 
Mexico is lower than in the United States is an obvious statistical fiction as 
the Instituto de Estadística de México (Mexican Statistics Institute) 
considers a person to be employed if he or she works only one hour a week 
or “has an imminent promise of work.” Individuals in precarious 
employment conditions, or specifically, those who actually have no work on 
the basis of which to survive, accounted for a fifth of the country’s labor 
force in 2010. Such a high real unemployment rate constitutes a permanent 
element of pressure on workers who are employed, due to the difficulty they 
will face when seeking employment with another company in the case of 
individual or mass firing. In the past, all periods of rapid employment 
growth have led to an increase in the levels of worker defiance and 
discontent, and therefore, in the number of strikes. While real 
unemployment levels remain above 20%, unemployment becomes a 
powerful element in discouraging organized working class resistance. 
                                               
41 Marx, K. El Capital, Libro I, Capítulo VI Inedito. Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1971, p.72. 
42 “The average rate of unionization is only 29% for the 50 most important companies in 
Mexico, including the large public companies. The most notable case of blocking 
unionization is that of the 230,000 employees of Walmart, where they are not  defined 
as wage workers but ‘associates.’”. Bibian, C.Las Empresas de México. In: Las 
Quinientas Empresas más grandes de México, Informe de la Revista Expansión, June 
20, no. 1068, Mexico, Grupo CNN Expansión, 2011, p.201. 
 
  
The safety valve of Mexican emigration 
During the last two decades, the emigration of young workers to the 
United States, totaling an average of about 400,000 per year, has 
significantly diminished social and political pressure on Mexican 
capitalism—which is incapable of resolving social problems in the over 100 
cities where Mexico’s proletariat is currently concentrated. Emigration to 
the North creates a paradox in which there may be more Mexican workers in 
the US in regular, stable employment in certain key sectors than there are 
within Mexico.
43
 Many of those with rebellious discontent decide to leave 
the country—in the absence of effective organized alternatives for 
expressing their discontent—and end up participating in labor resistance in 
the United States. 
Preservation of vertical control over national unions 
A significant portion of the most important national unions, such as 
those of oil workers, teachers, railway workers and the power workers 
(those outside the Distrito Federal and some surrounding areas)
44
, are kept 
                                               
43 There were 2.1 million Latino workers in the US in 2010 in the construction industry, 
with the great majority from Mexico. The number of construction workers in Mexico 
who are in the formal economic sector and pay into the social security system is only 
1.3 million. In the case of the mining industry, the number of workers is similar, with 
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) acknowledging 112,000 Latino workers in 
mining production in the US, out of a total of 731,000 workers, while in Mexico there 
are 108,000 mining workers in the formal sector. In the transportation sector, there are 
1.6 million Latino workers in the US, while in Mexico there are 600,000 transportation 
workers in the formal sector. In manufacturing, there are more workers in Mexico’s 
formal sector, with a total of 3.9 million industrial workers, in comparison to the 2.2 
million Latino workers in US factories. In the agricultural sector there are 443,000 
permanent wage-earning workers in Mexico—the country’s stable agricultural 
proletariat—while the number of wage-earning Latino workers in agricultural activities 
in the US, according to the BLS, is 468,000. The total number of wage-earning Latino 
workers in the United States in the activities mentioned above is 6.48 million, while in 
2010 in Mexico the number of permanent wage-earning workers who are in these same 
sectors and who pay into social security and are therefore part of the formal sector is 
approximately 6.35 million. In summary there are more Latino workers in the United 
States, most of whom are Mexican than there are Mexican workers in the same sectors 
in Mexico’s formal economy. US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employed Hispanics or 
Latino Workers by sex and occupation. Current Population Survey. Table 13, 2010 and 
2010 and Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social, IMSS. Cubo de Información 
Estadística 2010, http://www.imss.gob.mx2010. 
44 There are two major power worker unions, the  SUTERM (Sole Union for Electrical 
Workers of the Mexican Republic) and the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (SME—
Mexican Electrical Workers Union). The SME was the union at Luz y Fuerza del 
  
under authoritarian control by the union officialdom through undemocratic 
internal statutes, various types of governmental support, the usual control 
mechanisms of an organizational oligarchy, and when necessary, violence 
by union thugs or agents of the state. As in the old days under the PRI 
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional --Institutional Revolutionary Party), 
the new right-wing governments have been very effective in re-creating 
vertical control over the large labor organizations.
45
 The recent major labor 
conflicts have resulted from employer lockouts against militant, combative 
labor organizations such as the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (SME). 
The attack on the SME culminated in the abitrary, illegal firing of 44,000 
workers.
46
 In 2011 the transnational footwear corporation, Sandak, 
dismantled its factory in the Mexican state of Tlaxcala in order to get rid of 
the independent union established a few years earlier. Workers were sent to 
their homes to work within a cottage industry scheme. 
Though strikes have been few and far between in recent decades, the 
discontent of workers has been expressed in other ways, as we have briefly 
described. The absence of genuine unions and state repression of strikes has 
pushed workers’ discontent into other forms not generally measured in 
strike statistics. In 2006, Mexican workers’ discontent burst forth on a 
massive scale on both sides of the border. The immigrant rights movement 
in the U.S. was a working- class movement mainly composed and led by 
Mexican workers. Their demands were for dignity and social rights for 
immigrant workers. Their one-day massive general strike was not initially 
                                                                                                                       
Centro (LyFC--Central Light and Power Company) which is the public company that 
distributes  power in central Mexico, with only token power production. It buys almost 
all the power it distributes from the La Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE—
Federal Electricity Commission), the other state owned power company that handles 
production (for most/all of) and distribution for areas outside the jurisdiction of the 
LyFC. The union at the CFE is the SUTERM, a compliant, undemocratic and corrupt 
union that does not challenge the government’s plans for privatization and squeezing 
workers even more.  The CFE has quietly contracted out significant amounts of power 
production to private companies whereas the SME has opposed privatization of power 
production and attacks on workers’ rights. In response to the opposition of the SME, the 
government liquidated the LyFC with a military assault on October 10, 2009 and fired 
44,000 workers. The company was then taken over by the CFE who hired new workers 
who belong to the SUTERM. 
45 Roman, R. and Velasco, E. The State, the Bourgeoisie, and the Unions: The Recycling of 
Mexico System of Labour Control. Latin American Perspectives Review. Issue 147, vol. 
33, pp.96-99, 2006. 
46 Roman, R. and Velasco, E. Mexico: The Murder of a Union and the Rebirth of Class 
Struggle, Part I: The New Assault. www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/279.php and Part II: 
The Fightback. www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/280/php, 2009. 
  
supported by the top leadership of most unions, but pushed forward by mid-
level leaders and rank and file activists of Mexican and other national 
origins. The Oaxaca insurgency was initiated by a dissident state section of 
the official teachers’ union and supported by much of the laboring poor of 
the city of Oaxaca and the state. The brutal attack by the state government 
on the striking teachers led to a general uprising that controlled the city of 
Oaxaca for five months.
47
 The third, the anti- electoral fraud movement in 
Mexico of the same year, though led by political elites, was also mainly 
based on the working class. Despite sharing many underlying grievances 
and a broad concern for social justice, these movements never converged 
although there were a myriad of formal and informal linkages. These 
struggles and linkages are sowing the seeds for a possible continental 
movement of workers’ protest. And more recently, as mentioned earlier, 
workers’ protests in the northern maquiladora regions have involved 
wildcat strikes, highway occupations, and even burning facilities. And in 
May-June 2012, the dissident school teachers’ organization, the CNTE, has 
been carrying out a strike that has closed schools in the states of Oaxaca, 
Chiapas, Morelos, Michoácan, and parts of Mexico City.
48
 The Oaxaca 
teachers have occupied the central square of the city of Oaxaca and are 
blockading highway toll booths and the local airport. 10% of Oaxaca’s 
teachers, accompanied by many teachers from other states, have occupied 
the central square of Mexico City. This widespread strike will not be 
counted in the official government figures, neither federal nor local, as it is 
considered an illegal strike.  
State of Exception and Social Violence  
The transition from one-party rule to electoral competition has not 
brought democratic rights to most of the population. In fact, the levels of 
institutional and social violence have increased in a formidable manner 
across Mexico. The feminicides carried out with impunity against female 
workers in cities with maquiladoras along the country’s northern border are 
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one of the most brutal examples of state-permitted violence. The 
criminalization of hundreds of thousands of young people has been taking 
place in Mexico as well as the U.S. Mexico’s prison population has nearly 
tripled since NAFTA was signed. The “war against drugs” – actually a war 
over control of the production and distribution of drugs within the state-
cartels complex – has led to the presence of the Army and the Marines on 
the streets of numerous industrial cities, and to the increasingly frequent use 
of institutional violence to intimidate workers from protesting. Between 
2007 and 2011, 55,000 Mexicans have been killed in “confrontations” in 
which irregular forces or State security forces have been involved.
49
 A state 
of terror – some state-executed, some state-tolerated50 – creates an 
intimidating environment in which it takes great courage to organize 
collective action. In short, a working class subjected to a State of Exception 
faces huge difficulties in organizing strikes in a peaceful way in order to 
demand respect for their rights.   
Conclusion and Prospects 
We have sought to present a more methodologically complete 
picture of strike patterns in Mexico by aggregating data collected by the 
federal and local Boards of Arbitration and Conciliation. We have also 
argued that the interpretation of strike patterns in Mexico has to move 
beyond an exclusive emphasis on political dynamics and also examine 
changes in the economy, capitalist strategies, and influences of workers’ 
movements and revolutions internationally. We have also pointed out that 
even this aggregation of data paints a very incomplete picture of strike 
patterns in Mexico as many strikes, including some that are widespread and 
of long duration, are simply not recorded in official data for reasons that 
have been discussed above. We have also sought to show that working-class 
protests, especially given the paucity of genuine unions, have taken political 
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and community forms as well as, at times, through direct action of various 
kinds.  
We have also discussed the neoliberal strategies that have combined 
with Mexico’s old system of labor control to try to disarticulate worker 
resistance and organization. This combination of neoliberal strategies and 
old forms of labor control has had considerable success. But as we have also 
pointed out, there are significant signs of worker resistance.  The seeds of a 
renewal of a workers’ movement have been planted by the very same 
processes of neoliberal capitalism that have combined with old forms of 
labor control to disarticulate worker resistance. These collective actions 
have taken dramatic forms, at times well beyond those of trade unionism. 
The Oaxaca rebellion was a good example of this – a teachers’ strike, state 
repression, and an uprising of a whole city – led, in considerable part, by the 
state teachers’ union. Traditions of communalism and solidarity survive in 
many Mexican communities and are transported to cities by internal and 
cross-border migrants, both in Mexico and in the U.S. These old traditions 
and invocations
51
, deep in collective memory, may yet combine with the 
intelligence and tools available in the 21st century, in ways not yet known, 
to shape workers’ collective responses to the continuing assaults on their 
dignity and well-being. 
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Appendix 1 
Year 
 
Index of Strikes 
 
1920 45,9 
1921 82,2 
1922 52,3 
1923 38,7 
1924 36,1 
1925 13,5 
1926 6,1 
1927 4,2 
1928 1,9 
1929 3,7 
1930 4,0 
1931 2,9 
1932 14,9 
1933 3,4 
1934 53,6 
1935 170,3 
1936 178,8 
1937 152,8 
1938 84,6 
1939 80,4 
1940 94,7 
1941 37,7 
1942 26,0 
1943 203,2 
1944 235,3 
1945 58,4 
1946 54,9 
1947 34,5 
1948 23,3 
1949 23,9 
1950 21,8 
1951 38,2 
1952 30,0 
1953 44,3 
1954 24,7 
1955 35,8 
1956 42,2 
  
Year 
 
Index of Strikes 
 
1957 51,2 
1958 196,3 
1959 100,5 
1960 100,0 
1961 98,9 
1962 192,3 
1963 133,7 
1964 16,4 
1965 17,8 
1966 24,1 
1967 20,7 
1968 41,6 
1969 38,2 
1970 54,6 
1971 54,1 
1972 33,4 
1973 57,6 
1974 55,4 
1975 84,9 
1976 108,2 
1977 129,4 
1978 87,8 
1979 142,4 
1980 374,5 
1981 311,4 
1982 701,9 
1983 320,4 
1984 204,0 
1985 162,9 
1986 322,3 
1987 297,9 
1988 172,4 
1989 234,7 
1990 217,2 
1991 152,3 
1992 167,9 
1993 166,8 
1994 156,0 
1995 153,1 
1996 122,3 
  
Year 
 
Index of Strikes 
 
1997 104,8 
1998 73,7 
1999 68,2 
2000 45,9 
2001 67,4 
2002 68,4 
2003 65,3 
2004 64,5 
2005 72,7 
2006 63,9 
2007 79,3 
2008 45,4 
2009 26,5 
2010 22,3 
 
Source: Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social. 
Anuario de Estadísticas del Trabajo (1940-2010) 
INEGI.  Estadísticas sobre relaciones laborales de 
jurisdicción local y federal 
JFCA ,Junta Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje, 
Informes Anuales del Presidente de la Junta (1928-
2010) 
 
  
 Figure 1. México: Strike Index 1920- 2010 (1960=100) 
 
 
 
Source:  
Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social. Anuario de Estadísticas del Trabajo 
(1940-2010) 
INEGI. Estadísticas sobre relaciones laborales de jurisdicción local y federal y 
JFCA   Junta Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje, Informes Anuales del Presidente 
de la Junta (1928-2010) 
 
  
Appendix 2 
 
 
Roman and Velasco Index vs Zapata Series
Number of
Strikes Strikes Total Roman Strikes
año Councils Council Federal Velasco Zapata
Local Federal plus Local Index Series
1960 310                67                  377                100,0            nd
1980 1.339            93                  1.432            379,8            1.139            
1981 1.066            108                1.174            311,4            1.066            
1982 1.971            675                2.646            701,9            1.925            
1983 978                230                1.208            320,4            216                
1984 548                221                769                204,0            427                
1985 489                125                614                162,9            159                
1986 903                312                1.215            322,3            312                
1987 949                174                1.123            297,9            174                
1988 518                132                650                172,4            132                
1989 757                118                875                232,1            118                
1990 670                149                819                217,2            150                
1991 438                136                574                152,3            136                
1992 477                156                633                167,9            477                
1993 474                155                629                166,8            474                
1994 472                116                588                156,0            472                
1995 481                96                  577                153,1            481                
1996 410                51                  461                122,3            410                
1997 356                39                  395                104,8            356                
1998 245                33                  278                73,7              245                
1999 225                32                  257                68,2              225                
2000 147                26                  173                45,9              147                
2001 219                35                  254                67,4              219                
2002 213                45                  258                68,4              213                
2003 202                44                  246                65,3              204                
2004 205                38                  243                64,5              nd
2005 224                50                  274                72,7              nd
2006 186                55                  241                63,9              
2007 271                28                  299                79,3              
2008 150                21                  171                45,4              
2009 81                  19                  100                26,5              
2010 73                  11                  84                  22,3              
Fuente: Secretaria del Trabajo y Previsión Social, Junta Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje, Informes Anuales e 
INEGI, Anuarios Estadísticos de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1980-2011.
  
Pre-empting New Social Movements, Pioneering Social-
Movement Unionism: Australian Builders Labourers in the 
1970s 
Verity Burgmann and Meredith Burgmann 
Social-movement unionism and new social movement theory 
he term ‘social-movement unionism’ was coined in 1988 by Peter 
Waterman
1
 but popularized in Kim Moody’s Workers in a Lean World.2, 
which studied the rise of social-movement unionism in the 1990s in South 
America, South Africa, South Korea and the more industrialized parts of the 
Third World. Moody argues social-movement unionism grew out of the new 
material circumstances imposed by corporate globalization. It is 
characterized by militancy, internal democracy, an agenda for radical social 
and economic change, a determination to embrace the diversity of the 
working class in order to overcome its fragmentation, and a capacity to 
appeal beyond its membership by using union power to “lead the fight for 
everything that affects working people in their communities and the 
country” 3 
Robin Kelley’s study of Justice for Janitors in the United States 
(Kelley 1997: 6-18), Sam Gindin’s research on Canadian automobile 
                                               
1 Waterman, P. Social-Movement Unionism: A New Union Model for a New World Order? 
Review, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 245-78, 1993.  
2 Moody, K. Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy. London and 
New York: Verso, 1997 
3 Ibid., p. 269, 271. 
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workers (Gindin 1995), Gay Seidman’s study of workers’ movements in 
Brazil and South Africa (Seidman 1994), Andrew Vandenberg’s study of 
the 1995 ‘Toys ‘R’ Us dispute in Sweden (Vandenberg 2006: 182-84), 
provide other examples of the extent to which organized labour reasserted 
itself in militant and broad-ranging ways in social-movement unionism 
during the last decade of the twentieth century.
4
 These writings investigate 
the capacity of the labour movement to use its industrial power to effect 
social change, not only on behalf of workers but also on behalf of much 
wider constituencies, whose interests have become aligned with labour 
against the neo-liberal austerities imposed by globalizing capitalism. Social-
movement unionism reasserted the efficacy of class struggle at the same 
time as it emphasized the significance of forms of oppression apart from 
class: the militant best of labour movement traditions informed by the 
inclusive values and organizational principles of the new social movements. 
The phenomenon of social-movement unionism also attracted 
scholarly attention to the capacity of the labour movement not only to effect 
social change because of its power at the point of production, but also to 
transform itself. In pointing to the latter, the new social movements are 
deemed a fundamental influence, especially in the USA. For example, 
Lowell Turner examined the efforts on the part of American unions to 
change themselves from “inward-looking business unions” to an “outward-
looking social movement”.5 Continuing this project in 2007 in Labor in the 
New Urban Battle Grounds, Turner defines social-movement unionism as 
“an activist mobilization-based unionism that, in contrast to established 
insider unionism, pushes for substantial social change”. It refers to “union 
strategies that use social movement-type approaches, such as coalition 
building, grassroots mobilization, aggressive organizing, demonstrations, 
and civil disobedience, and which typically operate outside established 
channels”. Alluding to further semantic development, he notes that: “The 
concept is at once condensed and broadened in the term social unionism to 
                                               
4 Kelley, R.D.G. 1997, The New Urban Working Class and Organized Labor. New Labor 
Forum. Vol. 1, no. 1, pp.6-18, 1997. Gindin, S. The Canadian Auto Workers: The Birth 
and Transformation of a Union. Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1997; Seidman, G. Manufacturing 
Militance: Workers’ Movements in Brazil and South Africa. Berkeley: University of 
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5 Turner, L. Building Social Movement Unionism. In: Rekindling the Movement. Labor’s 
Quest for Relevance in the 21st Century, eds. L. Turner, R. Hurd and H. Katz. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2001. 
  
encompass both social movement approaches and other coalition-based 
innovations in areas such as economic development”.6 
The term “social-movement unionism” suggests the labour 
movement required the influence of new social movements to develop its 
desirable characteristics—with the possible exception of militancy. The 
term thus replicates, perhaps inadvertently, the false binary constructed 
during the 1980s in new social movement theory. This dichotomy contrasts 
traditional labour movement concerns, such as wages and conditions, job 
control and job security, with issues championed by the new social 
movements, such as saving the environment and representing the interests of 
those whose identities are based on gender, sexual preference, race or 
ethnicity. New social movement theory even suggested that labour was 
incapable of providing social opposition and even shared interests in 
common with capital: labour and capital were both involved in the 
production process and committed thereby to maintaining capital growth, 
which was necessarily destructive of the environment.
7
   
New social movement theorists persistently neglected to 
acknowledge the extent to which labour movements historically had 
challenged prejudices based on empire, nation, race, gender and so on.
8
 
Long before such issues were raised by the new social movements and 
presented as “new”, these issues were on the agenda for social change 
provided by the most class-conscious sections of international labour 
movements, for example, the Industrial Workers of the World. New social 
                                               
6 Turner, L. An Urban Resurgence of Social Unionism. In: Labor in the New Urban Battle 
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Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, 
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movement activists too have drawn wildly inaccurate caricatures of trade 
unions as “economistic” bastions of homophobia, masculinism, racism, 
ethnocentrism and ecological irresponsibility. In the stereotype constructed 
by new social movement theorists and articulated on the ground by new 
social movement activists, labour movements are inhabited by bigoted 
workers concerned only with their material self-interest, and new social 
movements are comprised of the educated, enlightened and altruistic, who 
care about much broader interests and issues.
9  
Introducing the New South Wales Builders Labourers’ Federation 
It is interesting therefore to draw attention to an example of a union 
during the first half of the 1970s that spectacularly refutes new social 
movement theory and its assumptions embedded in the terminology of 
“social-movement unionism”: the New South Wales branch of the 
Australian Builders Labourers’ Federation (NSWBLF).10 This union 
confounds the stereotype of unions as incapable of embracing concerns 
beyond the workplace without the leavening influence of the new social 
movements. It also precedes social-movement unionism by two decades. 
In the early 1970s the Australian Builders Labourers’ Federation had 
30,000 members across the country. It covered all unskilled labourers and 
certain categories of skilled labourers employed on building sites: dog-men, 
riggers, scaffolders, powder monkeys, hoist drivers and steel fixers. These 
builders labourers were commonly known as “BLs”. The building industry 
was booming at this time and so was the union. Between 1969 and 1971, 
BLF membership rose nationally by 136%. By 1973, the NSWBLF had 
11,000 members, more than doubling its membership since the late 1960s 
and covering a very high proportion of eligible workers in the industry. Its 
membership was guided by many committed officials, who were strongly 
influenced by New Left ideology with its emphasis on equality, 
participatory democracy and direct action. Especially outstanding as leaders 
of this union were Jack Mundey, Joe Owens and Bob Pringle. Mundey and 
Owens, and a significant proportion of organizers and rank-and-file 
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activists, were members of the radically anti-Stalinist Communist Party of 
Australia (CPA); and Pringle was a fellow-traveler.
11
 The CPA had 
benefitted politically from the departure of China-line enthusiasts in 1963 
who had formed the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist). The 
much larger CPA increasingly pursued a New Left trajectory. It criticized 
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, inciting Moscow-line 
adherents to depart to form the Socialist Party of Australia in 1971. This left 
the CPA freer than ever of Old Left political baggage. In 1970 the CPA 
Congress outlined a new policy, the “coalition of the left” concept that had 
been evolving since the 21st Congress in 1968, which emphasized the need 
for trade unions to involve themselves in “action on social and political 
issues going beyond the traditional concern of unionism.”12 
The NSWBLF became the CPA’s “show-piece”, according to one of 
its organizers, Viri Pires: “The CPA is very small. It can have ideas but it 
can’t do much with them. It was the BLF which tested the ideas.”13 Taking 
its cues from the CPA, the NSWBLF developed “a new concept of 
unionism” committed to “the social responsibility of labour”: it argued that 
workers had a right to insist that their labour not be used in harmful ways 
and that the organized labour movement should concern itself with all 
manner of social and political issues.
14
  This principle of “the social 
responsibility of labour” was not brought to the union from without by the 
influence of new social movements, which had barely made a mark in 
Australia by this stage.
15
 Rather, it was grounded in pre-existing radical 
labour movement ideologies and traditions. Older NSWBLF activists still 
honoured the Industrial Workers of the World (the “Wobblies”), who had 
been especially prominent in Australia, and the syndicalist legacy more 
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broadly.
16
 Mick Ross, for example, argued that “unions have more chance 
of changing society than any other group of people.”17 And the New Left 
influences on the CPA during the 1960s and thereby on the NSWBLF 
leadership were crucial. In pursuing this principle of “the social 
responsibility of labour”, the NSWBLF in the early 1970s was characterized 
by the same salient features in Moody’s typology of social-movement 
unionism. These characteristics will be examined in turn, to tell the tale of 
this union whose pioneering social-movement unionism suggests the 
capacity of labour to transform itself without guidance from the new social 
movements.
 
Militancy 
Industrial militancy is defined as much by disposition as by deeds, so 
it is best measured by degrees of determination, usually pursued in practices 
such as strike action, but not necessarily so. Interviewed in 1978, Mundey 
assessed the union’s record of militancy: “We were pushing things up to the 
employers. We as a union had changed”.18 Heightened militancy on the part 
of the NSWBLF was apparent in four principal areas: the fight for better 
wages and conditions; the campaign to improve working conditions; the 
strategic use of industrial sabotage; and encroachment upon managerial 
prerogatives. 
Continual, successful wage campaigns were conducted by the union 
from 1970 to 1974, resulting in substantial real wage increases. Mundey 
regularly articulated the union’s commitment to industrial militancy. In 
1970 he wrote that: “Most militant workers have been critical for years of 
the general passivity displayed in strikes, and the failure … to really force 
the issues”.19 Interviewed on national television on 27 September 1971, he 
argued the need for workers to undertake militant industrial action and 
develop new tactics: “Without militancy we will not improve the life of the 
worker.” He suggested offensive strike action in service industries, such as 
public transport: keeping trains and buses running during strikes but 
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refusing to collect fares; and factories producing foodstuffs should continue 
to make them but instead give them to “the needy in our society”.20 When a 
Labor government was elected in December 1972 after twenty-three years 
of conservative rule, he stated there was a danger that the union movement 
would be “too co-operative” with the new government and stressed the 
continuing need for workers to take direct action to demand “a bigger share 
of the cake and more social progress for the workers”.21  
The union was unrelenting in its pressure on employers to provide 
the best possible working conditions. In 1970 it embarked upon an 
aggressive campaign to “Civilise the Building Industry”: it did not plead 
with employers to provide a safe and decent working environment, but 
rather it insisted that such was the right of those who laboured in the 
building industry.
22
 A union circular to organizers advocated that decisions 
on standards must be made by the workers concerned: “DON’T LET THE 
BOSS DECIDE FOR YOU”.23 Workers would refuse to work in extreme 
heat or in the rain—and the union ensured they received full pay 
nonetheless. For example, in early February 1973, workers spontaneously 
walked off building sites when the temperature reached forty degrees 
Celsius and the union warned employers there would be strike action if the 
workers were not paid for the day.
24
 The union also placed bans on building 
sites that did not employ two dog-men per crane (one at the top and one at 
the bottom), to prevent dog-men being expected to “ride the hook” of the 
crane, a dangerous practice that had caused many fatalities prior to the union 
campaign against it. By the end of 1972 “riding the hook” was virtually 
eliminated from the industry and two dog-men per crane became the rule 
rather than the exception.
25
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The union was prepared when necessary to practice industrial 
sabotage in pursuit of better wages or conditions. During a long strike in 
1970, rank-and-file members engaged in spontaneous demolition of work 
carried out by strike-breakers.
26
 If an employer did not accede to a demand, 
the breaking of concrete pours—or threat thereof—was not uncommon. 
Wrongly set concrete has disastrous consequences on a building site. Union 
organizer Tony O’Beirne described how quickly the tactic spread, along 
with the realization of the power this gave the BLs: “breaking concrete 
pours [...] we said ‘that’s just the most fantastic thing that’s ever 
happened’”.27 Another tactic was destruction of equipment. For instance, 
when a company in central Sydney commenced excavation of a site with no 
washbasins or toilets, the workers on the site hurled a compressor into the 
very deep hole in the ground that had been excavated. When the workers 
returned the next day, they found four fully lined sheds, three toilets and a 
full row of washbasins.
28
 
A well-known NSWBLF adage reminded the officials: “Never eat 
the boss’s lunch unless you occupy the site and find it on his desk”.29 The 
NSWBLF developed serious strategies for encroachment upon managerial 
rights. On a national television discussion with Upper Clyde Shipyards 
leader Jimmy Reid in May 1975, Mundey emphasized that most work-ins 
were defensive acts which occurred over retrenchments, but that NSWBLF 
work-ins were often offensive, with labourer’s insisting upon greater control 
of their workplace
30
 For example, a campaign at the Opera House for a 35-
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hour week for 48 hours pay escalated and culminated in the workers 
expelling management from the site and continuing work under workers’ 
control from 8 April until 15 May 1972. Two of the organizers, John 
Wallace and Joe Owens, wrote an informative account of the experience. 
They recall that by “Day 2”, company foremen were “completely ignored” 
and were told firmly by the men that “they were not needed and could go 
and sit in the office, go home or throw themselves in the harbour, but just 
keep out of the way”.31 They claim that the manner in which the 35-hour 
week was won and the form in which the 35-hour week operated, 
“substantially increased the real control the workers had over production on 
the job. In the final analysis, almost all of the power of management on the 
job rested with the workers”.32 
The militancy of the NSWBLF was facilitated by the unprecedented 
boom conditions in the building industry. Developers needed speedy 
completion of speculative projects, financed by venture capital loans at high 
interest rates. However, the building industry craftsmen’s union, led by SPA 
officials, was not so militant. SPA abhorrence of New Left ideals influenced 
the leaders of this craftsmen’s union as much as CPA enthusiasm for those 
same ideas inspired the NSWBLF.
33
 NSWBLF militancy was also 
encouraged by the fact that BLs were more favoured by the technological 
changes accompanying the boom than were the craftsmen. The new 
construction methods required larger scale preparatory demolition and 
excavation, carried out by BLs; greater use of pre-cut components placed on 
site by BLs; increased use of concrete, which was handled by the BLs; and 
greater reliance on ticketed BLs, such as dog-men, in skyscraper 
construction.
34
 These factors greatly enhanced the BLs’ power at the point 
of production. Union organizer Kevin Cook observed: “the boss wasn’t 
really the boss, we knew it and he knew it”.35 
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Internal democracy 
According to radical journalist Pete Thomas, the basis of the union’s 
militant strength was “democratic control by the rank and file”: that is, the 
way in which the tenure of officials was limited, and the fact that the 11,000 
members were regularly exercising their strength and initiative through job-
site committees and stop-work meetings.
36
 The union’s organizational 
principles and practices anticipated the social-movement unionism of the 
1990s in its emphasis on internal democracy and rank-and-file participation 
in opposition to the more hierarchical forms of traditional unionism. The 
leaders of the NSWBLF were determined to expand internal union 
democracy and to reduce the distinction between leaders and led, effectively 
transferring power away from themselves and back to the rank-and-file 
unionists who had elected them. Mundey wrote in the union’s journal: “The 
leadership aims for ‘total involvement’ in decision making by the 
membership. We are opposed to ‘top’ decisions making without reference to 
the membership”.37 As a result, the union improved its density; and the rank 
and file responded to the emphasis on internal democracy with considerably 
higher levels of involvement. Interviews with long-serving members who 
could recall earlier regimes confirm that this was indeed the case.
38
  
Organizers and officials of other building industry unions during this 
period noticed the unusually high degree of NSWBLF rank-and-file activity 
and how this was encouraged by the union leadership.
39
 An international 
comparison was also drawn at the time. A bricklayer, a member of the 
Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians in Britain, was so 
intrigued by the inclusive style of the NSWBLF he wrote about it in order to 
publicize its organizational achievements among British trade unionists. 
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Compared with its British counterpart, he considered the NSWBLF was 
“like a dream”.40  
In recognition that it was often not formal constraints which most 
inhibited participation and democracy, the union leadership encouraged 
members to “drop in” to the union’s office at Room 28 at Sydney’s Trades 
Hall and to participate in informal discussions on union matters with 
officials. This increased the leadership’s accessibility, and rank-and-file 
perceptions of its accessibility: the ordinary member felt able to criticize and 
advise the leadership in a way unusual in Australian trade unionism. 
Secretarial staff who had worked in other union offices remarked upon 
this.
41
 Apart from standard provision of interpreters to encourage non-
English-speaking members to talk, rank-and-file participation in meetings 
was improved by a simple change in mass meeting procedure. The difficulty 
most members, not just those with language problems, had previously 
experienced speaking in a large meeting was reduced by a new system 
whereby members queued at microphones and spoke in turn rather than 
having to depend on catching the chairman’s eye.42 
Unlike the officials of most other unions, NSWBLF officials 
received the same wage as the members on the job, including periods of 
strike activity. For example, during the long-running 1970 strike to reduce 
the “margin” in pay between skilled and lesser skilled construction workers, 
the union resolved “that officials’ wages be stopped whilst the strike is on”. 
Not one official dissented from this decision.
43
 The union officials did not 
change their lifestyles but continued to conform to working-class norms. 
They remained drinking and eating in the same places, with the same people 
(Judy Mundey 1978; Jack Mundey 1978; Owens 1977; Pringle 1978). 
Interviews with the female office staff reveal that they started work the 
same time as the workers, at 07.00 or 07.30, unlike the officials of other 
unions, who rarely started work before 08.30.
44
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Most of the officials had worked in the industry for long periods. 
The union’s policy was that all officials, even industrial officers and 
publications editors, had to come from the shop floor. Only one NSWBLF 
official, Bill Holley, had more than an elementary education—a situation 
which distinguished the union leadership from those of other unions. The 
central core of full-time elected officials was supplemented by temporary 
organizers brought on to service specific areas for certain periods of time; 
these temporary appointments had to be endorsed at branch meetings. 
Between 1973 and 1974, according to a report by Pringle and Owens, thirty-
nine organizers “have come on and gone back to the job”.45 NSWBLF 
policy specifically encouraged rank-and-file workers to take the initiative in 
industrial disputes.
46
 Tom Hogan, a city organizer, recalled that “stoppages 
would occur and you’d only find out two hours later that they’d stopped. 
Once I went to seven stop-work meetings in a day. There was a tremendous 
amount of initiative taken by the men on the job”.47 
The most startling innovation was limited tenure of office: the 
insistence that officials, after six years at the most, return to work as a 
builders labourer. Designed to prevent bureaucracy, inertia and hierarchy, 
Mundey described it as “a Wobbly idea”.48 He explained: “The driving 
force that made me suggest limited tenure was my own experience of seeing 
modern, contemporary unionism and seeing the need for some inbuilt 
guarantee for limiting power and having inbuilt renewal”.49 Mundey 
suggested on national television late in September 1971 that such a practice 
would be beneficial for the entire union movement.
50
 He applied the 
principle to himself, retrospectively, so when his six years was up, he 
returned to work as a pick-and-shovel labourer at the beginning of 1974.
51
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An agenda for radical social and economic change 
Social-movement unionism, Moody observes, “uses the strongest of 
society’s oppressed and exploited, generally organized workers, to mobilize 
those who are less able to sustain self-mobilization”.52 Early in 1972 a 
NSWBLF circular to all job organizers maintained that, “for a union to be 
meaningful it must speak up on all issues affecting the life of not only the 
members of a union but all Australian people”53 Pringle expressed the 
NSWBLF viewpoint: “The strong should support the weak in issues that 
involve everybody”.54 Mundey insisted the NSWBLF “feels strongly about 
unions and the whole workers’ movement involving themselves more 
deeply in all political, moral and social questions affecting ordinary 
people”.55 Owens believed that trade unionists should contest exploitation 
“not just in their workplace but everywhere”.56 The union’s activism on a 
wide range of social issues such as the rights of women, indigenous 
Australians and homosexuals disproved assumptions in new social 
movement theory that the organized working-class necessarily neglected 
such matters. 
The union was strongly committed to Aboriginal rights and assisted 
this cause from at least the early 1960s.
57
 As the movement became more 
militant in the 1970s, Pringle was especially generous in providing bail for 
arrested Aborigines: “It was evident every time”, he informed the Sun 
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newspaper, “that these people had been the subject of excessive zeal”.58 
When Aboriginal activists wanted help in advertising a major demonstration 
for Aboriginal rights to be held on 14 July 1972, the union arranged for 
banners to be hung on the jibs of cranes around the city. Pringle himself was 
arrested during this demonstration, receiving a black eye, bruising and 
abrasions, and a four-hour stint in a police cell.
59
 In a subsequent leaflet, 
“The Black Awakening”, Pringle objected to the way in which this march 
was not allowed the same freedom of movement as the annual war veterans’ 
march, that it was forced onto the footpath by the police and when anyone 
overflowed on to the road they were hassled or arrested by the police.
60
 The 
union donated frequently to Aboriginal causes. Aboriginal activist Lyn 
Thompson wrote to the union that “with the moral and financial support 
given to us such as the Builders’ Labourers give, we will soon start solving 
a lot of our problems”.61 
Most importantly, in December 1972, the union placed a black ban 
on the demolition of houses occupied by Aborigines in the inner-city suburb 
of Redfern. A big developer had bought most of them to renovate as 
expensive houses and had evicted the Aborigines. This ban greatly aided the 
black movement’s resistance to the developer, which led ultimately to the 
federal government buying the disputed dwellings from the developer and 
granting the area to the black community in March 1973 as an Aboriginal 
housing scheme under Aboriginal control. At least ten Aboriginal builders 
labourers were employed on the reconstruction and renovation work. Many 
of the back fences were pulled down to create a communal recreation area. 
One of the two factories in the area was converted into a hall-workshop-
gym and cultural centre; the other became a pre-school run by Aboriginal 
mothers and a medical centre linked with the Aboriginal Medical Service. 
The corner store became a co-operative shop, selling food cheaply. This 
Redfern Aboriginal Community Housing Scheme of sixty-five houses, 
managed by an elected co-operative committee, was proudly declared to be 
the first successful Aboriginal land rights claim in Australia.
62
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In June 1973 the union placed what would later be called a “pink 
ban” on construction at Macquarie University. Jeremy Fisher, treasurer of 
the campus Gay Liberation Group, had been a resident of a university 
college until its Master had discovered Fisher’s role as a gay activist. The 
Master insisted Fisher could not remain at the college unless he undertook 
to have his “perversion” cured. Fisher refused so he was expelled. The 
Macquarie University Students’ Council approached the NSWBLF, which 
recommended a ban that was endorsed unanimously by the BLs on campus. 
“Universities are places for people to learn—they should not discriminate 
against individuals”, Mundey explained to the press. “The ban will remain 
until the authorities at the University allow homosexuals to study there the 
same as anyone else.” The ban stopped construction of a lecture theatre, 
extensions to the gymnasium, a maintenance depot and a science workshop. 
The University Council ordered Fisher’s reinstatement, so the ban was 
lifted.
63
 
The union’s preparedness to jeopardize members’ work prospects by 
placing a ban over the issue of homosexual rights was applauded by 
homosexual liberationists, who found the stereotype of the homophobic 
building worker confounded by the union’s practical support for their cause. 
Pringle was interviewed about the union’s policy on homosexuality by gay 
movement reporters, who were clearly exhilarated by the union’s stance, 
because builders labouring, “probably more than any other industry, has 
masculinity as its foundation”.64 Pringle explained to these reporters: “We 
as an executive believe that it is a presumption of any sort for society to be 
the moral judge for an individual’s sexual preference.” He made it clear 
that, while the homosexual liberation movement had to lead the fight, the 
union would stand up for homosexual rights wherever appropriate: “We will 
help, support and do all we can”.65 The union sponsored a motion to its 
Federal Conference in 1973: “Conference calls on all sections of 
government to alter existing laws to allow homosexuals the same privacy in 
their personal relations as heterosexuals and be subject to no more control 
under the law.” Also in 1973, it moved a motion at the Labor Party State 
Conference calling for legalization of homosexual relationships and an end 
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to discrimination.
66
 The National Homosexual Conference in August 1975 
cited the direct material support to NSW Gay Lib. by the then progressive 
leadership and rank and file BLs’ as an example of why homosexual women 
and men should support unions seeking social change.
67
    The union 
demonstrated support for women’s rights in numerous ways. Both the 
Builders’ Labourer and the Rank and File Rag featured articles about 
women’s issues and advertisements for women’s day marches, the women’s 
unemployment centre, abortion demonstrations and so on. Caroline Graham 
described how the Women’s Electoral Lobby approached the union for help 
in raising funds for an abortion rights advertisement: “The response was 
typically generous: not only did we receive a large cash donation, but the 
union president Bob Pringle, helped our representative to compose and lay 
out the advertisement.” The union officials often marched on International 
Women’s Day.68 The 1973 Rank and File Committee’s election policy 
statement favoured “giving maximum assistance to women’s struggle for 
complete political and social liberation in our society”69. Its most 
spectacular support for women’s liberation occurred in June 1973. For some 
time, authorities at the University of Sydney had been resisting attempts by 
two tutors, Jean Curthoys and Liz Jacka, to launch a women’s studies course 
in the Philosophy Department, despite the fact that the staff concerned and 
the proposed course had been approved by the relevant undergraduate 
studies committee. When the Professorial Board vetoed the proposed 
women’s studies course, Mundey deemed the decision “sexist” and, 
following an approach from concerned students, announced a ban on all 
further construction at the university, including a medical faculty building 
and a theatre complex. Coming only one week after the Macquarie 
University ban in defence of homosexual rights, Mundey explained the 
union treated the bans as “top priority”, because the union had a social 
conscience—and considered that universities should reveal theirs: “In these 
days of social enlightenment and reform, the wiping out of these 
discriminations should start at the universities. Now we find that 
discrimination is being promoted at the universities. The ban will stay on all 
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further construction until the decisions are reversed”.70 Mundey affirmed 
this ban to a 2,500-strong meeting of students striking in support of the 
proposed course on 29 June. Since the university urgently required the 
completion of certain buildings, the dispute was resolved internally and the 
ban lifted.
71
 The course commenced in 1974 as one of the first in this field 
of study that became commonplace at universities around the world. 
Determination to embrace working-class diversity 
Social-movement unionism, according to Moody, understands the 
need to counteract the way capitalism fragments workers along lines of 
nationality, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and disability and utilizes 
prejudice to increase profits.
72
 In November 1971, the NSWBLF noted in a 
motion to the BLF Federal Conference that some trade union officials 
during past periods of unemployment had been “conned into supporting 
right wing policies of assisting capitalism in its own crisis, by restricting 
women workers’ right to work, especially married women; sharing the job 
at reduced wages; and fostering anti-migrant and racial attitudes towards 
other workers”.73 The union significantly improved the participation of 
labourers from non-English speaking backgrounds by providing interpreters 
at meetings, translating union publications into various languages, and 
encouraging recent immigrants to run for office and act as job delegates.
74
 
The NSWBLF also had a significant Aboriginal membership. From 
at least 1962 it was encouraging its Aboriginal members and supporting 
them in anti-racist activity.
75
 In the early 1970s one of the union’s 
organizers, Kevin Cook, was also a prominent and well-respected 
Aboriginal leader. Cook’s standing facilitated the union’s ability to establish 
non-racial structures within the union, to encourage anti-racist attitudes at 
                                               
70 Age, 28 June 1973. 
71 Crouch, W. Some black among the BLF green, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 November, 
1974; Mundey, J. . Mundey, J. Green Bans & Beyond. Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 
1981. 
72 Moody. Op.Cit. pp. 269, 271, 290, 309. 
73 ´The Right to Work’ in NSW Branch, ‘Agenda Item for Federal Conference, November 
1971’, 2 pp roneod. 
74 Pires. Op.Cit. 
75 ‘Aboriginal Builders’ labourer to Represent Our Union’, May 1962, NSWBLF press 
clippings collection. 
 
  
membership level, and to maintain meaningful links with Sydney’s 
indigenous community. Cook’s many positions within the Aboriginal 
movement included presidency of the Black Theatre Art and Culture Centre 
established in Redfern in 1974. In the first issue of its magazine, Mereki, 
NSWBLF organizer Tom Hogan wrote a feature on behalf of the union, 
congratulating the Black Theatre “for their guts and determination in 
demanding that the Black voice of Australia be heard”, and assuring the 
theatre “of our continued support in your fight against racism and for the 
self-determination of your people”. Referring to the union movement’s 
emblem of the black and white hands clasping, he noted how important it 
was to “strengthen that grip”, referring to the struggles of black Australians 
against developers and the union’s struggles to prevent workers’ homes 
being demolished. “A common enemy has arisen for Black and White. 
These types of attacks bring our organisations and our memberships closer 
together [...]. Separately we have fought tyranny [...] together we shall 
overcome”.76  
Most unusually, the NSWBLF promoted the right of women to work 
in the industry as builders labourers on an equal basis with men. The union 
leadership was ideologically committed to the women’s liberation struggle 
and actively supported the women’s cause in significant ways; yet it did so 
in one of the most traditionally “macho” of all industries. As harbinger of 
social-movement unionism, it sought from within the all-male bastion of the 
Australian building industry to overcome the fragmentation of the working 
class along gendered lines to ensure that women had the opportunity to 
pursue employment in the building industry on an equal basis with men. By 
the end of 1971 the BLF had nine female members.
77
 In 1972 several strikes 
occurred to force bosses to accept female labour. In these confrontations the 
employers’ objections were couched in terms of a threat to management 
prerogative: a rejection of anything that smacked of “union hire”. 78 The 
women’s rights issue became inextricably linked to that of job-control; and 
this was to be a recurring motif. Strikes and work-ins in support of the right 
of women to work as BLs confronted employers’ sexist discrimination, and 
were an indication of the genuinely egalitarian atmosphere generated within 
the union. Many of the incidents received press coverage, so it became 
widely known that builders labouring was a new option open to women who 
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did not wish to be “cooped up in an office”, as many female BLs explained 
it—and one that paid better wages than other women received for manual 
labour. The women reported good experiences of support from the male 
labourers, recounting individual acts of kindness and support: men who 
taught them how to lift things more easily and safely, strip wood, use 
jackhammers and so on; and men who encouraged them to become job 
delegates.
79
 
In June 1973, 17 women enrolled for a hoist drivers’ course at 
Sydney Technical College. One of these, Lyn Syme, who later became 
prominent in the union, entered the industry at the end of 1973. She says the 
men on her job suspected one of the women who had completed the hoist 
drivers’ course was going to turn up, because the area organizer, Tony 
Hadfield, had insisted that the company hire a ticketed hoist driver and that 
the union would have one on the job by Monday. She describes the men’s 
reactions as “quite good really”. Hadfield had just succeeded in achieving 
proper pay rates for the labourers on the job, so the union was in good 
favour at the time. The men’s reaction protected her from the boss’s 
displeasure when he first encountered her after she had already been 
working the hoist for several hours: “he freaked at first, but I was there, I’d 
met everybody—there was nothing he could do”.80 
By 1974 the union had eighty female members.
81
 It actively 
encouraged women to take official union positions.
82
 There were countless 
other examples of leadership support for the right of women to work in the 
building industry. The 1973 Rank and File Committee’s election policy 
statement included “the right of women to work as builders labourers”. At 
the 1973 Federal Conference of the BLF, the NSWBLF called on each state 
to “take immediate action to establish the rights of women to work in the 
industry”. By 1974, its agenda items included abortion leave as well as 
paternity and maternity leave. Also during 1974 the branch sought to 
achieve a national industrial court ruling “that the right of women to work in 
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the building industry be recognized without discrimination”. A 1974 issue 
of On Site, published by BLs, noted: “The Builders Labourers Federation 
has taken a principled stand on the question of women in the building 
industry. Bitter struggles have been fought by rank and file workers to get 
women on job sites, and they are an example to all.”83 
Capacity to lead community struggles 
Moody describes the way social-movement unionism “can make the 
very concept of class more real” and increase class-consciousness as it 
extends working-class power. The ability of social-movement unionism to 
arouse broad constituencies to radical action is facilitated by its “class vision 
and content”.84 The union’s “green bans” from 1971 to 1975 clearly 
demonstrated the union’s capacity to appeal beyond its membership to lead 
a community struggle. Based on its commitment to the social responsibility 
of labour, NSWBLF members refused to work on environmentally or 
socially undesirable construction. Bans were placed at the request of 
resident action groups or the National Trust; and a significant social 
movement developed in support of these bans, which saved Sydney from 
much of the devastation that would otherwise have been wreaked by 
developers. It was the first such action in the world and had international 
ramifications within environmental politics.
85
 
Owens argued that unions had the ability to restrain corporations and 
prompt governments to reconsider foolish decisions, so had to concern 
themselves with  
”important social issues” and “become more active in opposing pollution 
and despoliation of natural resources”.86 Mundey maintained unions had to 
become involved with environmental issues, because “too few people 
question the products we make”; and he stressed that working-class people 
had a particular interest in environmental protection, because they suffered 
most from environmental problems.
87
 In February 1973, he coined the term 
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“green bans” to distinguish them from traditional black bans. He claimed 
the use of “green” expressed the union’s determination to save open space 
or valued buildings and ensure people in any community had some say in 
what affected their lives.
88
 Petra Kelly’s naming of the German Greens was 
motivated by her experience of these bans when she visited Australia in the 
mid-1970s and became inspired by the way they brought together residents, 
environmentalists and unionists. In this way, the “green” terminology 
coined by the NSWBLF green bans movement entered the world’s political 
vernacular.
89
 
In Sydney, the movement got under way in June 1971 when a 
resident action group from the fashionable harbour-side suburb of Hunters 
Hill sought the help of the NSWBLF to save Kelly’s Bush on the harbour 
foreshore, where developer A.V. Jennings wanted to build luxury houses.
90
 
These thirteen middle-class women, who called themselves the “Battlers for 
Kelly’s Bush”, had already lobbied the local council, the mayor, the local 
State member and the Premier, all without success. The union asked the 
women to organize a local meeting to gauge the degree of local support for 
a ban. More than 600 people turned up and formally requested the union to 
ban the destruction of Kelly’s Bush. When the union agreed to do this, 
Jennings declared it would use non-union labour. However, building 
workers on a Jennings project in North Sydney sent this message to 
Jennings: “If you attempt to build on Kelly’s Bush, even if there is the loss 
of one tree, this half-completed building will remain so forever, as a 
monument to Kelly’s Bush.” Jennings abandoned its plans—so Kelly’s 
Bush remains as an open public reserve.
91
 After this first success, resident 
action groups rushed to ask the NSWBLF to impose similar bans; and the 
union obliged so long as evidence of widespread local support was 
provided. 
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The green bans were of three main kinds: to defend open spaces 
from various types of development; to protect existing housing from 
demolition to make way for freeways or high-rise development; and to 
preserve older-style buildings of historic, architectural and cultural 
significance from replacement by office-blocks or shopping precincts. 
Environment, heritage and social issues were intertwined, as gentrification 
of inner-Sydney suburbs threatened low-income residents with displacement 
by developers keen to exploit more affluent markets. The green bans’ 
defense of working-class residential areas was often linked with the union’s 
opposition to freeway construction and diversion of funding from public 
transport.
92
  
One working-class residential area saved was The Rocks, site of the 
first British settlement on Sydney Cove. Despite its historical significance, 
only a green ban prevented the oldest buildings in the country being 
replaced by high-rise office blocks and luxury apartments. The NSWBLF 
halted the redevelopment project, “because the scheme destroys the 
character of this historic area and ignores the position of the people 
affected”. The Rocks Resident Action Group mobilized enthusiastically in 
support of the ban and drew up a “people’s plan” for acceptable renovation 
of the area. It announced that, in the face of the usual apathy, inaction and 
favoritism of the Government, it had been left to unionists “to show 
leadership in protecting our citizens and their historic buildings”. With the 
green ban prompting the Sydney Cove Redevelopment Authority to propose 
a series of improved plans, the union position was stated clearly by Mundey 
in August 1973: ”My federation will lift its ban when the residents are 
satisfied with what is being put forward by the authority.” In March 1974, 
when the latest plan was again sent back to the architect, a reporter 
observed: “the most powerful town planning agency operating within NSW 
at the moment is the BLF”. When the next set of plans eliminated high-rise 
buildings in conformity with the “people’s plan”, the ban was lifted. By the 
1990s the Ministry for Planning was admitting that the green ban had 
resulted in the plans for the area being “an overwhelming success”, reflected 
in the millions of tourists who visit the historic site each year.
93
 
The union also worked with environmental organizations, as well as 
resident action groups, in defence of nature. Ancient trees in Sydney’s 
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Botanic Gardens were protected from being sacrificed to a parking lot for 
the Opera House. A large part of Centennial Park was saved from becoming 
a concrete sports stadium. The nature reserve of Riley’s Island off the coast 
just north of Sydney was rescued from 300 luxury home sites that would 
have destroyed much of its fish and bird-life. The beautiful Tomaree 
Peninsula further north averted high-rise development on its foreshore. And 
there were others.
94
 Not just concerned residents and environmental 
organizations, but the National Trust also turned to the NSWBLF to aid its 
efforts to save sites of architectural and cultural significance from 
replacement by high-rise office blocks and freeways. The union announced 
it would refuse to demolish any building designated significant by the 
National Trust.
95
 Many graceful old banks, churches, theatres, cinemas and 
other significant heritage buildings throughout Australia owe the fact that 
they are still standing to the green bans’ movement.96  
By 1975, more than forty green bans had stalled five billion dollars 
worth of development at mid-1970s prices.
97
 About half of these prevented 
the destruction of individual buildings or green areas; the other half 
thwarted development projects affecting much larger areas. Mundey 
maintains that the political significance of the green bans movement was 
that it forged a “winning alliance” between environmentalists and 
unionists.
98
 The bans had a significant long-term impact on environmental 
legislation, town planning and public attitudes. Because of the industrial 
power wielded by the BLs and the popularity of the green bans, 
governments were obliged to respond to the union’s challenge. At both state 
and federal levels, governments initiated or improved legislation to ensure 
more socially responsive and ecologically responsible planning and 
development.
99
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A social-movement union before new social movements 
Nobel Laureate Patrick White wrote a public letter to Sydney’s 
major newspapers in November 1973 to endorse the contentious green bans 
movement initiated by the NSWBLF: 
It is a sad reflection on our so-called civilization that 
residents of Sydney […] are forced time and again to turn to the 
BLF […] But how much longer can the citizens of Sydney ask 
these men to endure the responsibility of protecting a citizen’s 
right to live comfortably and without anxiety.
100
  
The scholarship on social-movement unionism depicts it as an aspect 
of labour movement renewal and revitalization, bringing social movement 
attributes to unionism’s way of conducting itself. Social-movement 
unionism in this literature is a turn-of-the-millennium trend, emerging after 
the heyday of the new social movements and in the circumstances of 
globalization: a moment as much as a movement. Yet the NSWBLF in the 
early 1970s meets all Moody’s criteria that distinguish social-movement 
unionism. Two decades ahead of the social-movement unionism 
phenomenon, its emergence suggests that the characteristics which define 
social-movement unionism are not necessarily dependent on the influence of 
the new social movements but can be generated from within the labour 
movement itself—from its own radical traditions. 
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The Greek trade union movement in controversy: against a 
state-centred approach to labour movement theory 
Anna Koumandaraki 
Introduction 
he Greek trade union movement is said to have so far exerted a rather 
limited influence on the status of the Greek workforce. There are two factors 
which are held responsible for this situation: the slow and inconsistent way 
that industrialization took place in the country and the authoritarian 
approaches of the Greek state to trade unions since they emerged.
1
 As an 
influential scholar of Greek trade unionism pointed out, the Greek trade 
union movement is more a simulacrum of an institution than an actual 
labour movement.
2
 The reason for this is that, from the very beginning, 
Greek politicians succeeded in manipulating the trade union cadres by 
promoting them to leadership positions in political alignment with the 
government. Most of these cadres had no relation whatsoever with the 
problems, attitudes and interests of working people, but owed their posts in 
the high echelons of the trade union hierarchy to their affiliation to the 
governing party leaders. This paper aims to question these well established 
arguments by putting emphasis on the circumstances under which the Greek 
labour movement formed itself and to decipher the reasons why this 
movement became a state-manipulated bureaucracy. 
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Thessaloniki: the emergence of a great industrial centre in the rural 
Balkans 
The first trade unions emerged in the late nineteenth century (1870) 
but their presence had a significant impact on the Greek government’s social 
policy only in the first decades of the twentieth century. More specifically, it 
was only in 1914 that the first laws regulating the activities of trade unions 
were enacted. The Liberal party, which was governing at that time, was the 
first party in power which showed concern for labour movement 
organization. In 1918, the same government set up the necessary conditions 
for the creation of the General Confederation of Greek Labour (GSEE). The 
Confederation, which until now is the supreme hierarchical institution of the 
Greek labour movement, very soon after 1918 found itself under the Liberal 
Party’s patronage. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the Greek 
trade union movement succumbed to governmental orders without frictions. 
Moreover, Greek trade union history is rather contentious because trade 
union agitation was combined with conflicts related to issues of national 
sovereignty and problematic assimilation of ethnic minorities. 
The reason why I put forward the issue of national homogeneity is 
that in the 1900s, when the first militant trade unions emerged, the Greek 
national territory did not include many areas which were important for the 
trade union movement. Macedonia and Thrace, for example, only became 
Greek after two bloody wars between Greece, its Northern neighbour 
Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Thessaloniki, the large Macedonian 
capital and a significant industrial centre in the era, became Greek only in 
1912.
3
 Thessaloniki was a multicultural and multi-ethnic city: Greeks, Jews, 
Turks Bulgarians, Armenians, Rom and many others had co-existed for 
centuries. If the city’s nationality were to be determined by that ethnic group 
which constituted the majority of the population, then it should be defined 
as a Jewish city and not a Greek one, since Jews and not Greeks were the 
majority. More importantly, Jews were significant for the city’s economy 
not only as capitalists, but also as workers manning the most developed 
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industries in the city. The latter abounded to such an extent, that one could 
very well argue that Thessaloniki had been the biggest industrial centre in 
the Ottoman World before 1912, and had a technological infrastructure 
much more robust than Athens in the years that followed the city’s 
acquisition by the Greek army. Under no circumstances, however, does this 
mean that Greeks did not play an important role in the city’s economy as 
workers. However, there were industries such as tobacco handling and 
processing in which Jews constituted the overwhelming majority.
4
 
It would not be wrong to say that the tobacco workers of 
Thessaloniki were a privileged group within the Macedonian working class, 
since their salaries were considerably higher than those earned by their peers 
in other Macedonian cities. Moreover, tobacco workers had a particularly 
positive identity of themselves which was exceptional compared to the 
Greek working class.
5
 This identity was combined with socialist ideology 
which was particularly influential amongst Jewish workers.  
The Jewish Federation 
In fact, the most prominent socialist organization both in Macedonia 
and later on in the entire Greek territory was the Federacion which was 
founded in 1909. It was not only controlled by tobacco workers, but also by 
the Jewish socialist intelligentsia, that is, a group consisting of distinguished 
figures committed to the promotion of Jewish workers’ solidarity. Greeks or 
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other ethnic groups did not participate in its ranks preferring to organize 
their own national organizations. It should be noted here, that before the 
Greek incorporation of Thessaloniki, the city’s population was divided into 
conflicting national organizations. Greeks, Bulgarians and Turks were 
seeking the acquisition of Macedonia by their respective nation states. Only 
the Jews did not have a nation state to fall back on. However, they thought 
of Thessaloniki as their own city. Thus, it is not surprising that the day after 
26 October 1912 when the Greek army entered the city, many Jews regarded 
this as an occupation of the city by foreigners.
6
 Although the leaders of the 
Federacion later played an active role in the Greek workers’ movement, and 
their capacity as the leaders of labour organization in the country was 
eventually acknowledged by the Greeks, in their early brochures, they 
combined working-class ideals with particular national hints. Abraham 
Benaroya, the most prominent Federacion leader, compared the working 
class of Thessaloniki to its counterparts in Athens and Piraeus, arguing 
favourably on behalf of his city peers: 
Those who are in charge of the centres and the unions in Athens 
are characterized by ambitions that are alien to the needs of the 
growing working masses. The labour centres of Thessaloniki 
constitute something of an exception. Fewer in number and 
more centralized, they emerged later and were more influenced 
by the mass expressions of socialist activities.
7
 
In other words, Benaroya presented the Federacion as an alternative 
model to the majority of Greek labour organizations. It was a militant and 
well-structured organization with a concise programme able to motivate the 
working masses. In fact the Federacion managed to represent Greek labour 
both in the first Conference of the Greek Labour Confederation and was the 
main organization in the establishment of the Greek Socialist Labour Party 
(SEKE) in 1918. They were also proposed by the Greek Prime Minister El. 
Venizelos to represent Greece in the 1918 European Socialist Conference in 
London.
8
 The Federacion however, was still imbued with distinctively anti-
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nationalist views, which could be easily considered by Greeks as anti-
Hellenic.
9
 In 1918, with new elections imminent, Venizelos, in an attempt to 
re-establish some connection with the community, deemed the socialist 
leader Benaroya a suitable intermediary. Venizelos did not really desire an 
autonomous organization of the working class, but realized that working-
class living standards were so poor, that the labour problem had to be dealt 
with somehow, especially at a time when socialism was gaining ground and 
had established considerable influence among working people. Venizelos 
intended to put an end to this, but, for the moment, he also needed the 
European socialists' good will to pursue his nationalist and military 
aspirations. Consequently, the Federacion succeeded in prevailing in Greek 
trade union politics and in taking positions on the Greek Turkish war of 
1919-1922 which were against the government irredentist strategy. Under 
Benaroya’s influence, the SEKE decided that the Balkan Socialist Parties 
should fight all imperialist claims of their national governments and 
declared that the only way to bring about the union of the Balkan peoples 
and lasting peace and understanding, was the creation of a Balkan 
Democratic Federation, “founded on genuine democratic principles, 
guaranteeing full and true political, ethnic and linguistic freedom, regardless 
of race and religion”.10 This proposal for a Balkan Democratic Federation, 
which was close to Benaroya's heart too, however moderately it was put 
forward by the party, indelibly marked the destiny of SEKE. Whilst the 
party became the principal pro-peace political organization in those years, 
during the strike wave of 1919 -1920 many socialists all over the country 
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were either imprisoned or deported to remote islands. Some of them were 
forcefully inducted into the army, where they attempted to disseminate 
socialist principles, and induced their fellow soldiers to take an active anti-
war stand. It was in the army that many Greek soldiers first heard about the 
Russian Revolution and became communists. Meanwhile, the situation at 
the front deteriorated rapidly for the Greek side. The government's decision 
to continue the war until the Greeks in Asia Minor had been freed from 
Turkish sway, led to the defeat of Greece and the influx of 1,200,000 
refugees into Greece. This was not without an impact on SEKE too. First of 
all, the ethnic composition of the country's Northern provinces changed 
radically: the flood of refugees made Greeks an overwhelming majority, 
especially since, at the same time, Muslims were forced to leave. The Jews 
lost much of their economic superiority and were confined to a few districts 
in Thessaloniki. Moreover, for the established landowners of Macedonia, 
the refugees' arrival meant the break-up of their estates, which the 
government distributed as part of a resettlement programme. The Greeks’ 
prevalence in Macedonia militated against the federalist principles SEKE 
was advocating. Furthermore, the soldiers returning from the war had in the 
meantime acquired a radicalism that challenged the SEKE leadership. The 
latter, a few months before the Asia Minor disaster (in the congress of 
February 1922), had decided in favour of the principle of ‘peaceful co-
existence’ with the bourgeois regime. For this very decision, they were 
attacked by the returning soldiers as political reformists, and expelled from 
the party ranks (Benaroya was amongst those expelled).  
The Greek Communist party position on Macedonia and its effects on left-
wing trade union identity 
In 1920 the SEKE changed its name to the Communist Party of 
Greece (KKE), and in 1924 it officially embraced the principles stipulated 
by the Communist International. The new party line on the national question 
was slightly different from that of its predecessor. In 1925, after the 
COMINTERN (under the insistence of Bulgarian communists) spoke up for 
an independent Macedonia, the KKE incorporated this goal into its own 
programme. The Comintern’s decision to support the national independence 
of Macedonia was connected with the favourable prospects of the Bulgarian 
communists igniting a socialist revolution in the Balkans. It demanded 
international recognition of the need for an independent Macedonian state, 
an attitude which implied the existence of a nationally homogeneous 
Macedonian population seeking autonomy.  
  
The Communists’ definition of nation referred to an historically 
formed community of people who are bound together by a common 
language, inhabit a common area, share an economic life and have a 
common national character expressed in a common culture. Every national 
group thus conceived, should, according to communist theorists, enjoy the 
right of “self determination”. In Lenin’s words, this right may be employed 
“up to the point of separation” of the national group from the state in which 
it lives. Lenin outlined a theory of nationality for the purpose of combating 
nationalism itself, aiming to direct the masses’ attention against the 
bourgeoisie.
11
 He argued that there are no nations more important than 
others. All nations are equal and may legitimately exercise the right of self-
determination. What he meant is that where “historical” nations have 
occupied the territory of other nations, the communist comrades should back 
the struggle of oppressed nations for self-determination up to the point of 
separation. In the context of Greece, the communists’ duty would be the 
fight for the emancipation of the Macedonian people and the subsequent 
separation of Macedonian land from Greece. On national issues, Lenin 
observed, workers and capitalists tend to form a united front against an alien 
national element in the state in which they live, or against a neighbouring 
nation which oppresses a kin minority. Instead of doing this, the proletariat, 
according to Lenin, should oppose its own bourgeoisie and sustain the right 
of national minorities within its own state to national independence.
12
 
In 1924 when the Greek Socialist Party was transformed into the 
Communist Party of Greece, Stalin, who had risen to the leading position in 
the Soviet Union and the Comintern, followed Lenin’s policy on national 
questions to its extremes. The Soviet government considered Macedonia to 
be the place where the socialist revolution in the Balkans could be 
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successful. Hence, they supported the plans of the Bulgarian nationalist 
organization EMEO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization –
VMRO in Bulgarian) for the emancipation from Greece of a separate 
Macedonian state identified with Bulgarian national interests. According to 
this line, the Greek communists should also fight for Macedonian national 
self-determination against the imperialistic Greek bourgeoisie. The Greek 
Communist leaders did not have the power to defend Greek national 
interests in the Comintern since the old socialist cadres who could defend 
them had lost the party leadership and the young cadres who replaced them 
were not realistic enough to confront the Comintern anti-Greek attitudes. 
However, later the Greek communist leaders changed their mind and did 
their best to influence the Comintern against the slogan of a Macedonian 
nation separate from Greece. Pandelis Pouliopoulos and Nicolaos 
Zachariadis, who was imposed as the leader of the Greek communist party 
by the Comintern, tried to persuade the leading international communist 
organization about the negative consequences of such position on the Greek 
Left.
13
  
This attitude was certainly more radical than the position of the 
SEKE, which had sought a Balkan Federation recognizing a variety of 
ethnic minorities living in Macedonia. Yet, as noted above, this more radical 
stance presumed that the Macedonian people were a separate nation seeking 
its independence and did not at all consider the ethnic diversity among these 
people. Thus, paradoxically, the position of the new party was ethnocentric 
even though it was advocating the rights of a nation fighting against Greek 
national interests. The new policy calling for an independent Macedonia 
implied a homogeneous Macedonian and Thracian majority population in 
these regions, Greek sovereignty notwithstanding. Whilst the SEKE 
programme had sought the autonomy of ethnic groups and the protection of 
their rights under the umbrella of a multinational federation, the new 
programme did not rule out the possibility of setting up a new sovereign 
nation-state. The KKE's acceptance of such a prospect constituted a 
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significant change from the ideology that the SEKE had supported, which 
might in all probability, signify a more general attempt of the party to 
become institutionally stronger. Another symptom of this was the creation 
of separate ‘red’ trade unions in 1927, after the communists had left the 
United General Confederation of Greek Labour (GSEE) and created their 
own union confederation.  
According to Kofos, the KKE position on Macedonia and Thrace 
reflects the party leadership’s ignorance of the true situation in Northern 
Greece.
14
 Agelos Elefantis argued that not only was that position mistaken 
and harmful to the party in the long run, but it also was a position that the 
Greek communists accepted with great reluctance, and only after they had 
been virtually ordered to do so by the Communist International. In addition, 
it occurred at a time when the party started dissenting from its socialist 
origins.
15
 With the KKE still under the influence of Benaroya and other 
socialists, the ‘long lawful existence’ of the party proclaimed in 1922 in the 
context of the bourgeois regime was dismissed in 1924 as reformist by the 
new communist leadership elected in the meantime. Furthermore, according 
to Elephantis, the elimination of the old socialist leadership deprived the 
Communist Party of experienced members whose political reformism was 
counterbalanced by the great appeal which they enjoyed amongst the 
working people.
16
 By contrast, the new leaders were more radical, and 
whilst committed to socialist principles, lacked the political skills to provide 
the KKE with substantial popular support. To George Mavrogordatos’ mind, 
the KKE's position on Macedonia deprived the party of the vote of the 
people who might otherwise have become its popular base.
17
 These were the 
refugees from Asia Minor, many of whom were frightened off by the party's 
position. Even though they had been the worst-hit victims of the Irredentist 
War, they held the conviction that it had been fought principally for their 
liberation. Resettling the majority of them in Macedonia and Thrace had 
                                               
14 Kofos has written that the failure of KKE to attract the masses through its slogan for a 
‘united and independent Macedonia and Thrace” should be mainly attributed to the fact 
that the people to whom this slogan was directed simply did not exist. According to the 
statistics of the League of Nations, the ethnic composition of Greek Macedonia in this 
period was: Greeks 1,341,000 (88%), Muslims 2.000 (0.1%), Bulgarians 77.000 (5.1 
%), Various 91000 (6.0%), Total Population: 1, 511, 000.  Kofos, E. Nationalism and 
Communism in Macedonia. Thessalonica: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1964, p.83. 
15 Elefantis, Ibid., p.54. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Mavrogordatos, G. The Stillborn Republic. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 
  
made it possible for the Greek government to claim that Greeks were the 
dominant ethnic group in the region. The communists' demand for an ethnic 
Macedonian state, apart from being anti-national, deliberately ignored the 
actual situation in Macedonia.  
The Class Identity of Native Macedonians and Refugees from Asia Minor  
As the KKE's inherited political affinities lay with the old inhabitants 
of Macedonia, the interest they took in the refugees was superficial. This 
was in keeping with the party's anti-nationalist, anti-war principles. Its 
stance in relation to the Macedonians can be seen as an attempt to protect 
the rights of ethnic minorities in the Balkans, which were endangered by 
efforts to divide the region into different nation states. During World War I 
and the Greek-Turkish war which followed, the SEKE was the leading 
campaigner for peace inside Greek borders. As Mavrogordatos quotes: 
The satisfactory settlement of the refugees, and in particular 
their access to real property, whether rural or urban, was thus 
conceived as the most effective strategy for making them 
immune to leftist agitation. Full ownership of one's house or 
agricultural land was supposed to firmly establish a 
fundamentally 'bourgeois' identity, taken in its broadest sense. 
Placed in this perspective, the settlement of the refugees and 
their establishment as property owners have been widely hailed 
as an achievement which left no ground for the Communist 
Party.
18
 
Although the Greek Communists were thought to abide by the orders 
of the Comintern on the issue of Macedonia, Slavo-Macedonians provided 
the ground for the Greek Communist party to develop an antinationalist and, 
to the eyes of the Greek government, anti-Hellenic strategy on the issue. 
Although since 1922 Macedonia had become ethnically Greek, one should 
not forget there was still a compact Slavo-Macedonian minority which had 
considerable linguistic and socioeconomic differences from the 
overwhelming Greek majority. These people had felt that their rights and 
interests in the region were seriously threatened due to the Greek 
government’s decision to settle Asia Minor refugees in the most productive 
arable lands of the Macedonian peninsula. In addition, Greek state, after 
1936 when the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas had been imposed, forbid 
                                               
18 Ibid., p.215. 
  
Slavophones to speak their own language in public and to organize festivals 
wherein their own language was cherished. In other words the Greek state 
treated the Slavophones as an ethnic minority within their own territory 
which potentially threatened Greek national sovereignty in the Northern 
provinces. The Slavophones’ difficult situation did not leave the Communist 
Party activists indifferent; they took for granted that the language of the 
particular minority identified with that of the native Macedonian population. 
In their line of thought, the refugees from Asia Minor were seen as the 
enemy who jeopardised the interests of the natives regarding the fertile 
Macedonian lands.
19
 
The conflict between the native people of Macedonia and refugees 
from Asia Minor had a class dimension: whilst the natives belonged to the 
peasantry and the working class, the refugees, thanks to the government’s 
decision to distribute lands to them, became small landowners who tried 
their best to avoid proletarianization. The ethnic diversification between the 
two groups was thus combined with a conflict of their class interests. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the avant-garde of the Greek working class 
were the tobacco workers who played the leading role in all mobilizations of 
the Greek labour movement in the interwar period. The combination of class 
agitation with ethnic differences bitterly divided the Greek trade union 
movement into those trade unions which were attached to the state and an 
unofficial fraction, which, due to its anti-national ideology, became 
inadmissible by the Government as an official representative of the Greek 
working people. Moreover, since the left-wing trade union movement was 
condemned by Greek law as a Communist party mechanism, it was not only 
considered to be a threat to national integrity, but was also expunged from 
official texts and governmental documents. The communist unions’ 
expulsion influenced the bibliography on Greek trade union movement: for 
                                               
19 As Iakovos Michailidis has argued, “the main cause of the conflict between Slavophones 
and Refugees which continued to be even more powerful in the next two decades was 
connected with solely financial issues and more specifically with the question of 
distribution of the lands which before their liberation by Greeks were propertied by 
Muslim landowners. The conflict between Slavophones and refugees over lands was, 
according to Michailidis “the superior social conflict in interwar Greek”. Michailidis I. 
“Slavophonoi kai Prosfiges: Politikes Sinistoses Mias Oikonomikis Diamaxis 
[Slavophones and Refugees: Political Aspects of a Financial Confrontation]” in 
Veremis, T. Tautotites sti Makedonia [Identities in Macedonia].Athens: Papazissis, 
1997, p.123. 
  
Anthonis Liakos, Theodoros Katsanevas and George Mavrogordatos,
20
 the 
trade unions which were worth mentioning were the unions which were 
affiliated to the political parties of the government and its parliamentary 
opposition. According to this line of argument, the trade unions which were 
affiliated to the Greek Communist Party lacked considerable influence on 
working people due to the option of the Communist party to support the 
separation of Macedonia from Greece, losing ground among working people 
who accused it of committing treason. Therefore, Communist Party 
influence in the working class was practically eliminated. Having said that 
however, scholars of the Greek trade union movement failed to see that the 
Communist Party programme was particularly appealing to those sections of 
the Greek working class who, for reasons related to the Greek government’s 
strategy against different ethnic groups, could not identify with the anti-
communist and pro-national policy that these governments advocated. 
Mouzelis, for instance, regarded confrontations as an insignificant 
parameter of the Greek social formation as a whole.
21
 Yet as Serapheim 
Seferiadis has shown, even in the countries of the semi-periphery like 
Greece, the labour movement was developed.
22
 As the author wrote, the 
uneven and slow pace of industrialization did not restrain Greek working 
people in regard to the creation of trade unions in the inter-war era. Perhaps 
these unions did not have the robust organizations that their counterparts 
had in the countries where industrialization was the focal point of economic 
growth, but even under the conditions of retarded industrial development, 
trade unions emerged. This happened, as Seferiadis explained, because 
working-class organizations are primarily political organizations which 
reflect the way that working people experience their class identity.
23
 The 
way that this identity is experienced varies amongst the different societies. 
                                               
20 Liakos, A. Ergasia ke Politiki stin Ellada tou Mesopolemou, [Employment and Politics in 
Inter-War Greece], Athens: Idrima Ergasias ke Pedias tis Emporikis Trapezas, 1993;  
Katsanevas, T. Trade unions in Greece, Athens: National Centre of Social Research, 
1984; Mavrogordatos, G. Metaxi Pitiokampti ke Procrusti: Hoi epaggelmatikes 
organoseis sti simerini Hellada, [Between Pitiokamptis and Procroustis: Professional 
Associations in Contemporary Greece] Athens: Odysseas, 1988. 
21 Mouzelis, N. P (1986) Politics in the Semi-Periphery, London: MacMillan, 1986. 
22 Seferiadis, S. Gia tin sygrotisi tis ergatikis taxis stin Ellada (1870-1936) [The 
Constitution of the Greek Working Class (1877 -1936)]. Elliniki Epitheorisi Politikis 
Epistimis, tefxos 6, n.11, pp. 9-78, 1995.  
23 Cited in Ibid., p.13. Seferiadis’ argument is informed by E.P. Thompson’s famous 
quotation: “Class is defined by men as they live their own history, and in the end, this is 
its only definition”. Thompson, E.P. The making of the English Working Class. London: 
Penguin, 1963, p.10. 
  
Hence, even in the semi-periphery there are particular productive sectors 
where the labour movement is particularly strong. This was the case of 
tobacco workers in Northern Greece.  
The tobacco workers’ role in the Greek labour movement 
Tobacco workers have been considered to be an exceptional case 
within the Greek working class. Authors like R. V. Burks and more 
recently, Mark Mazower, have emphasized tobacco workers’ differences 
from the rest of the working class. In Burks’ words: 
The tobacco workers’ union is among the oldest and most 
stoutly organized in Greece; in matters of seniority, the tobacco 
worker is among the best protected labourers in Greece. 
Furthermore, his work is counted as highly skilled and is among 
the best paid. The women, dressed in neatly pressed and brightly 
coloured cotton prints, are reputed to be the best-dressed among 
lower class Greek women. On pay day, fruit peddlers and other 
hawkers can be seen hovering near the doors of the warehouses, 
doing a brisk trade in oranges and other fruits, much too 
expensive for the purse of the average Greek worker.  
On the other hand, employment among tobacco workers is highly 
seasonal. Much depends on the state of the world market and its ability to 
absorb Greek (that is Turkish) tobacco. A tobacco manipulator may be 
employed only six months in the year. During unemployment he must fall 
back on a meagre government dole. He alternates between more than 
average prosperity and hungry impecuniousness.
24
 
And in Mazower’s words: 
Tobacco workers formed one of the most militant sections of the 
Greek labour force. Several factors lay behind the tobacco 
workers’ tradition of organized radicalism: the urban refugees’ 
lack of ties to the land, and the working environment itself, 
where several hundred employees worked alongside one another 
in one of those cavernous warehouses which still impress the 
visitor of Kavala or Xanthi. In a country where most of the 
work-force was slow to develop a sense of collective action, the 
                                               
24 Burks, R.V. The dynamics of Communism on Eastern Europe, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1962, pp.55-56. 
  
achievements of the Tobacco Federation of Greece were 
startling.
25
 
Arguing about the exceptional class consciousness and political 
participation of Macedonia’s tobacco workers, one should not forget that 
Macedonia and particularly Thessaloniki was, in the interwar era, a city of 
high agitation and confrontation on the part of the working class.
26
 The 
influence of the Communist Party, and furthermore that of the old socialist 
cadres, on Thessaloniki’s working-class activists was particularly strong.27 
Therefore one could argue that the trade union movement in the Northern 
Greek provinces did not follow the dominant model of a state manipulated 
trade union bureaucracy but instead, it expressed a militancy that questions 
the well- established argument of the Greek trade union movement’s 
weakness and docility towards the state. The existence of a strong left-wing 
trade union movement was also responsible for the anti-communist 
legislation that was enacted in Greece in 1929 (the Idionimon law). The law 
was enacted by the Venizelos’ government and clearly stipulated the 
imprisonment of those who “attempt to implement ideas obviously aimed at 
overthrowing the established social regime by the use of violence or by 
                                               
25 Mazower, M. Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991, p.126. 
26 See Daggas, A. O Chafies. [The Informer]  Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 1995, pp.69-106. 
Also Moskoph, Op.Cit. Indeed Moskoph has argued that the sad end (ten deaths and 
Metaxas’ imposition of dictatorship) of the 1936 tobacco workers' strike demonstrations 
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the largest party organization at that time.  According to Moskoph's own figures 
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democrats and hard liners, reduced the membership to 600.  The most serious decline in 
the strength of the KKE in Thessaloniki was in 1933, when the party lost 30 per cent of 
its members in the city but, according to Moskoph, increased its membership by 500 per 
cent in the province of Macedonia! (See Moskoph, Ibid., p.459) cited also in 
Koumandaraki, A. Identity in the Semi-Periphery: The case of the Greek Trade Union 
Movement. PhD thesis. University of Essex, 1996, pp. 16-17. 
27
 Popular support for the KKE remained steady in Thessalonica and much above the 
national level during all of the inter-war period. Whilst the party polled only 4.3 per 
cent in the national elections in 1932 and 1933, the Thessaloniki vote remained a steady 
20 per cent throughout.  Of the Jewish vote, with a quarter of the city's total, 15 per 
cent, went to the KKE. Moskoph, K. Op.Cit. pp. 456-457. 
  
detaching the [national] territory”, It is not surprising that Idionimon also 
prohibited ideas aimed at the overthrow of the social system and the 
prosecution of suggestions favourable to local autonomy, which obviously 
referred to left wing party positions on an independent Macedonia and 
Thrace. Thus the government under the pretext of vexed national interest by 
KKE cadres took measures aiming to penalize autonomous trade unions. 
According to official statistics for the years 1929-1937, more than 60 per 
cent of the people condemned for crimes against state security or for 
infringements of Idionimon, belonged to the working class. In the same 
period, 96.4 per cent of the people prosecuted for having threatened national 
security, were penalized on the grounds of Idionimon, and only 3.6 per cent 
on the grounds of other laws.
28
 After the imposition of Metaxas’ 
dictatorship, Idionimon was replaced by even harsher legislation, where the 
penalization of communist ideology was mainly based on its alleged anti-
patriotic attitude. The militant trade unions were certainly prosecuted on the 
grounds of anti-communists’ protection of the national integrity of Greece. 
More important, the economic policy that was implemented in the inter-war 
years tried to diminish the number of working people who belonged to the 
working class and to promote instead the affluence of the small enterprise 
managers who owned very small and family-run units with very few 
employees.
29
 This situation was certainly against the empowerment and the 
unity of the labour movement. Therefore, the weak trade union movement 
which was seen as the main characteristic of Greek workers’ movement did 
not emerge “naturally” through inconsistent and limited industrialization 
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Seferiadis has shown, many of these entrepreneurs suffered from equal degree of 
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was an explosive phenomenon all over the country, (Seferiadis, Op.Cit., pp. 9-78). 
  
only; it was also the outcome of a programmed state strategy against trade 
union agitation.
30
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this article was to find out whether a strong labour 
movement was feasible in Greece. As certain scholars of the Greek labour 
movement have argued, Greek trade unions from the very beginning of their 
organization became politically dependent on the Greek state and 
consequently lost their opportunity to express themselves in a subversive 
way. The article attempted to figure out the reasons why the trade unions’ 
manipulation by the governing political parties occurred, and to prove that 
this is to a great extent due to the Greek Communist Party’s position for an 
independent Macedonia and Thrace. In other words, the main argument is 
that those unions that followed a strategy against the Greek government’s 
policy on labour, soon found themselves involved in a struggle committed 
to minority rights. Consequently, given the Greek state’s pro-nationalist 
profile, they were persecuted as dangerous to their country’s national 
sovereignty. Last but not least, I would like to argue that the study of the 
history of the Greek trade union movement needs a more detailed, thorough 
and systematic approach, in which the detailed research of particular sectors 
and historical moments is emphasized. In my view, only in this way will we 
be able to know the extent to which working people were affected and 
mobilised by left-wing political agitation and were able to overcome  their 
political passivity, which I hope is made clear in this work.  
                                               
30 Koumandaraki, A. Op. Cit. pp. 138-141. 
  
Abstracts 
The Party as Vanguard: The Role of the Russian Social Democratic 
Party in Strikes in St. Petersburg, 1912–14 
Alice K. Pate 
From 1912–1914, Russian Social Democrats agreed that the expanding 
strike movement had to be controlled by the Party. Radicalization of the 
workers’ movement brought on by the stresses of modernization created a 
more mature movement in these years. After decades of illegal organization, 
followed by legal organization under a new law permitting the existence of 
“societies,” the trade union movement in Russia began to flower. The 
violent repression of striking workers at Lena Gold Fields led to an increase 
in the frequency of strikes and contributed to further radicalization of the 
workers in the years before 1914.  Historians have contended that the more 
radical Bolshevik faction of the party won support from the radicalized 
workers while moderate Mensheviks condemned strike activity, favoring 
trade unionism and revisionism. Research of activities in St. Petersburg does 
not support this interpretation. This paper will argue that Russian Social 
Democrats in both the Menshevik and Bolshevik factions who were active 
in St. Petersburg organizations retained the theoretical position that the 
Party was the vanguard of the revolution. 
 
The Prerevolutionary Strike Movement in Russia, 1912-1916 
Kevin Murphy 
The prerevolutionary strike movement in Russia from 1912-1916 was one 
of the most spectacular in world labour history. Because labour historians 
have tended to focus their attention on the revolutionary years of 1905 and 
1917, the strike wave before 1917 remains largely ignored. In terms of the 
number of participants and political demands, however, the prolonged 
movement was unprecedented. Examining strikes at the factory level, this 
essay argues that revolutionaries, particularly the Bolsheviks, acted as 
catalysts for the movement. The presence or absence of revolutionary 
  
agitators, even at the shop level, determined whether workers participated in 
the strike actions.   
 
 
Workers’ Strikes in the Paris Region in 1968: Continuities and 
Discontinuities  
Michael Seidman 
Many analysts have regarded the workers’ strikes in the Paris region as the 
apex of the workers’ movement in Western Europe during the 1960s. In 
terms of numbers of strikers and media coverage, the work stoppages were 
undoubtedly the most spectacular of the decade. However, the 1968 Paris-
area strikes did not break with the established patterns of stoppages in 
twentieth-century France. As during the Popular Front of the late 1930s, the 
momentary weakness of the state—which the student movement provoked 
in 1968 (not electoral politics as in 1936)—helped to launch the wave. The 
overwhelming majority of strikes were not “wildcats” (grèves sauvages) 
since the unions played a major role in both their initiation and termination.  
The great mass of strikers showed much less interest in autogestion than in 
material demands. The gains from this strike wave especially benefited the 
lowest-paid workers—youth, women, and immigrants—who received 
significantly higher pay and fewer working hours. Consumerism played a 
paradoxical role in both fomenting worker demands and acting as a socially 
cohesive force which induced them to return to work, but a powerful state—
following the counterrevolutionary Republican tradition—supplemented 
consumerism by defending property and the “right to work.” 
 
The Significance of the Mass Strike during the German Revolution of 
1918-1919 
William A. Pelz 
In the early years of the twentieth century long before World War I, German 
labor fiercely debated the use of strikes, particularly the mass strike, as a 
weapon in the class struggle.  Most famous is the radical position articulated 
by Rosa Luxemburg in The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade 
Unions (1906).  In the furnace of the First World War, the question of the 
strike as an anti-war, if not insurrectionary, weapon took on added urgency.  
Various anti-war and radical groups had different approaches, ranging on 
  
the left from that advocated by the Revolutionary Shop Stewards to the 
ideas of Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht within the Spartakusbund.  The 
role of the strike within the unfolding German Revolution of 1918-19 will 
be examined with an eye to evaluating both its potential and limitations as a 
revolutionary tactic. 
 
When the Cactus Blooms: A Century of Strikes in Mexico 
Richard Roman and Edur Velasco 
There has been an underestimation of strikes in Mexico in several recent 
important studies due to serious methodogical flaws. As well there has been 
a tendency to a one-sided view of the role of the state in the determination 
of strikes. The exclusive emphasis by many scholars on the state’s 
determination of strikes in Mexico neglects the activity of workers 
themselves and the influence of economic cycles and international events on 
the development of strikes and strike waves. By measuring workers’ 
protests in a more complete manner, we demonstrate the serious 
inadequacies in many existing studies. By conceptualizing the roots of 
workers’ protests in a more holistic manner, we seek to provide alternate 
interpretations. The first part of the paper focuses on these issues of 
measurement and interpretation. The middle sections look at the historical 
development of strikes over a long time frame. And, in the last part, we 
examine the new strategies of capital and the state to prevent strikes in 
Mexico’s new period of continental economic integration. It also raises the 
prospects for the renewal of workers’ struggles given Mexico’s popular 
traditions of solidarity and the relentless character of the neoliberal assault 
on workers’ rights, dignity, and well-being. 
 
Pre-empting New Social Movements, Pioneering Social-Movement 
Unionism: Australian Builders Labourers in the 1970s 
Verity Burgmann and Meredith Burgmann 
Kim Moody’s Workers in a Lean World (1997) identifies five 
characteristics of social-movement unionism: militancy; ultra-democratic 
forms of organization; an agenda for radical social and economic change; a 
determination to embrace the diversity of the working class to overcome 
fragmentation; and a capacity to lead community struggles. The use of the 
term ‘social-movement unionism’ to describe this phenomenon that arose 
  
during the 1990s in response to the challenges posed to labour movements 
by globalization implies its impressive attributes owed much to the 
influence of the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. However, in 
the early 1970s, the New South Wales branch of the Australian Builders 
Labourers’ Federation (NSWBLF) pioneered a form of unionism that meets 
all the criteria in Moody’s typology. The NSWBLF created this inspiring 
form of unionism out of the best of traditional labour movement values and 
practices, encouraged by the New Left in the late 1960s rather than new 
social movement influences, and well in advance of the development of 
‘social-movement unionism’ from the 1990s onwards. 
 
The Greek trade union movement in controversy: against a state-
centred approach to labour movement theory 
Anna Koumandaraki 
This article focuses on the most significant arguments regarding the lack of 
political autonomy among Greek trade unions since their emergence in the 
early twentieth century. The arguments that are underlined here are those 
about trade unions’ weakness in motivating working people and organizing 
a massive labour movement. Until now there has been a state centred 
approach to union studies which underlines the Greek government’s 
admittedly successful strategies to manipulate trade unions. The ‘state-
centred’ analyses have certainly failed to see the movement's fragmentation 
into two sections: one legal and one illegitimate. More specifically, they 
have failed to see that labour legislation was combined with laws that 
restricted political freedom to only those unions which had been subordinate 
to the state and therefore that it created a group of unions that, once declared 
illegal, could no longer constitute part of the movement's official 
representation. In contrast to the state-centred approach, my society-centred 
approach shifts the focus of analysis from the official and legitimate trade 
union movement to those organizations that suffered governmental 
restraints, operating without legal protection. The article argues that the fact 
that the avant-garde of this section was in the hands of non-Greek nationals 
made the confrontation of these unions with the Greek state a critical event 
in the movement's history. In other words, the fact that the autonomous 
trade union movement was not identified with the nationalist ideology 
embraced by the Greek state led to the imposition of legal measures against 
it. 
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